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PHILOSOPHY ACROSS THE CURRICULUM:
DEMOCRATIC NIETZSCHE'S PHILOSOPHICAL PEDAGOGY AND
CONTEMPORARY RADICAL DEMOCRATIC EDUCATIONAL REFORM

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This thesis ☐ is
☒ is not to be regarded as confidential

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3/96
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This work has been a labor of love, hate, death and birth. I have walked away, run away, and crashed and burned from it more than once. It is less that I am goal-oriented than that my will to complete the Nietzschean dare had life of its own. As Nietzsche would want it, the writing of this dissertation has been my overcoming. I lost much, I gained even more. There is an extra depth of feeling and laughter that I share with those who knew me before and since. There are no adequate words of thanks for your support, belief, and encouragement/opportunity to allow me to "see myself through your eyes" all these years. It is not that I will prize my new friends any less; I am just aware that for you it is proven that I never had to be anything other than I was. You know who you are and you know that I am grateful.

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ABSTRACT

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A democratic pedagogy that is informed by Friedrich Nietzsche's writings and reinforced and supplemented by contemporary radical democratic educational reformers (Paulo Freire, Ivan Illich, Jonathan Kozol, and Neil Postman) is defined and elaborated. First, the conventional image of Nietzsche as an anti-democrat is explored so as to leave the way open for a democratic Nietzsche. Second, a democratic Nietzschean pedagogy based on the categories of individualization, generativity, literacy, and health is described. This pedagogy culminates in *amor fati* as the norm of individualized education. Third, the democratic Nietzschean perspective is used to guide the reading of the democratic reformers so that their observations on current schooling/educational practices and their possible transformation reinforce and supplement the democratic Nietzschean perspective through adding a political, and a technological, and an augmented social dimension. Freire, Illich, Kozol, Postman, and Nietzsche are shown to comprise what Michel Foucault calls a "discursive formation" -- sharing a common grid of concerns and defensive/offensive arts.

References preceded by # refer to aphorism numbers.

INTRODUCTION

This (introduction) (advanced organizer) (guide) is the first text the reader will find if they approach this work in a linear fashion, although these are the last words of the project for the author (at least in this version of the work): A sense of completion for me, a welcoming to you. I assert this to unmask "the fact that it is the ending that *retroactively* confers the consistency of an organic whole on the preceding events. [Unmask] the radical contingency of the enchainment of narration, the fact that, at every point, things might have turned out otherwise."¹ As Foucault has stated, "I never know at the beginning of a project what I'll think at its conclusion. Thus it is difficult to indicate clearly what the method is which I employ."²

This beginning is my conclusion. What follows is not a written empirical wandering. Yet on the whole this is no modern project/scholarship of thesis-development-refutation. There is even less of doubling commentary (as if I could tell you what Nietzsche or any one else really meant). This project has been a process whereby I have generated my (present) lived assents in a world where simple answers have been criticized. I have taken the life wisdom generated from this process and organized it so that it is communicable. Its telling is a living even if not the living of the tale.

¹Slavoj Zizek, *Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan through Popular Culture* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), 69.

²Michel Foucault, *Remarks on Marx*, trans. R. James Goldstein and James Cascaito (New York: Semiotext(e), 1991), 28.

In form and intent, this dissertation veers from "traditional" theses.³ There is no literature review per se⁴ (the whole work is a literature-review) and no implications for further study explicitly stated. Rather, I (re)present the inductively generated ideas that emerged from my reading, thinking, and assimilating (English translations of) Friedrich Nietzsche's ideas. Replication of the work might not be possible even if someone else took the years to work on this corpus of texts, did a thorough document/content analysis, and wrote up their results. This text is a written expression of my overcoming and an expression of my encounter with the limits/possibilities of my existence. How could another individual possibly duplicate that?

What follows is the explication of a democratic philosophical pedagogy that is informed by Friedrich Nietzsche and filled out by contemporary radical educational reformers. The Nietzschean component is oriented toward education as a life process, whereas the reform component is more narrowly focused on schooling. However, there is no

³I direct the reader to Nimrod Aloni's 1987 dissertation from Columbia University as one example of a work similar in form to this one. Nimrod Aloni, "Overman and the Overcoming of Nihilism: Nietzsche as Educator" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1987).

⁴For a thorough literature review on Nietzsche and education, see Ann Margaret Sharp, "The Teacher as Liberator: An Analysis of the Philosophy of Education of Friedrich Nietzsche" (Ph.D. diss., University of Massachusetts, 1973), 12-30. Since Sharp's work the following studies of Nietzsche on education have appeared. None of them is oriented toward a democratic Nietzschean pedagogy and none of them bring together all of Nietzsche's observations on education through the body of his work. John Thomas English, "Nietzsche's Concept of Ressentiment: An Application to Higher Education" (Ph.D. diss., University of Oregon, 1973). James Vincent Burke, "Nietzsche's Answer to Schopenhauer's Pessimism: A Study of its Educational Significance" (Ph.D. diss., Rutgers University, 1976). Lorraine Hazel Wolf, "Nietzsche and Transpersonal Education" (Ph.D. diss., University of Kansas, 1982). Nimrod Aloni, "Overman and the Overcoming of Nihilism: Nietzsche as Educator" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1987). Gary Robert Lemco, "Nietzsche as Educator" (Ph.D. diss., Georgia State University, 1987). Leslie Paul Thiele, "The Politics of the Soul: Heroic Individualism in the Thought of Friedrich Nietzsche" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1989). Donald Fleming, "Schopenhauer as Nietzsche's Educator" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1990). Thomas Wolfgang Heilke, "Friedrich Nietzsche's Political Education: The Foundation for an Aesthetic State" (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1990). Michael G. Bend, "Nietzsche's Critique of the Liberals' Education to Control the Love of Domination" (Ph.D. diss., University of Delaware, 1991).

sharp distinction between the two elements, as will be evidenced in the many references to Nietzsche in the section on reform.

In *Experience and Nature*, John Dewey differentiates between philosophy and metaphysics.⁵ In these times when "philosophy is dead" and theory reigns, I recur to Dewey's distinction with a twist. Understanding overdetermination, there is no one reality, philosophy has no self-evident definition. There are only philosophies, wisdoms, there is no Philosophy, no Truth. (Each philosopher has always defined what philosophy has meant for them.) Even so, I am writing about something that words refer to (I live therefore I am) and am not merely writing about words. philosophy⁶ is alive and well as I use it; I learned philosophy as "martial arts of the mind,"⁷ not as any one systematization or way. It is not that important to me that a firm distinction be made between philosophy and theory. I find myself using the term philosophy because I am not willing to leave behind the entire history of western philosophy just because its foundations have been shown to be cracked or nonexistent. For me, "to do philosophy" is to undertake a "reflective review;"⁸ it is an active loving stance toward my (thinking) life.

What is left as a viable method for me in this postmodernized mediascape is hermeneutics. In Vattimo's words, the term "hermeneutic ontology" "is better suited to indicate not only a technical discipline related to the exegesis and interpretation of texts, but a specific philosophical

⁵John Dewey, "Experience and Nature," in *John Dewey: The Later Works, 1925-1953, Volume 1*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale, Ill: Southern Illinois University Press, 1988), 50.

⁶Understanding Derrida's insight that capitalization privileges, philosophy will remain in lower case throughout this text.

⁷Michael A. Weinstein, Class Notes, 1985-1994.

⁸Michael A. Weinstein, *Finite Perfection: Reflections on Virtue* (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1985), 57.

orientation."⁹ Nietzsche teaches that there are no facts, only interpretations.¹⁰ There is no epistemic standard, no reserve medium that I can direct your attention to or appeal to to justify this work. "Inner experience itself is authority."¹¹ For me this is not problematic; my interest is not in the "laws of reality" but in living well. The goal is to participate in the life world, not to live/find the Truth. I am not living for but living through. My hermeneutics is one of rapprochement.

The writing strategy most often employed in this work is what I call patchwording. The authors may be "dead" but I still (when possible) let them speak for themselves. Patchwording is a writing strategy that operates within contemporary (postmodernist) assumptions about culture. The patches are quotes from texts that are seamed together with thematic threads and are thickened with the baffling of brief commentary. The quilt may be composed of patches from a single text or multiple texts and may display any possible relation between different writings: consonance, opposition, subversion, consummation, to name a few.

Patchwording is a (postmodernist) writing strategy in which the patches -- the semantic units -- are appropriated quotations: an open acknowledgment and embrace of intertextuality, an acceptance and affirmation that cultural work at the present time should be in great part winnowing a hypertrophied culture and criticizing and recombining its elements to bring out often unsuspected harmonies and clashes. The

⁹Gianni Vattimo, "Nietzsche and contemporary hermeneutics," in *Nietzsche as Affirmative Thinker*, ed. Y. Yovel (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1986), 58.

¹⁰Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage, 1967), #481. Also, see, Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, #604; Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, in *On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1969), 129.

¹¹Georges Bataille, *Inner Experience*, trans. Leslie A. Boldt (New York: State University of New York Press, 1988), 8.

patchword construction gains its autonomy as a writing from its thematic framing and seaming, its baffling commentary and, most importantly, from the relations generated among the quotations. An analogy can be made to Claude Levi-Strauss's "bricolage"¹² and more generally to contemporary art forms such as appropriated collage and sampling. There is not much new in this strategy, however: patchwork quilts have been around for (at least) centuries.

In addition to patchwording, this written discourse as a whole is a postmodern text in several important ways.¹³ Firstly, the text is designed to have a decentered organization. Each chapter is written in a different genre. For example, the first chapter is a conventional commentary, written impersonally and culminating in criticism of alternative perspectives. In contrast, the second chapter is a patchworded essay of poetic scholarship in which the beauty of Nietzsche's mode of expression is brought out. The third chapter combines some of the approaches in the first and second chapters, but it is written as a supplement. The coda is a personal reflection in the form of an interview.

The fact that the text is decentered in terms of genre does not mean that it lacks thematic coherence or scholarly precision. With regard to the latter, each part is written according to standards of scholarly accuracy at a level of generalization fitting the genre at hand. With regard to the former, the attempt to define, clarify, and enhance a Nietzschean pedagogy is always present as an organizing project.

¹²Claude Levi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind*, trans. George Weidenfeld and Nicolson Ltd. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), 16-22. See, also, Deena Weinstein and Michael A. Weinstein, *Postmodern(ized) Simmel* (London: Routledge, 1993), 62-70.

¹³See Sharon Crowley, *A Teacher's Introduction to Deconstruction* (Urbana, Ill: National Council of Teachers of English, 1989) for a concise explanation of (postmodern) (deconstructive) reading/writing techniques.

The text is also postmodern in the way that it builds or snowballs. In particular, Chapter Three, which is a supplementary enhancement of Nietzsche's democratic philosophical pedagogy by contemporary radical reformers, depends on the matrix of categories created in Chapter Two. That is, Chapter Three should be read with Chapter Two in mind as its background and reference. Also, Chapter Three snowballs in that it begins as a reflection on Nietzsche-Paulo Freire, then moves to a reflection on Nietzsche-Ivan Illich that includes Freire, and so on through Neil Postman and Jonathan Kozol. The order in which the reformers are placed was selected with the enhancement that each could provide the others in mind.

Snowballing is a hermeneutic of successive enhancement. It builds to a culmination, allowing the conclusions to emerge, rather than announcing them in advance. The choice to use snowballing came after rejecting the more familiar strategy of themes and comparisons as the leading approach. There is much comparison and contrast among themes in Chapter Three, but it is done within the context of the various reformers and Nietzsche informing one another. This choice permits a more dialogic text than could have been achieved otherwise.

Some words should also be said about graphological marks. There is one use of "erasure" (the crossing out of a word - here ~~disestablishing schools~~), which is done in order to hold the term under suspicion while still allowing its use. Much more frequent is the use of successive parenthetical remarks to (show) (state) (indicate) that none of the terms are privileged. The slash mark operates in this work/text, to express unity, separation, or both. Capitalization and decapitalization (for example, Aristocratic and democratic; Political and political; Philosophy and philosophy, a distinction

made earlier in this introduction) are exercised to highlight the differences between the perspectives in question. In many sentences there are pairs or series of phrases or words within quotation marks. There are paragraphs containing several short quotations from one source which have only one footnote reference at the end of the paragraph.¹⁴ This style is employed as a consequence of patchwording.

Although I have incorporated postmodern maneuvers into this text, it is not a work of postmodernism, but an enhancement of a modern notion of individualization with postmodern sensitivity to writing, genre, and the linguistic construction of self.

I have learned philosophy as invitation right from the start. I offer this work with the graciousness of a dinner hostess. The smorgasbord is limited however by the realization that we are animals with finite potentials. Chapter One, like bitter herbs, is meant to clean your palate. What I have called the Aristocratic (and anti-democratic) Nietzsche is hard (if not impossible) to assimilate/digest. Without using pejorative terms or a psychoanalytic critique, I am not sure how to interpret these Nietzschean views. I can easily forgive him for all his weaknesses and waywardness on his own terms -- he saw life experimentally, not as something that is consistent or that can be made consistent. Or at least this is what he wrote in what I have claimed is his democratic phase. So read Chapter One to learn what I have left behind, and to get a sample of the multiplicity of Nietzsche the writer. The section on Nietzsche as anti-democratic statist is

¹⁴Using only one footnote for several citations or short quotations in a paragraph is within the guidelines stated in *The Chicago Manual of Style*, 14th ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), 15.17-15.18.

presented for assimilation. The others are to pass through, or to stand against.

Chapter Two is "my" Nietzsche. It is open for discussion whether assimilating these views has made me "who I am" or whether I was attracted to these ideas because of "who I was." In singer-songwriter Carrie Newcomer's appropriation of Rilke, the question becomes "am I the bird or the wing?" Her answer "yes" echoes mine. Chapter Two is a bricolage from all the English translations of Friedrich Nietzsche's written works; I love-pirated¹⁵ (selectively and reflectively appropriated) what enlightened my lived-assents. "How I live" is the texture of this discourse. As Aloni has stated, "consistency to Nietzsche's philosophy requires us to regard achievements in interpreting his works not merely in terms of learnedness, but primarily in terms of the ability to appropriate Nietzsche's themes and styles."¹⁶

In Chapter Three I turn my attention to the discourse of radical democratic educational reform that erupted in the 1960s and has continued since then. Here, too, I offer writings that have informed my teaching and life practice. Paulo Freire, Ivan Illich, Neil Postman, and Jonathan Kozol all have attempted to present democratic (in a broadly Nietzschean sense) criticisms and reforms of education. I describe the discursive formation that they share and show that it converges in many respects with Nietzsche's discourse and also supplements it. What is most important here is the notion of supplementation. Chapter Three is not meant to be a free-standing discussion of contemporary radical reformers, but a

¹⁵A term love-pirated from Michael A. Weinstein, Class Notes.

¹⁶Nimrod Aloni, "The three pedagogical dimensions of Nietzsche's philosophy," *Educational Theory* 39, no. 4 (1989): 306.

rapprochement of these writers and democratic Nietzsche. The result is a critical integration of Nietzsche into reform discourse.

I will save my final words about philosophy across the curriculum for a coda. The entire work builds up to them, though they are not necessary. philosophy across the curriculum is the rarely mentioned concept that informs everything that is written here. At this point I wish to make it clear that I define curriculum to include the various practices of life, all of which involve learning and all of which can be infused with what I will develop as philosophy. This includes, but is not restricted to, the use of curriculum in its traditional sense of the courses or disciplines that characterize systems of education.

CHAPTER 1 - ARISTOCRATIC NIETZSCHE

Any attempt to use Nietzsche as a tool for exploring education and perhaps informing radical democratic educational reform must deal with claims that Nietzsche is an anti-democrat. He articulated anti-democratic perspectives throughout his works. A diachronic reading of Nietzsche yields the various anti-democratic perspectives that he deployed. Early Nietzsche called for an anti-democratic romantic submission to genius, sometimes for the sake of culture, sometimes for humanity in its highest exemplars. Later, Nietzsche had a more aggressive anti-democratic view of castes and systems of disciplinization. Some of his anti-democratic perspectives remain throughout his works.¹

Early Nietzsche: The Genius

When Nietzsche was lecturing in Basel he believed in geniuses. How else could he account for his own success? "The young man of hardly twenty-five *was* appointed Professor without even a doctorate to his name."² His anti-democratic perspective that sacrifice is a spontaneous law of life can be seen as justification for his early success. This young Nietzsche, via the persona of the philosopher-master teacher, taught "the

¹Those anti-democratic sentiments in Nietzsche that are based on what seem to be prejudices against particular groups, such as the Germans, the Jews, and women, will not be considered within the main text. It is not clear that these are prejudices; they could be Nietzschean provocations to awaken the spirit of his times.

²Erich Heller, *The Importance of Nietzsche* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988), 57.

most sacred hierarchy in the kingdom of the intellect -- the servitude of the masses, their submissive obedience, their instinct of loyalty to the rule of genius."³ When he spoke those words he believed in himself and in the world. The young Nietzsche believed in history.

Nietzsche's belief in history during his early period was based on an optimistic doctrine that human beings have "real needs" that can be fulfilled within historical development. At times Nietzsche's belief in history's redemptive possibilities took on a democratic (albeit romantic) cast, as in the conclusion of "On the uses and disadvantages of history for life" when he calls for "each one of us" to "organize the chaos within him by thinking back to his real needs."⁴ However Nietzsche also gave an anti-democratic turn to his interpretation of history.

Nietzsche's anti-democratic sentiments come to the fore when he is engaging those who try to deny the transcendent character of life; i.e., those who do not believe in the importance of individual excellence. In "On the uses and disadvantages of history for life" his prime antagonist is Edward Hartmann, a German pessimist (perhaps the most complete pessimist in the 19th century).⁵ Against Hartmann's gospel of negation, which led to a fundamental equality of individuals with regard to the "world process," Nietzsche counterposes an aristocratic conception of history.

Nietzsche will have nothing to do with any kind of metaphysical interpretation of history, including humanism. There is no system of

³Friedrich Nietzsche, "On the future of our educational institutions," in *The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche*, ed. Oscar E. Levy, trans. J.M. Kennedy (Edinburgh: T.N. Foulis, 1910), 74.

⁴Friedrich Nietzsche, "On the uses and disadvantages of history for life," in *Untimely Meditations*, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 123.

⁵Nietzsche, "On the uses and disadvantages of history for life," 108-116.

history for the anti-democratic Nietzsche in two senses. There is no unfolding of a world process nor is there a master record. Unlike for Hegel, Nietzsche sees no progressive development in history. Some may cross a "bridge" but it is across, not to or from "becoming." There is no story, no narrative, but there are those who speak, who "call" across time. This is a "presence," when what has been (history) lives. But it is only the "giants" of "genius" who speak across time. There is only a cycle of genius informing genius. What comes between geniuses and what provides the material conditions for them to appear become merely means for the production of genius. And that is the way an Aristocratic⁶ Nietzsche would think it should be. The great bulk of humanity serves for him only a supportive function. Most provide no significance to life but are "excited chattering dwarfs who creep about beneath" the geniuses. Although there is no "history of man" there is a "goal of humanity."⁷

We need not take this to be a contradiction. Nietzsche is not saying in any specific way what the end of a process of history might be. Instead it is each genius who defines through her own activity what human existence means in its realization of value. It is in the above sense that Nietzsche writes of the "task of history" being the mediator between geniuses, to offer the possibilities for the "production of the great men": "the goal of humanity cannot lie in its end but only in its highest exemplars."⁸

Nietzsche's understanding that the goal of humanity is not some end produced by an autonomous process of history but instead is embodied

⁶In a Derridian spirit Aristocratic will be presented in upper case to remind the reader of its privileging.

⁷Nietzsche, "On the uses and disadvantages of history for life," 111.

⁸Nietzsche, "On the uses and disadvantages of history for life," 111.

within exemplary individuals leads him to profoundly anti-democratic views of education. One of the most extreme anti-democratic doctrines to be found in Nietzsche's early work is the idea that the many are sacrifices for the few.

Nietzsche inserts the notion of sacrifice within the dialogical text, "On the future of our educational institutions."⁹ This work, a written account of five of Nietzsche's philological teaching seminars, is unlike any other of Nietzsche's written offerings. The five lectures, a story told mostly via dialogue, "read like a *novella* by Herman Hesse."¹⁰ This is in stark contrast to Nietzsche's other styles -- poetry, aphorisms, prose meditations -- where the insights stand in clear sight, often self contained.¹¹ Maybe this is the result of a spoken presentation but a more fruitful suggestion would be that this text -- the only one in which Nietzsche addresses the major problems of educational theory head on -- mirrors in its very structure the process of education as dialogue.¹²

The dialogical form of "On the future of our educational institutions" permits Nietzsche to add nuances to his general anti-democratic stance. In a discussion between a philosopher and a "scolded pupil," Nietzsche emphasizes the rarity of excellence at the same time that

⁹Nietzsche, "On the future of our educational institutions." Originally delivered in Basel, 1872.

¹⁰David E. Cooper, "On reading Nietzsche on education," *Journal of Philosophy of Education* 17, no. 1 (1983): 120.

¹¹Although his discussion centers on Zarathustra, I make the same claim about authorship here as Henry Staten does in his 1990 *Nietzsche's Voice* [Henry Staten, *Nietzsche's Voice*, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1990)]. Staten takes issue with Gadamer for taking for "granted that there is a fixed entity called 'Nietzsche' who could or could not be 'simply' identified with Zarathustra" [Staten, *Nietzsche's Voice*, 4]. I, like Staten, would rather call "into play in relation to all of Nietzsche's texts all the resources of reading available to us, both of 'philosophical' reading and of 'literary' reading" [Staten, *Nietzsche's Voice*, 4]. As such, I make no attempt to differentiate among the characters in the lectures to determine which one espouses the "authentic" Nietzsche's wisdom.

¹²See Nicholas C. Burbules, *Dialogue in Teaching: Theory and Practice* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1993).

he acknowledges the more widespread social processes that allow genius to emerge. In the position of the pupil, Nietzsche "remembers" the philosopher's "cardinal principle of all culture." It is a pessimistic, negative rule. Most work hard, "ostensibly in their own interests," to obtain culture yet are sacrifices for the few. It is the "enormous magnitude of the educational apparatus" that hides what Nietzsche refers to as the "ridiculous disproportion" between those who are "really cultured" and the rest.¹³

In response, the philosopher affirms the pupil's judgment. However, he notes that while the pupil remembers his lesson, he seems to forget himself, thinking he too may be of the few. For Nietzsche, this is the "result of the worthless character of modern education" which allows people who have not attained a high level of cultural development to pose as though they had. Still this irony of unconscious sacrifice may be necessary for the production of genius.¹⁴

One of the most severe sacrifices is that of one's independence of judgment. Yet Aristocratic Nietzsche calls for this. Within an extended disquisition on the faults of German language education, Nietzsche in the guise of the philosopher carries the concept of sacrifice to its anti-democratic extreme. Although expressing the insight that "individuality is repressed and rejected by the teacher in favor of an unoriginal decent average,"¹⁵ for this Nietzsche individuality is itself in question. Can one be an individual without independent judgment? The anti-democratic Nietzsche states that "the one aim which proper education should most

¹³Nietzsche, "On the future of our educational institutions," 34.

¹⁴Nietzsche, "On the future of our educational institutions," 34.

¹⁵Nietzsche, "On the future of our educational institutions," 53.

zealously strive to achieve would be the suppression of all ridiculous claims to independent judgment." And why? To "inculcate" "obedience to the sceptre of genius."¹⁶

The idea of sacrifice and the notion that most human beings are at best means to fulfillments beyond themselves are expanded when Nietzsche takes on the arguments of democratic educational reformers. For Nietzsche, even if they themselves do not know, or are not aware of their motives, those who advocate education for all desire their own "absolutely unlimited freedom," a freedom, as it turns out, from the demands of higher cultural values. Nietzsche sees that "education of the masses" would be, at the least, difficult, "for the same reason that in great kitchens the cooking will be at best mediocre."¹⁷ For the Aristocratic Nietzsche, education of the masses is impossible. From this view, educational reformers who call for a democratic education are motivated by a wish to destroy any higher aristocratic values. "The education of the masses cannot, therefore be our aim; but rather the education of a few picked men for great and lasting works."¹⁸

Nietzsche's early anti-democratic views are encapsulated in his description of a normal historical situation as opposed to the pathology of democratic revolt: "An innumerable host of men struggle,"¹⁹ instinctively loyal "to the rule of genius,"²⁰ serving, submissive, yet seemingly "unaware" of their own sacrifice to/for the few. Can this be believed by

¹⁶Nietzsche, "On the future of our educational institutions," 54.

¹⁷Friedrich Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human*, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), #467.

¹⁸Nietzsche, "On the future of our educational institutions," 75.

¹⁹Nietzsche, "On the future of our educational institutions," 34.

²⁰Nietzsche, "On the future of our educational institutions," 74.

any other than the young or the "viciously naive?" Can it be believed now, after Marx, Althusser, Nietzsche?

Later Nietzsche: The Overman

There is an epistemic break after *Untimely Meditations*,²¹ Nietzsche no longer believes in salvation through history and most importantly loses faith in the automaticity of history. For the young, romantic Nietzsche, history is a veiled, ironic, and spontaneous dynamism. As noted above, there is an important sense in which there is no history for the young Nietzsche in the way that nineteenth-century system builders understood history as progressive, or as in Hartmann's case, pessimistically. Early Nietzsche interprets social processes in terms of how they realize or inhibit aristocratic values and particularly how they help or hinder the formation of culture-creating individuals -- geniuses. In a move reminiscent of Hegel's "cunning of reason" early Nietzsche often appeals to a process whereby masses of people with their own narrow interests unknowingly prepare the way for geniuses. In modern times, specifically the nineteenth century, however, Nietzsche identifies a revolt against the genius within democratic movements that throws into question the operation of cunning. That "sacrifice" is often interpreted as unknowing by early Nietzsche blunts its severity, indeed, makes it almost seem humorous at times. Once Nietzsche breaks with the spontaneity thesis, however, his anti-democratic doctrine becomes much more austere and voluntaristic. One might say that

²¹Friedrich Nietzsche, *Untimely Meditations*, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

the early Nietzsche is like Marx, giving play to historical spontaneity, whereas late Nietzsche is like Lenin, emphasizing willed determination.

Nietzsche lost his hope for the genius through his own illness, which forced his recognition of what is *Human, All Too Human*. In this text he repudiates romanticism and turns to both free spirits (the Nietzsche of chapter 2) and to a beginning of the Aristocratic Nietzsche advocating command and obedience in a caste system.²² This is not speculation or interpretation. Nietzsche himself, when offering his "*precepts of health*," recognized that he was "no longer a romantic: what?"²³ "I turned my perspective *around*."²⁴ By the time *Zarathustra* spoke Nietzsche was espousing the doctrine that man "is something that shall be overcome";²⁵ his call for the overman.

When Nietzsche proclaimed the death of God,²⁶ he understood that the "last men" make everything equal in value so that they do not have to judge or create. Nietzsche describes the "*last man*" in "Zarathustra's Prologue" in *Zarathustra*.²⁷ This type epitomizes Nietzsche's criticism of the general population of modern democratic societies. He initiates his reflection by saying that the "*last man*" is the most "contemptible" subject of all. Of course "last men" "do not like to hear the word 'contempt' applied to them." That is because, according to Nietzsche, they believe that their "education" "distinguishes them from goatherds."²⁸ He goes on to say

²²This is especially true of the second part of the text, "Assorted opinions and maxims" (1879) and "The wanderer and his shadow" (1880), which were printed as one text in 1886.

²³Friedrich Nietzsche, "Assorted opinions and maxims," in *Human, All Too Human*, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), P#2.

²⁴Nietzsche, "Assorted opinions and maxims," P#5.

²⁵Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Penguin, 1954), 12.

²⁶Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1974), #125.

²⁷Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 16-19.

²⁸Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 17.

that it will soon be the case that human beings will no longer crave transcendence of their condition. For Nietzsche, transcendence is tied to the ability, the strength, to feel that one is inadequate. The *last man* "is no longer able to despise himself."²⁹ It is laziness, weakness, and fear that Nietzsche wants to overcome.³⁰ For Nietzsche, the above are some of the qualities that define the "good man" who is called by many names: the "*last man*," the man of "the herd," "the rabble," "the mob," "the hodgepodge," the "common conscience," "the small people." The *last man*, the "one who blinks," believes in democracy, that all should be/are equal. But this "herd instinct" is a veil according to Nietzsche. "For, to *me* justice speaks thus: 'Men are not equal.' Nor shall they become equal."³¹

Contemporary postmodernist commentary has identified the central importance of the category of "forces" in Nietzsche's general views of human life. According to Deleuze, for Nietzsche, "all reality is already quantity of force."³² Forces are not equal; they are always ranged within hierarchies.³³ Deleuze goes further to divide forces into those that are active and those that are reactive. Active forces are creative, imposing, plastic, governing, exploitative, transforming. By contrast reactive forces are conserving, dominated, adapting. Reactive forces in this view are inferior to active forces.³⁴

Nietzsche the anti-democrat uses the difference that he acknowledges between superior and inferior forces to bolster his case against democracy.

²⁹Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 17.

³⁰Friedrich Nietzsche, "Schopenhauer as educator," in *Untimely Meditations*, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 127.

³¹Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 101.

³²Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 40.

³³Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 40.

³⁴Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 40-43.

There are differences in strength. Who has not known someone to utter "If only I were someone else?"³⁵ The strong re-create. The herd laments and turns against. Nietzsche the philologist has us consider that what we know of good and evil are the antitheses of the words' roots. "The word 'good' was definitely *not* linked from the first and by necessity to 'unegoistic' actions."³⁶ Exploitation is essential to living.³⁷ The *last man* "blinks" as if it were all something else.

Nietzsche distinguishes *master morality* and *slave morality*.³⁸ They differ, for example, in attitude toward cleanliness (master morality seeks purity);³⁹ in duties (master morality is stringent);⁴⁰ in their view of what life is worth (master morality insists on striving).⁴¹ It is clear to Aristocratic Nietzsche that these differences separate human beings from one another. Some of Aristocratic Nietzsche's defense of master morality is extreme and foundational, positing self-regulating and self-generating dynamics. "There is an *instinct for rank* which, more than anything else, is a sign of a *high rank*."⁴²

In *Human, All Too Human*, Nietzsche asserts that command is necessary for a higher culture to occur.⁴³ He speaks of "the caste compelled to work" so that the idle caste, "those capable of true leisure," can work only "if it wants to."⁴⁴ Systems of disciplinization, "ordering of

³⁵Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, in *On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1969), 122.

³⁶Nietzsche, *On The Genealogy of Morals*, 26.

³⁷Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1989), #259.

³⁸Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, #260.

³⁹Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, #271.

⁴⁰Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, #272.

⁴¹Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 199.

⁴²Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, #263.

⁴³Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human*, #439.

⁴⁴Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human*, #439.

rank," "slavery in some sense or other,"⁴⁵ are needed for this anti-democratic Nietzsche. And while it is not clear if the mass is aware of its plight here, the noble, the aristocratic, are fully aware of theirs. In *Daybreak*, Nietzsche notes that "one takes *pride* in obeying, which is the distinguishing mark of all aristocrats."⁴⁶ Each "accepts with good conscience the sacrifice of untold human beings who, *for its sake*, must be reduced and lowered to incomplete human beings, to slaves, to instruments."⁴⁷ *Beyond Good and Evil* yields the insight that "the essential characteristic of a good and healthy aristocracy, however, is that it experiences itself *not* as a function (whether of the monarchy or the commonwealth) but as their *meaning* and highest justification."⁴⁸

The basis of the position of Aristocratic Nietzsche, in its bearings on democracy, is that human beings are divided into two groups: those who serve and those who are served and who, in turn, serve culture (early Nietzsche) or themselves through the values that they proclaim and enforce (late Nietzsche). That is why Aristocratic Nietzsche is properly termed anti-democratic; the term "democratic" refers here to a refusal to make a means-end distinction between categories of individuals. In a phenomenological mode of expression, Aristocratic Nietzsche promotes a doctrine that human being is, for the many who serve and sometimes for the few who rule, "being-for-the-other." In early Aristocratic Nietzsche the masses unconsciously provide the conditions for the emergence of genius. In late Aristocratic Nietzsche the masses should be disciplined to

⁴⁵Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, #257.

⁴⁶Friedrich Nietzsche, *Daybreak*, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), #60.

⁴⁷Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, #258.

⁴⁸Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, #258.

serve a caste of commanders who pursue (serve?) higher life possibilities. In both cases, the masses clearly exist to serve an elite which may or may not exist to serve something beyond itself: a division has been made between two groups on the basis of a hierarchy of value, in which the members of one group are inferior in their very being to the members of another.

Being-in-and-for-other can be distinguished from the intentionality that is associated with democratic Nietzsche: being-in-and-for-self. That is not to say that the Nietzsche who is consistent with a democratic view that all individuals are worthy of pursuing a good life does not recognize that all human beings must in some way serve, at some time, at least, that which is other than themselves. Rather, for democratic Nietzsche any such service occurs within the project of individualization, in which each person's prime vocation is their own self-development. The Nietzsche who gives the way for individualization can be found in Chapter Two.

Nietzsche as Anti-democratic Statist

In Nietzsche's writings, there is another anti-democratic tendency that does not preach sacrifice of some group of people to another but that indicts the supremacy of herd values in modern democratic social systems. This kind of anti-democratic tendency is not necessarily adverse to a democratic interpretation of Nietzsche's educational thought. Here Nietzsche addresses how educational institutions representing the herd values of modern democratic social systems adversely impact all individuals. That is, Nietzsche's anti-democratic criticism of modern educational institutions is compatible with the defense of a definition of

democracy implied in many of Nietzsche's texts, based on values that are the very opposite to those of the herd.

Although thus far in this chapter a distinction has been made between early and late Nietzschean perspectives on democracy, when it comes to Nietzsche's anti-democratic views that focus on the impact of social systems on life, there is a uniformity to his position throughout his writings. Perhaps Nietzsche's intent as an anti-democratic statist is best expressed in his assertion in *Beyond Good and Evil* that "the democratization of Europe leads to the production of a type that is prepared for *slavery* in the subtlest sense."⁴⁹ That is, it is the way in which social structures are organized to propagate and minister to a herd morality that is the root flaw in democracy.

It would not be accurate to separate completely the various anti-democratic positions that Nietzsche espoused. Ultimately it will always be the herd, the mass, the *last man*, to which or whom democracy ministers. However, when Nietzsche turns his attention primarily to social systems, human beings are portrayed much more as victims of social dynamics than as inferior or superior beings. In this aspect of his anti-democratic thought, Nietzsche is not concerned with promoting individualization or beings-in-and-for-themselves. He remains concerned with being-for-other. But in this case the other is not a remarkable individual, a genius, or an aristocratic group; it is the excellence of culture. The fullest discussion in Nietzsche's writings of the ways in which the social systems of the modern democratic state impact upon individuals through educational structures appears in "On the future of our educational institutions."⁵⁰ Here, were it

⁴⁹Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, #242.

⁵⁰Nietzsche, "On the future of our educational institutions."

not for his goal of cultural excellence, he could almost seem to be a contemporary democratic educational critic, even reformer.

Most generally Nietzsche identifies two systemic tendencies that divert educational institutions to serving herd values: "these forces are: a striving to achieve the greatest possible *extension of education* on the one hand, and a tendency *to minimize and to weaken it* on the other."⁵¹ With regard to the expansion of education Nietzsche concentrates most of his attention on the ways in which modern educational institutions foster a spirit of capitalistic greed. In one response by the companion, one of the voices in the text, Nietzsche uses the words "pecuniary gain," "easiest and best roads to wealth," "coins of the realm," "the bond between intelligence and property," and the "rapid education" needed "so that a money-earning creature may be produced with all speed."⁵² Nietzsche's reflections apply to our times as well as his. Happiness is tied to gain. The expansion of education rests on the dogma: "as much knowledge and education as possible; therefore the greatest possible supply and demand -- hence as much happiness as possible."⁵³

Beyond fostering careerism and acquisitiveness, expansion of education also serves the state. Actually the State "always promotes" education.⁵⁴ Nietzsche, as the philosopher, uses Hegel's State as the "'absolutely complete ethical organism', the be-all and end-all of every one's education" to make his point.⁵⁵ The expansion of education, a surplus

⁵¹Nietzsche, "On the future of our educational institutions," 12.

⁵²Nietzsche, "On the future of our educational institutions," 36.

⁵³Nietzsche, "On the future of our educational institutions," 36.

⁵⁴Nietzsche, "On the future of our educational institutions," 88.

⁵⁵Nietzsche, "On the future of our educational institutions," 90.

of teachers, helps the State persuade the masses "that they can easily find the path for themselves -- following the guiding star of the State!"

Turning to the minimization and weakening of education, by which Nietzsche means the leveling down of challenges, he finds the primary beneficiary of this tendency to be the State: minimization "would compel education to renounce its highest, noblest and sublimest claims [the creation of great works of culture] in order to subordinate itself to some other department of life -- such as the service of the State."⁵⁶ The mechanism by which minimization is achieved is specialization. Specialization, "the division of labour in science," struggles "towards the decrease and even the destruction of learning."⁵⁷ Furthermore, the specialist can never be a being-in-and-for-self or even a being-for-culture but must serve some organizational complex that uses the specialist's partial contribution. Nietzsche saw (and it remains true now) that "the exploitation of a man for the purpose of science is accepted everywhere."⁵⁸ Even if one can "elevate himself above the herd by means of his specialty, he still remains one of them in regard to all else, -- that is to say, in regard to all the most important things in life."⁵⁹

It is in *The Gay Science* where Nietzsche comments that education proceeds by conditioning and seducing "a way of thinking and behaving, that once it has become a habit, instinct, and passion, will dominate [each] to [their] own ultimate disadvantage but 'for the general good.'"⁶⁰ This is done by praising the instrumentality of virtue and by "the unreason in

⁵⁶Nietzsche, "On the future of our educational institutions," 36.

⁵⁷Nietzsche, "On the future of our educational institutions," 40.

⁵⁸Nietzsche, "On the future of our educational institutions," 40.

⁵⁹Nietzsche, "On the future of our educational institutions," 39.

⁶⁰Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, #21.

virtue that leads the individual to allow himself to be transformed into a mere function of the whole."⁶¹

In a discussion that anticipates contemporary criticism of the mass media as a (counter-)educational force, Nietzsche notes that the tendencies of expansion and minimization are synthesized in the activity of journalism. "The newspaper actually steps into the place of culture, and he who, even as a scholar, wishes to voice any claim for education, must avail himself of this viscous stratum of communication which cements the seams between all forms of life, all classes, all arts, and all sciences, and which is as firm and reliable as news paper is, as a rule."⁶² If one were to substitute the mass electronic media, particularly television for newspapers, Nietzsche's point about journalism would find resonance in the writings of such a current critic as Neil Postman (see Chapter Three).

Contra Sharp

In the above discussion, a case has been made for several anti-democratic Nietzsches. The assumption here is that Nietzsche, the flesh and blood man, took many subject positions as a writer. In contrast to this writing strategy Ann Margaret Sharp, who has also addressed the problem of democratic and anti-democratic themes in Nietzsche's writings, has attempted to present a unified intellectual portrait of Nietzsche's political character.⁶³

⁶¹Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, #21.

⁶²Nietzsche, "On the future of our educational institutions," 41.

⁶³Ann Margaret Sharp, "The Teacher as Liberator: An Analysis of the Philosophy of Education of Friedrich Nietzsche" (Ph.D. diss., University of Massachusetts, 1973).

Sharp does not solve the problem of reconciling anti-democratic and democratic positions in Nietzsche's writings. Instead she mixes various positions in the same discussion. Sharp argues both for a position that is similar to the one taken in the second chapter of the present work of a democratic Nietzsche, and for a position that can be usefully called aristocratic humanism. That Sharp is primarily a humanist is indicated by her assertion that "it is only to the extent that education serves the human race that it has meaning."⁶⁴ It is with regard to this claim primarily that the present discussion takes exception. A reading of Nietzsche's educational writings does not yield passages in which Nietzsche espouses educational humanism.

Sharp's textual basis for a Nietzschean humanism is the call of *Zarathustra* to be faithful to the earth, to lead virtue back to the earth so that "it may give the earth a meaning, a human meaning."⁶⁵ Sharp draws two lines of argument from that passage. The first, which is similar to the position of a democratic Nietzsche, is that the earth can only take on human meaning if educators "begin to seriously discover the best possible ways of educating men for self mastery, wisdom and courage" [individualization].⁶⁶ This position does not involve any commitment to "humanity" as a collective entity, which is alien to Nietzsche's writings. Sharp's second line is that Nietzsche's goal for education is to "help students become responsible human beings who out of love for themselves and others take it upon themselves to transform nature and truly humanize it."⁶⁷

⁶⁴Sharp, "The Teacher as Liberator," 10.

⁶⁵Sharp, "The Teacher as Liberator," 9.

⁶⁶Sharp, "The Teacher as Liberator," 9.

⁶⁷Sharp, "The Teacher as Liberator," 9.

For Sharp the humanization of nature implies a strong humanism that combines aristocratic and democratic features within a conception of humanity as a collective entity. In brief, Sharp's humanist Nietzsche would have educators "discover ways of creating superior individuals" who are dedicated to the "salvation of humanity."⁶⁸

As a consequence of her humanism Sharp is forced to argue that Nietzsche did not hate the masses. In the sense that there is a Nietzsche who was opposed to the effects on individuals of the operation of a democratic social system Sharp is correct. However, it is not true that Nietzsche had a "love of the masses."⁶⁹ Indeed, as has been shown above, most of Nietzsche's anti-democratic commentary was highly critical, even contemptuous of the masses. By imputing a "love of mankind" to Nietzsche, Sharp can claim that Nietzsche's "philosophy could result in the nearing of the Ideal of democracy envisioned by men such as John Dewey."⁷⁰ Nietzsche's texts do not support such a claim.

⁶⁸Sharp, "The Teacher as Liberator," 9.

⁶⁹Sharp, "The Teacher as Liberator," 51.

⁷⁰Sharp, "The Teacher as Liberator," 52.

CHAPTER 2 - dEMOCRATIC¹ NIETZSCHE

In the previous chapter a distinction was made between the intentionalities of being-in-and-for-other and being-in-and-for-self. The former was associated with the complex of views defining Nietzsche's anti-democratic positions on education, taken together under the rubric Aristocratic. The latter, which was not developed when it was first introduced, is the formal and general framework in which Nietzsche's democratic pedagogy takes concrete shape; that is, the specific characteristics of Nietzsche's democratic pedagogy all find their places within the structure of being-in-and-for-self. Individualization is the ever-renewed consummation of a democratic Nietzschean pedagogy: "Individuals - being truly in-and-for-themselves."²

democratic Nietzsche

The various positions of Aristocratic Nietzsche exalt something -- be it the genius or the overman -- over the individual. This is not the case for democratic Nietzsche. The emergent categories, Aristocratic and democratic, by habit, lead to the world of politics. As shown in the

¹In a Derridian spirit democratic will remain lower case throughout this text when defined as for-self (each self).

²Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1974), #23. Kaufmann notes that the phrase "*diese wahren An-und Fur-sich's*" was appropriated by Hegel from colloquial German to refer to the distinction between the potential of a thing and its actualization. The being-in-and-for-itself is that being oriented toward its own realization. [Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, 21n.]

previous chapter, Nietzsche was opposed to the democratic political systems of his time. democratic as construed here does not (necessarily) refer to any political party, or to majority rule. democratic here sides with participation not government. "I am granted an eye beyond all merely local, merely nationally conditioned perspectives."³ democratic Nietzsche is Nietzsche the existentialist. Under a radical definition of democracy, this Nietzsche can speak to "every involuntary, conscripted candidate to humanity."⁴ If Machiavelli's Prince represents the first moment of modern self-confidence, Nietzsche represents the second by democratizing the Prince and making him apply to each of us. Nietzsche saw that "nowadays the democracy of *concepts* rules in every head - *many together* are master."⁵ Nietzsche's democracy: "to create and guarantee as much *independence* as possible: independence of opinion, of mode of life and of employment."⁶ As Kaufmann puts it, "his insistence that truly human beings are not functions of any race, color, or creed, but widely scattered over the centuries and continents, is as characteristic as is his attack on the State."⁷

In order to clarify Nietzsche's position on the state, I recur to Althusser's distinction between Repressive State Apparatuses (RSA's) and Ideological State Apparatuses (ISA'S)⁸, terminology not available to Nietzsche. This terminology bridges the gap between politics and

³Friedrich Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, in *On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1969), 225.

⁴Louis Althusser, "Freud and Lacan," in *Lenin and Philosophy*, trans. Ben Brewster (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1986), 216.

⁵Friedrich Nietzsche, "The wanderer and his shadow," in *Human, All Too Human*, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), #230.

⁶Nietzsche, "The wanderer and his shadow," #293.

⁷Walter Kaufmann, *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist* (New York: Meridian, 1950), 151.

⁸Louis Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses," in *Lenin and Philosophy*, trans. Ben Brewster (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1986), 142-146.

philosophy that the designations Aristocratic and democratic breach. Both the ISA's and the RSA's are controlled/perpetuated by ideology. It is the Lacanian Master Discourse, the hegemonic ideology, that fuels the state apparatuses.⁹ Ideological controls are Political [my emphasis]. Politics with a capital P is all social transformative activity, education is (at least) Political. democratic Nietzsche has much to say about transformative activity, some of it social activity.

But there is a distinction between ideology and political acts that directly attempt to alter policies/structures through RSA's, to take over, or to revolutionize (overthrow) (deconstruct?) the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government. politics with a small p, the "common" connotative definition of the word, defines activities in and around the RSA's, a use of state apparatuses to promote some form of collective life or other. RSA's function "at least ultimately" "by violence."¹⁰ Nietzsche's democratic pedagogy is not political in the second sense in which I have used that term. "What is needed is not a forcible redistribution but a gradual transformation of mind: the sense of justice must grow greater in everyone, the instinct for violence weaker."¹¹

Althusser's theory of the state and the role that the educational state apparatus (an ISA) has in interpellating individuals as subjects is kindred to Nietzsche's criticism of the democratic state. Nietzsche warned that state education proceeds by conditioning and seducing "a way of thinking and behaving that, once it has become a habit, instinct, and passion, will dominate [each] *to [their] own ultimate disadvantage* but 'for the general

⁹Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses," 146.

¹⁰Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses," 143.

¹¹Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human*, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), #452.

good."¹² democratic Nietzsche hears something else than just a for-other hailing. Nietzsche's democratic pedagogy teaches how to be for-self, to hear and respond to your own callings. What is here called philosophy across the curriculum is trans-cultural, but not Rousseauian humanism/universalism. Nietzsche the psychologist teaches that we can never get back to our first nature, there is no human development as such, we are not all equal in all respects, and there are constraints and abysses at every present/turn.

With regard to equality Nietzsche speaks of two kinds: "The thirst for equality can express itself either as a desire to draw everyone down to oneself (through diminishing them, spying on them, tripping them up) or to raise oneself and everyone else up (through recognizing their virtues, helping them, rejoicing in their success)."¹³ In the discussion that follows of Nietzsche's *amor fati*, the lowest-common-denominator form of equality will be shown to be based on *ressentiment* whereas the contrasting form is the healthy, preferred "equality." But in no voice does Nietzsche say that everyone is equal, or that they should be, except in having a life that is no one else's. Nietzsche's pedagogy calls for a start where one is, anywhere with anybody. This curriculum takes each in their specificity with regard to their body, psyche, embeddedness, life strategy. "Those who are evil or unhappy and the exceptional human being -- all these should also have their philosophy, their good right, their sunshine!"¹⁴

Nietzsche observed that most "hammer even into children that what matters is something quite different: the salvation of the soul, the service

¹²Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, #21.

¹³Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human*, #300.

¹⁴Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, #289.

of the state, the advancement of science, or the accumulation of reputation and possessions, all as the means of doing service to mankind as a whole; while the requirements of the individual, his great and small needs within the twenty-four hours of the day, are to be regarded as something contemptible or a matter of indifference."¹⁵ Not much has changed since Nietzsche analyzed western public schooling. Education for individualization is still untimely. One of Nietzsche's early thoughts out of season was the realization that if "you acquire a living knowledge of the history of great men, you will learn from it a supreme commandment: to become mature and to flee from the paralyzing upbringing of the present age which sees its advantage in preventing your growth so as to rule and exploit you to the full while you are still immature."¹⁶ There is power in analysis because you lose the illusions by seeing the constraints. "Sate your soul with Plutarch and when you believe in his heroes dare at the same time to believe in yourself."¹⁷

The Nietzschean (I)(eye): self-observational discourse

*"The most personal questions of truth -- 'What am I really doing? And why am I doing it?' -- that is the question of truth which is not taught in our present system of education and is consequently not asked; we have no time for it."*¹⁸ Yet "always the self listens and seeks: it compares, overpowers, conquers, destroys. It controls, and it is in control of the ego

¹⁵Nietzsche, "The wanderer and his shadow," #6.

¹⁶Friedrich Nietzsche, "On the uses and disadvantages of history for life," in *Untimely Meditations*, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 95.

¹⁷Nietzsche, "On the uses and disadvantages of history for life," 95.

¹⁸Friedrich Nietzsche, *Daybreak*, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), #196.

too. Behind your thoughts and feelings, my brother, there stands a mighty ruler, an unknown sage -- whose name is self. In your body he dwells; he is your body."¹⁹ As Lacan puts it "the ego isn't the 'I,'" it is "a particular object within the experience of the subject" "which fills a certain function which we call here the imaginary function."²⁰ "The subject sets itself up as operating, as human, as *I*, from the moment the symbolic system appears."²¹ The conscious *I* is an event that comes in and out of the history of my body. Nietzsche teaches that "*we are none of us* that which we appear to be in accordance with the states for which alone we have consciousness and words. . . . *Our opinion of ourselves*, however, which we have arrived at by this erroneous path, the so-called 'ego', is thenceforth a fellow worker in the construction of our character and our destiny."²²

The ego is an emergent from the body and discourse, the ego manages to be through language. It is a function of the body for Lacan and Nietzsche. Yet for Nietzsche there is the chance that not all has to be misrecognition and/or interpellation: the ego can mediate a body-life through language. There is the possibility of grasping some of what is nondiscursive and organizing it discursively. Nietzsche's democratic pedagogy is made possible through a discursive practice that reveals the

¹⁹Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Penguin, 1954), 34.

²⁰Jacques Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book II, The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis, 1954-1955*, trans. Sylvana Tomaselli, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller (New York: Norton, 1988), 44.

²¹Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book II*, 52. I use Lacan's categories and insights without agreeing with him that it is language itself or the symbolic order that is problematic in itself. Rather, it is the way people are treated (which includes the use/abuse of language) that is (often) problematic. The self that Nietzschean discourse creates is not only Lacan's fictive self of the symbolic order. Nietzsche does know that "language and the prejudices upon which language is based are a manifold hindrance to us when we want to explain inner processes and drives" [Nietzsche, *Daybreak*, #115]. However, he does not believe that the discourse of the ego amounts entirely to misrecognition. Rather, the ego co-constitutes the self once it has made its appearance. For Nietzschean radical pedagogy it might not be as important that language represses as how the various use(s) of discourse(s) repress.

²²Nietzsche, *Daybreak*, #115.

structure and contents of individual's lives to themselves. That practice is called here self-observational discourse, that discourse in which the ego takes on the role, consciously or unconsciously, of observing the self. (The ego is always relative to the discourse that posits the ego.) Self-observational discourse is the way in which the self becomes aware of itself and its circumstances.

Nietzsche's philosophical pedagogy fosters the emergence of a self-observational mediating self for each individual. As Foucault has noted, "one of the basic principles of the self [is] to be equipped with, have ready to hand, a 'helpful discourse.'"²³ The self is mediated to self and others through discourses. In Kierkegaard's words, "the self is a relation that relates itself to itself in the relation."²⁴ The self is partly what the self tells itself about itself, even if that only means realizing that every time you take up a new subject position you are taking up a new self. Kierkegaard teaches that "a person cannot rid himself of the relation to himself any more than he can rid himself of his self which, after all, is one and the same thing, since the self is the relation to oneself."²⁵

Sartre's *Nausea* explores the gap between living or telling.²⁶ Deleuze's Nietzsche straddles with active and reactive forces.²⁷ democratic Nietzsche speaks to experimenting and reassessing. For Nietzsche, "our moral judgments and evaluations too are only images and fantasies based on a physiological process unknown to us, a kind of acquired language for

²³ Michel Foucault, *The Care of the Self*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1988), 101.

²⁴ Søren Kierkegaard, *The Sickness Unto Death*, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 13.

²⁵ Kierkegaard, *The Sickness Unto Death*, 17.

²⁶ Jean-Paul Sartre, *Nausea*, trans. Lloyd Alexander (New York: New Directions, 1964), 39.

²⁷ Giles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 39-44.

designating certain nervous stimuli[,] that all our so-called consciousness is a more or less fantastic commentary on an unknown, perhaps unknowable, but felt text[.]"²⁸ Yet democratic Nietzsche would not follow Baudrillard in celebrating the death of psychoanalysis;²⁹ "for psychology is now again the path to the fundamental problems."³⁰ They would agree that "the art of psychological dissection and computation is lacking above all in the social life of all classes."³¹ But for Nietzsche this is never "a matter of indifference[,] -- One should consider that *almost all the physical and psychical frailties* of the individual derive from this lack."³² "The best are lacking when egoism begins to be lacking."³³ Nietzsche the moral psychologist calls for an "honesty" to make one's "experiences a matter of conscience for knowledge. 'What did I really experience? What happened in me and around me at that time? Was my reason bright enough? Was my will opposed to all deceptions of the senses and bold in resisting the fantastic?'"³⁴ While Nietzsche reserves skepticism for the reports of conscious experience about self and maybe even goes so far as some contemporaries who believe that no discourse can give "reality" because "reality" is a meeting ground between code and flux, he supports the way

²⁸Nietzsche, *Daybreak*, #119.

²⁹Mike Gane, ed. *Baudrillard Live* (London: Routledge, 1993), 45. It is noteworthy that Baudrillard and Nietzsche reach the same conclusions about the importance of *amor fati* despite this difference about psychoanalysis. For Baudrillard, *ressentiment* is "opposed correctly to fatality, to *amor fati*" [Gane, 209]. A full discussion of *amor fati* appears toward the end of this chapter.

³⁰Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1989), #23.

³¹Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human*, #35.

³²Nietzsche, "The wanderer and his shadow," #6. For the effects that *ressentiment* causes to others see the Aristocratic Nietzsche's criticism of the last man in "Zarathustra's Prologue" [Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 16-19].

³³Friedrich Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, in *Twilight of the Idols and The Anti-Christ*, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin Books, 1990), 97.

³⁴Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, #319.

toward self-knowledge, the undertaking of the discipline (subject position) of self-observational discourse.

Self-observational discourse is Nietzschean psychoanalysis; observation is a continual process of analysis.³⁵ democratic Nietzsche teaches that "all instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly *turn inward*."³⁶ Self-observational discourse cultivates an inner tolerance of life and presences the act of interpretation. There is no trust in appearance, nothing one can take for granted. Nietzsche as phenomenologist teaches the wisdom of taking the pulse of one's vitality. philosophy across the curriculum cultivates a never ending, always changing observation of the details of daily living. Derrida asks, "what does philosophy *not have to do* with psychoanalytic 'speculation'?"³⁷ The question of surrendering to the intensity of one's own vitality can only be asked once one knows how to take a pulse of their vitality.

Self-observational discourse slides between the self observed and the self observing. "To know, e.g., that one has a nervous system (-- but no 'soul' --) is still the privilege of the best informed."³⁸ "One is bound to admit that most people see the *closest things of all* very badly and very rarely pay heed to them."³⁹ "The closest things, for example, eating, housing, clothing, social intercourse, are not made the object of constant impartial and *general* reflection and reform: because these things are

³⁵Here too Nietzsche differs from Lacan and Lacan's Freud. Nietzsche does not preclude and in fact encourages the process of self-analysis.

³⁶Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, in *On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1969), 84.

³⁷Jacques Derrida, *The Post Card*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987), 265.

³⁸Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage, 1967), #229.

³⁹Nietzsche, "The wanderer and his shadow," #6.

accounted degrading, they are deprived of serious intellectual and artistic consideration."⁴⁰ "We must again become *good neighbors to the closest things* and cease from gazing so contemptuously past them at clouds and monsters of the night."⁴¹

One of democratic Nietzsche's most radical transvaluations of the tradition of Western educational philosophy is to privilege the requisites of ordinary life. "These small things -- nutrition, place, climate, recreation, the whole casuistry of selfishness -- are inconceivably more important than everything one has taken to be important so far. Precisely here one must begin to *relearn*. . . . All the problems of politics, of social organization, and of education have been falsified through and through because one mistook the most harmful men for great men -- because one learned to despise 'little' things, which means the basic concerns with life itself."⁴² "The mood in which we usually exist depends upon the mood in which we maintain our environment."⁴³

Self-observational discourse is a gateway to other discourses. It brings out a decidedly postmodern element in democratic Nietzsche. Nietzsche bridges the modern/postmodern and the theory/practice split by recognizing that the body/subject is more than "being-through-discourse-in-the-world" (there is the lived phenomenological experience that is not merely a category of interpretation for hermeneutics) but language is necessary for the constitution of the self. According to Bataille, "'oneself' is not the subject isolating itself from the world, but a place of

⁴⁰Nietzsche, "The wanderer and his shadow," #5.

⁴¹Nietzsche, "The wanderer and his shadow," #16.

⁴²Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, 256.

⁴³Nietzsche, *Daybreak*, #283.

communication, of fusion of the subject and the object."⁴⁴ Postmodern understandings allow for an ontology consistent with a democratic pedagogy because postmodernism builds a sensitivity to the intervention of discourse into all our knowings and understandings.

Self-observational discourse had to be clarified before any statements could be made about ontology and valuations because both of those will appear within a discursive context. When it is turned to the question of the general structures and contents of self-related being, self-observational discourse yields an ontology that follows from its concentration on the individual. Individualization is the primary term within this ontology and is diversified by two other terms, generativity and literacy.

Individualization

Walt Whitman shows the possibilities for the expression of democratic Nietzsche's notion of individualization as a state of being; "I say that the least developed person on earth is just as important and sacred to himself or herself, as the most developed person is to himself or herself." Nietzsche's individualization is also a norm. Nietzsche stresses that "the fact of our existing at all in this here-and-now must be the strongest incentive to us to live according to our own laws and standards."⁴⁵ Nietzschean individualization is a slide between a state of being shared by all self-referential life and a norm of a consummated process of

⁴⁴Georges Bataille, *Inner Experience*, trans. Leslie Anne Boldt (New York: State University of New York Press, 1988), 9.

⁴⁵Friedrich Nietzsche, "Schopenhauer as educator," in *Untimely Meditations*, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 128.

education.⁴⁶ Individualization includes in its multiplicity the entire integral, multi-dimensional, embodied, spirited, psychic being [person]; and the rational, calculating, (somewhat) autonomous individual.

As a state of being individualization is defined by Nietzsche in a minimalist way: all human beings are at least self-referential. Nietzsche's dare is maximalist. democratic Nietzsche offers a philosophical pedagogy adapted to encouraging each to live as much of the dare as each has the strength for. In this voice, individualization is a norm. Nietzsche had made what is now considered the postmodern move, resituating, decentering, the romantic self, the transcendent self. For many postmodernists the move of decentering has led to a devalorization of the (individual) (self) (ego) (human). For Nietzsche it is all the more reason to take great concern for the individual who now becomes the object of a self-activity of "individualization."

Understanding that there is no "natural path to self-development," Nietzsche credits Schopenhauer [among others] with raising him "above" his "insufficiencies insofar as these originated in the age" and teaching him "to be untimely."⁴⁷ Nietzsche posits that "for an individual to posit his own ideal and to derive from it his own law, joys, and rights -- that may well have been considered hitherto as the most outrageous human aberration and as idolatry itself."⁴⁸ By contrast, "we believe, in short, that the aim of public school is to prepare and accustom the student always to live and

⁴⁶The term individualization appears within this text with different usages determined by the contexts in which the term is used. These different usages play off the slide between individualization as a state of being and individualization as a norm.

⁴⁷Nietzsche, "Schopenhauer as educator," 133.

⁴⁸Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, #143.

learn independently."⁴⁹ "As a thinker one should speak only of self-education."⁵⁰ "Woe to the thinker who is not the gardener but only the soil of the plants that grow in him!"⁵¹

For Nietzsche we are each as bound to our bodies as we are to language; the body-ego can/will take care of itself if self-observational discourse is learned/practiced. Individualization is something we cannot escape and yet it is something we must cultivate. This need not be seen as a contradiction. Nietzsche is not offering a copy theory of truth but rather an hypothesis for living. His democratic pedagogy fosters "a morality which rests entirely on the *drive to distinction*."⁵² "Education ought to *compel* to virtue, as well as it can and according to the nature of the pupil."⁵³

Individualization as a state of being

Individualization as a state of being has more than one dimension. It is (at least) a condition of existence and an inevitability of action. Nietzsche illuminates individualization as a condition of existence throughout his texts. "We are always only in our own company;"⁵⁴ whether one "associates with books, human beings, or landscapes."⁵⁵ "We cannot look around our own corner."⁵⁶ "There is absolutely no escape, no

⁴⁹Friedrich Nietzsche, "On the future of our educational institutions," in *The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche*, ed. Oscar E. Levy, trans. J.M. Kennedy (Edinburgh: T.N. Foulis, 1910), 124.

⁵⁰Nietzsche, "The wanderer and his shadow," #267.

⁵¹Nietzsche, *Daybreak*, #382.

⁵²Nietzsche, *Daybreak*, #30.

⁵³Friedrich Nietzsche, "Assorted opinions and maxims," in *Human, All Too Human*, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), #91.

⁵⁴Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, #166.

⁵⁵Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, 225.

⁵⁶Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, #374.

backway or bypath into the *real world*! We sit within our net, we spiders, and whatever we may catch in it, we can catch nothing at all except that which allows itself to be caught in precisely *our* net."⁵⁷ "Oh that we could forget ourselves! The attempt fails."⁵⁸ "No matter how far a man may extend himself with his knowledge, no matter how objectively he may come to view himself, in the end it can yield to him nothing but his own biography."⁵⁹ "There is nothing whatever that is impersonal."⁶⁰

There are also many examples of individualization as a state of being resulting from the inevitability of action. In these cases Nietzsche takes positions that are associated with existentialism, of which he is recognized as a precursor.⁶¹ His connection to existentialism is through his insistence upon the necessity of making one's own life, ultimately by oneself. "No one can construct for you the bridge upon which precisely you must cross the stream of life, no one but you yourself alone."⁶² "Fundamentally, all our actions are altogether incomparably personal, unique, and infinitely individual."⁶³ "Ultimately, the individual derives the values of his acts from himself; because he has to interpret in a quite individual way even the words he has inherited. His interpretation of a formula at least is personal, even if he does not create a formula: as an interpreter he is still creative."⁶⁴ "*Only the wearer creates the costume.*"⁶⁵

⁵⁷Nietzsche, *Daybreak*, #117.

⁵⁸Nietzsche, "On the future of our educational institutions," 135.

⁵⁹Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human*, #513.

⁶⁰Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, #6.

⁶¹See, for example, Walter Kaufmann, *Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre* (New York: Meridian, 1956).

⁶²Nietzsche, "Schopenhauer as educator," 129.

⁶³Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, #354.

⁶⁴Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, #767.

⁶⁵Nietzsche, "Assorted opinions and maxims," #325.

Individualization as a norm

For democratic Nietzsche individualization as a state of being fuels individualization as a norm. Most basically, human beings find it difficult, in Nietzsche's view, to affirm their radical solitude and self-closure. The first demand of individualization as a norm is to learn to tolerate solitude. "I have gradually seen the light as to the most universal deficiency in our kind of cultivation and education: no one learns, no one strives after, no one teaches -- *the endurance of solitude*."⁶⁶

Beyond the affirmation of individualization as a state of existence is Nietzsche's call for a healthy self-love. "One must learn to love oneself -- thus I teach -- with a wholesome and healthy love, so that one can bear to be with oneself and need not roam."⁶⁷ Love of self, "is of all arts the subtlest, the most cunning, the ultimate, and the most patient."⁶⁸ "For one thing is needful: that a human being should *attain* satisfaction with himself[;] . . . whoever is dissatisfied with himself is continually ready for revenge, and we others will be his victims"⁶⁹ "*The way to happiness*:" "To admire oneself."⁷⁰

In addition to love of self, individualization teaches each to create their own table of values. "Morality trains the individual to be a function of the herd and to ascribe value to himself only as a function."⁷¹ Nietzsche educates "to be a self and to esteem oneself according to one's own weight

⁶⁶Nietzsche, *Daybreak*, #443.

⁶⁷Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 193.

⁶⁸Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 193.

⁶⁹Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, #290.

⁷⁰Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, #213.

⁷¹Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, #116.

and measure," as a "pleasure" and not a "punishment."⁷² "'Selflessness' has no value either in heaven or on earth. All great problems demand *great love*, and of that only strong, round, secure spirits who have a firm grip on themselves are capable."⁷³

The aim of a radical democratic Nietzschean pedagogy is fostering individuals who are truly in-and-for-themselves, who do not merely repeat what they have heard and imitate "what already exists."⁷⁴ democratic Nietzsche saw that "*the great majority of people* does not consider it contemptible to believe this or that and to live accordingly, without first having given themselves an account."⁷⁵ The individual "well-turned-out person" "collects from everything he sees, hears, lives through, *his* sum: he is a principle of selection, he discards much."⁷⁶ Individualization is being-in-and-for-self and being-in-and-through-self. Life "shouts at everyone of us: 'Be a man and do not follow me -- but yourself! But yourself!'"⁷⁷ "He who does not have two-thirds of his day to himself is a slave."⁷⁸ "The shortest route is not the most direct but that upon which the most favourable winds swell our sails: thus do seafarers teach us."⁷⁹

The above quotes show that the imperative to create one's own table of values does not mean, for Nietzsche, that there should not be constraints on the ways in which the creative process is configured. Whatever values an individual sets up, they should be, for democratic Nietzsche, consistent with the affirmation of solitude and the healthy love of self. Also,

⁷²Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, #117.

⁷³Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, #345.

⁷⁴Nietzsche, "On the uses and disadvantages of history for life," 123.

⁷⁵Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, #2.

⁷⁶Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, 224.

⁷⁷Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, #99.

⁷⁸Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human*, #283.

⁷⁹Nietzsche, "The wanderer and his shadow," #59.

considered as a norm, individualization for Nietzsche would lead to a personality with sufficient self-love not to vent hatreds destructively against self or others. That is, though everything might be "permitted" in the construction of values, the destructive possibilities would never be actualized by one who has individualized.

Generativity

Generativity is the cause and effect of individualization. It is, like individualization, both a state of being and a norm. As a mere state of being it is the power that brings individuals into being and in great part sustains them without their choice or deliberate effort. "What alone can *our* teaching be? -- That no one *gives* a human being his qualities: not God, not society, not his parents or ancestors, not *he himself*. . . . *No one* is accountable for existing at all, or for being constituted as he is, or for living in the circumstances and surroundings in which he lives."⁸⁰ From his earliest works Nietzsche shows how individualization is generativity and regenerativity. "I mean by plastic power the capacity to develop out of oneself in one's own way, to transform and incorporate into oneself what is past and foreign, to heal wounds, to replace what has been lost, to recreate broken moulds."⁸¹ The very opposite of plastic power is degeneration in which healing and recreation are replaced by the loss of integrity: "Is it not *degeneration*" that is "worst of all?"⁸² "Nothing is ugly but *degenerate* man."⁸³

⁸⁰Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, 64.

⁸¹Nietzsche, "On the uses and disadvantages of history for life," 62.

⁸²Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 75.

⁸³Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, 89.

Generativity is also a norm -- the power of constituting the individual directed by that individual to becoming a being-in-and-for-self. "We, however, *want to become those we are* -- human beings who are unique, incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create themselves."⁸⁴ The table of values for a self is to become who you are while making yourself what you are not. For the democratic, existential Nietzsche there is a slide between the extreme romantic Nietzsche, who asserts that "your true educators and formative teachers reveal to you what the true basic material of your being is,"⁸⁵ and the Aristocratic Nietzsche, who teaches that "man is something that shall be overcome."⁸⁶ For the democratic, existential, postmodern Nietzsche there is also a slide between the vital and the cultural constitution of the individual/self. "You shall become the person you are,"⁸⁷ yet "to become what one is, one must not have the faintest notion *what* one is."⁸⁸ To individualize, to (be)(make) a self in a world of appropriation (language) without absolute answers, is to be a generative bricoleur.⁸⁹ "Be robbers and conquerors as long as you cannot be rulers and possessors."⁹⁰ "Again and again transform the water into wine on one's own account."⁹¹ Self is a process of continuous construction. Individualization as a norm puts the stress on each as the one who has to generate and become the possibilities one might be. "We human beings are

⁸⁴Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, #335.

⁸⁵Nietzsche, "Schopenhauer as educator," 129.

⁸⁶Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 12.

⁸⁷Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, #270.

⁸⁸Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, 254.

⁸⁹For a discussion of Levi-Strauss' *bricoleur*, see Deena Weinstein and Michael A. Weinstein, *Postmodern(ized) Simmel* (New York: Routledge, 1993), 64.

⁹⁰Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, #283.

⁹¹Nietzsche, "Assorted opinions and maxims," #109.

the only creatures who, if they have turned out unsatisfactorily, can cross themselves out like an unsatisfactory sentence."⁹²

Being-in-and-for-self is a life's work. For Nietzsche, "to experience is to invent[.]"⁹³ We find our beginnings and endings at every moment. Nietzsche teaches that "becoming has no goal and that underneath all becoming there is no grand unity in which the individual could immerse himself completely as in an element of supreme value."⁹⁴ Nietzsche affirms this condition. "Why make a principle of what you yourselves are and must be?"⁹⁵ We may find greater value "for the enrichment of knowledge" in the sense of the wisdom of life practice by listening "to the gentle voice of each of life's different situations; these will suggest the attitude of mind appropriate to them. Through thus ceasing to treat oneself as a *single* rigid and unchanging individuum one takes an intelligent interest in the life and being of many others."⁹⁶ There is no privileging of consistency, in fact one may be compromised by being consistent.⁹⁷ "For one must be able to lose oneself occasionally if one wants to learn something from things different from oneself."⁹⁸ Nietzsche does not sacrifice the complexity that self-observation reveals in life for a systemization. He examines each of the regions of life, fitting them into the entire life-process, if only as unresolved opposites.

One of the most indicative and important regions of life is that of dreams, which for Nietzsche is often more fundamental than the reflective

⁹²Nietzsche, *Daybreak*, #274.

⁹³Nietzsche, *Daybreak*, #119.

⁹⁴Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, #12.

⁹⁵Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, #9.

⁹⁶Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human*, #618.

⁹⁷Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, 87.

⁹⁸Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, #305.

thought of wakefulness because dream work is a generativity of a generativity. The dream, "content, form, duration, performer, spectator" is generative of the self by the self: "You are all of this yourself!"⁹⁹ "Nothing is *more* your own than your dreams! Nothing *more* your own work!"¹⁰⁰ "I,' you say, and are proud of the word. But greater is that in which you do not wish to have faith -- your body and its great reason: that does not say 'I,' but does 'I.'"¹⁰¹

Nietzsche teaches us that to recognize our dream work and be open to the feelings/discourses the dreams contain can lead to a fuller waking life. "The meaning and value of our *dreams* is precisely to *compensate* to some extent for the chance absence of 'nourishment' during the day."¹⁰² "That which we sometimes do not know or feel precisely while awake -- whether we have a good or a bad conscience towards a particular person -- the dream informs us of without any ambiguity."¹⁰³ Dreams for Nietzsche do not disclose a world separate from that of waking life, but are referent to it. It is a "*misunderstanding of the dream*" that one is "getting to know a *second real world*."¹⁰⁴ Rather there is a single life process with different phases. The dreaming phase of the life process, as has been noted above, is seen by Nietzsche as generative of the wakeful consciousness.

According to Nietzsche, "what we experience in dreams -- assuming that we experience it often -- belongs in the end just as much to the over-all economy of our soul as anything experienced 'actually': we are richer or

⁹⁹Nietzsche, *Daybreak*, #128.

¹⁰⁰Nietzsche, *Daybreak*, #128.

¹⁰¹Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 34.

¹⁰²Nietzsche, *Daybreak*, #119.

¹⁰³Nietzsche, "Assorted opinions and maxims," #76.

¹⁰⁴Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human*, #5. For Nietzsche, it is this misunderstanding, this division of the world in two, that is the origin of all metaphysics.

poorer on account of it, have one need more or less, and finally are led a little by the habits of our dreams even in broad daylight and in the most cheerful moments of our wide-awake spirit."¹⁰⁵ When we dream we are weary "savages"¹⁰⁶ and at times "we use up too much of our artistic capacity -- and therefore often have too little of it during the day."¹⁰⁷ The Nietzschean dare of dreaming is also the Nietzschean dare of living: "Either we have no dreams or our dreams are interesting. We should learn to arrange our waking life the same way: nothing or interesting."¹⁰⁸

Not only do we generate our dreams but for Nietzsche we generate our history as well. "Direct self-observation is not nearly sufficient for us to know ourselves: we require history, for the past continues to flow within us in a hundred waves; we ourselves are, indeed, nothing but that which at every moment we experience of this continued flowing."¹⁰⁹ With each new present we generate a new history and with each new history generated we have a new present. This too is a state of being. Nietzsche also offers a norm regarding history. One of Nietzsche's early untimely meditations focuses on the advantages and disadvantages of using history for life. It is in this text that he discriminates between those who use the past and those who are paralyzed by the past. The former "take up the past" and make it their "own" while others either analyze and criticize or revere the past with a sense of nostalgia.¹¹⁰ Nietzsche supports approaching the past, our history, as a treasure-trove of signification for

¹⁰⁵Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, #193.

¹⁰⁶Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human*, #12.

¹⁰⁷Nietzsche, "The wanderer and his shadow," #194.

¹⁰⁸Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, #232.

¹⁰⁹Nietzsche, "Assorted opinions and maxims," #223.

¹¹⁰Nietzsche "distinguishes between a *monumental*, an *antiquarian* and a *critical* species of history" [Nietzsche, "On the uses and disadvantages of history for life," 67]. Each of these types can function to strengthen life or to encourage nostalgia.

resignification: "Should we not make new for ourselves what is old and find ourselves in it?"¹¹¹ Historizing is a link between literacy (which will be discussed below) and generativity.

Generativity is the dynamic element of individualization. "Education is a continuation of procreation, and often a kind of supplementary beautification of it."¹¹² "I have never ceased to educate myself, and even at the brink of the grave, while still in the flux of change, my comment on life changes with the surrounding tempest of events."¹¹³ Individualization is the never-ending process of listening to/generating vital promptings and appropriating discourses for enhancing/generating capacities. Most important is the notion that one makes oneself through one's generativity. In Irigaray's words, "the body is therefore no longer simply a body engendered by parents, it is also the one I give back to myself."¹¹⁴

Literacy

Literacy is the enablement of individualization as a form of being. A radical Nietzschean pedagogy requires you to "take your own language seriously!"¹¹⁵ "Every word is a prejudice."¹¹⁶ This pedagogy focuses on looking at discourses into which one is interpellated and making them into something for oneself. For a democratic Nietzschean pedagogy, literacy is diet; to live one must learn to see, learn to think, learn to speak and

¹¹¹Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, #83.

¹¹²Nietzsche, *Daybreak*, #397.

¹¹³Friedrich Nietzsche, *My Sister and I*, trans. Oscar E. Levy (Los Angeles: Amok, 1990), 23.

¹¹⁴Luce Irigaray, "Love between us," in *Who Comes After The Subject*, ed. Eduardo Cadava, Peter Connor and Jean-Luc Nancy (New York: Routledge, 1991), 171.

¹¹⁵Nietzsche, "On the future of our educational institutions," 48.

¹¹⁶Nietzsche, "The wanderer and his shadow," #55.

write.¹¹⁷ As stated in the above section on self-observational discourse, but in different words, language is a vital capacity, not merely a tool.

Literacy is, like individualization and generativity, both a state of being and a norm. As a state of being, literacy means, as was noted above, that we are always already interpellated into some discourses, that our thought is necessarily mediated by language, and that our thought is referent to our life through language. As Nietzsche puts it, "we have at any moment only the thought for which we have to hand the words."¹¹⁸ This remark should not be taken to mean that at each moment of life individuals are strictly determined in their thoughts, but that they only think within the possibilities of expression of their language.

As a norm literacy means that one achieves through capacitation and education a convergence of thought and life [which is always being disturbed as life generates (novelty) (shock) (trauma) to which thought must become adequate, and thought generates (judgments) (imaginaries) that life must seek to fulfill]. Generativity as a norm is concretely expressed by the double process of bringing thought into contact with life through self-observation, and by making thought serve the achievement of individualization as a norm. This is Nietzsche's normative definition of philosophy which for him is a discipline of life practice. For Nietzsche, "the only critique of a philosophy that is possible and that proves something, namely trying to see whether one can live in accordance with it, has never been taught at universities: all that has ever been taught is a critique of words by means of other words."¹¹⁹ Nietzsche the moral

¹¹⁷Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, 75.

¹¹⁸Nietzsche, *Daybreak*, #257.

¹¹⁹Nietzsche, "Schopenhauer as educator," 187.

psychologist teaches that literacy is generativity "wherever it is above all necessary to *do* properly and not merely to *know* properly."¹²⁰ Nietzsche believed that he profited "from a philosopher only insofar as he can be an example" "supplied by his outward life and not merely in his books."¹²¹ There need not be a lived-contradiction between that and Nietzsche's view that "I am one thing, my writings are another matter;"¹²² there is a difference between the bricks and the building.¹²³ To say that one is more than or other than their writings/texts does not negate the wisdom of thinking through one's life and living through one's thoughts. There is a difference between assessing whether you can live an author's words/philosophy and whether the author lived as s/he wrote. The convergence of thought and life is a way to health, not a restrictive dogma or a (modern) ideal of the unity of theory and practice.

The double process through which thought and life converge is put into effect by learning to speak well to and about life. Nietzsche criticizes the teaching of one's "mother tongue" in the public schools as if it "were a dead language and as if the present and future were under no obligations to it whatsoever."¹²⁴ "Let no one hope to reach sound aesthetic judgments along any other road than the thorny one of language, and by this I do not mean philological research, but self-discipline in one's mother tongue."¹²⁵ "Let us not forget this either: it is enough to create new names and estimations and probabilities in order to create in the long run new

¹²⁰Nietzsche, "On the future of our educational institutions," 50.

¹²¹Nietzsche, "Schopenhauer as educator," 136.

¹²²Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, 259.

¹²³Nietzsche, "Assorted opinions and maxims," #201. [This is also my response to those who ask me how I, a woman, could find so much wisdom and guidance from Nietzsche, a man, who can be read as hating women (Jews, Christians, Germans...)]

¹²⁴Nietzsche, "On the future of our educational institutions," 50.

¹²⁵Nietzsche, "On the future of our educational institutions," 59.

'things.'"¹²⁶ Nietzschean philosophical pedagogy stresses that "writing well and reading well -- both virtues grow together and decline together;" "To write better, however, means at the same time also to think better."¹²⁷

Thinking better in order to live better does not mean to have one's thoughts and one's actions in complete coordination, nor does it mean that there is a single thought adequate to life. It is always necessary for individuals both to observe their generativity and to direct their generativity also. Here too Nietzsche contributes to the contemporary, postmodern/radical, discourse on pedagogy. Nietzsche teaches that "there is *only* a perspective seeing, *only* a perspective 'knowing'; and the *more* affects we allow to speak about one thing, the *more* eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more complete will our 'concept' of this thing, our 'objectivity' be."¹²⁸ He is clear that he does not subscribe to the view that knowing necessarily results in appropriate action: "Is the 'terrible' truth not that no amount of knowledge about an act *ever* suffices to ensure its performance, that the space between knowledge and action has never yet been bridged even in one single instance? Actions are *never* what they appear to be! We have expended so much labour on learning that external things are not as they appear to us to be -- very well! the case is the same with the inner world!"¹²⁹ Yet learning discourses (including self-observational discourse) enhances/allows for credible readings and enjoyment. Nietzsche's democratic philosophical pedagogy is less concerned with whether language is a mirror of reality than with using discourses to live well. "The falseness of a judgment is for us not

¹²⁶Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, #58.

¹²⁷Nietzsche, "The wanderer and his shadow," #87.

¹²⁸Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, 119.

¹²⁹Nietzsche, *Daybreak*, #116.

necessarily an objection to a judgment; in this respect our new language may sound strangest. The question is to what extent it is life-promoting, life-preserving, species-preserving, perhaps even species-cultivating."¹³⁰ Nietzsche here poses health as the state of being pursued by individualized life.

Health

Despite the many Nietzsches and the many pedagogies that can be gathered under a Nietzschean guide, there is a thread throughout his writings -- health. All of Nietzsche's voices/words echo the call to health. The masses submitting to the genius or being surpassed by/into the overman can be interpreted as the Darwinian survival of the fittest, an effect of health. democratic, existential Nietzsche offers many opportunities for each reader to recognize and understand the importance of health. Is there a satisfactory answer to Nietzsche's question, "why is it that health is not as infectious as sickness?"¹³¹

Health is self-care. "Do whatever you will, but first be such as are *able to will*."¹³² Health is a goal of a Nietzschean philosophy across the curriculum: "*The great health* -- that one does not merely have but also acquires continually, and must acquire because one gives it up again and again, and must give it up."¹³³

Vital capacity is the positive standard that governs Nietzsche's valuations. Though considered a gateway to postmodern thinking,

¹³⁰Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, #4.

¹³¹Nietzsche, "The wanderer and his shadow," #129.

¹³²Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 172.

¹³³Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, #382.

democratic Nietzsche is not a viral theorist who is concerned primarily with cultural decadence.¹³⁴ His primary concern is health, which means the ability to affirm life. "Value physical and mental health."¹³⁵ "Listen . . . to the voice of the healthy body."¹³⁶ Cultivate the body-life because "all prejudices come from the intestines."¹³⁷ "Wherever a deep discontent with existence becomes prevalent, it is the aftereffects of some great dietary mistake."¹³⁸ To attain health, "you must eat, not only with your mouth, but also with your head."¹³⁹ Nietzsche observed that people prepare food "with a view to its effectiveness rather than its genuine effect."¹⁴⁰ And he asks, "is there any philosophy of nutrition?"¹⁴¹ "A philosophy which is at bottom the instinct for a personal diet? An instinct which seeks my own air, my own heights, my own kind of health and weather."¹⁴²

There is a connection between health and individualization.

Nietzsche teaches that "that which one individual needs for his health is to another a cause of sickness;"¹⁴³ "there is no health as such."¹⁴⁴ This follows from Nietzsche's view that there is no equality of vital capacity. It is clear for Nietzsche that "nobody is free to live everywhere."¹⁴⁵ Health requires selective assimilation of the environment. "Even the determination of what is healthy for your *body* depends on your goal, your horizon, your energies, your impulses, your errors, and above all on the ideals and

¹³⁴ Arthur Kroker, *Panic Encyclopedia* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989), 238.

¹³⁵ Nietzsche, *My Sister and I*, 75.

¹³⁶ Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 33.

¹³⁷ Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, 240.

¹³⁸ Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, #134.

¹³⁹ Nietzsche, "Assorted opinions and maxims," #279.

¹⁴⁰ Nietzsche, *Daybreak*, #203.

¹⁴¹ Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, #7.

¹⁴² Nietzsche, *Daybreak*, #553.

¹⁴³ Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human*, #286.

¹⁴⁴ Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, #120.

¹⁴⁵ Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, 240.

phantasms of your soul. Thus there are innumerable healths of the body."¹⁴⁶ His call for health is a call to abandon the "concept of a *normal* health, along with a normal diet and the normal course of an illness."¹⁴⁷ Be literate about where you are and work from there. "Do not be virtuous beyond your strength!"¹⁴⁸

There is a difference between a "feeling of power" [the culmination of a process of becoming healthy] and "the will to power" [assertive force of life] but both require/are the ability to exercise vital capacity.¹⁴⁹ Increasing vital capacity is a way to health that both necessitates and produces strength. Strength slides with individualization. Strength too is a state of being to which a norm is attached. "I teach the No to all that makes weak -- that exhausts. I teach the Yes to all that strengthens, that stores up strength, that justifies the feeling of strength. So far one has taught neither the one nor the other: virtue has been taught, mortification of the self, pity, even the negation of life. All these are values of the exhausted."¹⁵⁰ "On the other hand: we can increase courage, insight, hardness, independence, and the feeling of responsibility."¹⁵¹

The more domains of life with which one can become conversant, the more skills one has, the stronger and more confident one will become. Nietzsche affirms existing in the world with multiple skills, with the ability to deploy multiple discourses so as to be able to prevail over and survive the conditions of life. "If one has become a master in one thing one usually

¹⁴⁶Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, #120.

¹⁴⁷Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, #120.

¹⁴⁸Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 291.

¹⁴⁹"Feeling of power" can be found throughout Nietzsche's texts. See, for example, *Daybreak* (#356, #348, #65). "Will to power" is developed later, in, for example, Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil* (#13 and #259).

¹⁵⁰Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, #54.

¹⁵¹Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, #907.

for that very reason remains a complete bungler in most other things"¹⁵²
 "On this earth one pays dearly for every kind of *mastery*."¹⁵³ A goal of radical Nietzschean pedagogy is "the ability *to control* one's Pro and Con and to dispose of them, so that one knows how to employ a *variety* of perspectives and affective interpretations."¹⁵⁴

Pain, Suffering, Death

Health for Nietzsche is a comprehensive term. As such, there may be value in sickness. Not only will one who has been sick "have a much greater enjoyment of health," and "understand the philosophy of psychical health and recovery,"¹⁵⁵ but s/he will also often acquire "wisdom from the leisure to which his illness has compelled him."¹⁵⁶ Yet the democratic Nietzsche need not be read as advocating a call for ill-health. Rather, as he says in *The Gay Science*, "there are enough sublime things so that one does not have to look for the sublime where it dwells in sisterly association with cruelty."¹⁵⁷ In a Darwinian move, Nietzsche proffers that pain "would have perished long ago" if it was not both life-preserving and full of wisdom.¹⁵⁸ Nietzsche suggests that if we stopped trying to "*suffer less*" we might know "better how to *rejoice*."¹⁵⁹

Perhaps one of the most appropriated of all of Nietzsche's aphorisms is his declaration that "what does not kill me makes me stronger."¹⁶⁰

¹⁵²Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human*, #361.

¹⁵³Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, #366.

¹⁵⁴Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, 119.

¹⁵⁵Nietzsche, "Assorted opinions and maxims," #356.

¹⁵⁶Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human*, #289.

¹⁵⁷Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, #313.

¹⁵⁸Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, #318.

¹⁵⁹Nietzsche, "Assorted opinions and maxims," #187.

¹⁶⁰Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, 33.

Nietzsche's philosophical pedagogy recognizes and stresses the importance of facing pain, suffering and death. "He that consummates his life dies his death victoriously, surrounded by those who hope and promise. Thus should one learn to die; and there should be no festival where one dying thus does not hallow the oaths of the living."¹⁶¹ Not only should we learn to die, but we can use death to learn to live. "The certain prospect of death could introduce into every life a precious, sweet-smelling drop of levity -- and yet you marvelous apothecary souls have made of it an ill-tasting drop of poison through which all life is made repulsive."¹⁶² This is not, *The Geranium On The Window Sill Just Died but Teacher You Went Right On*.¹⁶³ Facing death is not a matter of a Freudian death-wish for Nietzsche. It is a look at what is happening, not a look at what one wishes were happening (or not).

Nietzsche teaches that the struggles of personal growth/decay be acknowledged as constitutive of individualization: "You refuse ever to be dissatisfied with yourselves, ever to suffer from yourselves -- and you call this being moral! Very well -- another, however, might call it being cowardly. But one thing is certain: you will never travel round the world (which you yourself are!) but will remain an impenetrable enigma to yourselves! For do you imagine that it is out of pure folly that we who think differently expose ourselves to our own deserts, swamps and icy mountains and voluntarily chose pain and self-satiety."¹⁶⁴ There is "much

¹⁶¹Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 71-72.

¹⁶²Nietzsche, "The wanderer and his shadow," #322.

¹⁶³Albert Cullum, *The Geranium On The Windowsill Just Died But Teacher You Went Right On* (Holland: Harlin Quist, Inc., 1971).

¹⁶⁴Nietzsche, *Daybreak*, #343.

that is our *own* [that] is also a grave burden!"¹⁶⁵ But "there is as much wisdom in pain as there is in pleasure."¹⁶⁶

amor fati

The exploration and exposition of a pedagogy for individualization and the path to health leads to Nietzsche's greatest dare -- *amor fati*. Nietzsche introduces *amor fati*, love of fate, in *The Gay Science* (1882), as a New Year's Resolution -- the aphorism is titled "*for the new year*;" as a wish -- "all in all and on the whole: some day I wish to be only a Yes-sayer."¹⁶⁷

Throughout *The Gay Science* Nietzsche gives many examples of a yes-saying strategy. There can be neither remorse nor annoyance when things go wrong.¹⁶⁸ There must be questioning. "On the whole I do not know whether I do not have more reason to be grateful to my failures than to any success."¹⁶⁹ "Misery and bouts of sickness and everything" "that is imperfect" yield the fruit of "a hundred backdoors through which" there is "escape from enduring habits."¹⁷⁰ Yes-saying is active. "There is no trick that enables us to turn a poor virtue into a rich and overflowing one; but we can reinterpret its poverty into a necessity so that it no longer offends us when we see it and we no longer sulk at fate on its account."¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁵Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 193.

¹⁶⁶Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, #318.

¹⁶⁷Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, #276.

¹⁶⁸Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, #41.

¹⁶⁹Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, #303.

¹⁷⁰Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, #295. Note that Nietzsche was against *enduring* habits but not against habits. In the same aphorism he continues: "Most intolerable, to be sure, and the terrible par excellence would be for me a life entirely devoid of habits, a life that would demand perpetual improvisation."

¹⁷¹Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, #17.

In addition to yes-saying, when Nietzsche first introduces *amor fati* it is also defined by the action of "looking away" which shall be the "only negation."¹⁷² "Moving away from things until there is a good deal that one no longer sees and there is much that our eye has to add if we are still to see them at all" is "what one should learn from artists" (and "physicians") for making things "beautiful, attractive, and desirable for us when they are not[.]"¹⁷³ "Let us look away."¹⁷⁴

By the time he wrote his next text (1883) Nietzsche seems to have gotten his "wish." *Zarathustra* introduces "one who can bless and say Yes," carrying "the blessings of my Yes into all abysses" -- something he acknowledges that he "fought long for."¹⁷⁵ Passing by is now a "doctrine" -- "where one can no longer love, there one should *pass by*."¹⁷⁶ *Zarathustra* honors "the recalcitrant choosy tongues and stomachs, which have learned to say 'I' and 'yes' and 'no.'"¹⁷⁷

There are (at least) two readings of *amor fati* as defined in 1882 and 1883, and patchworded above. First, *amor fati* is yes-saying. But it is also looking away, opting out, distancing.¹⁷⁸ Say yes but when possible have "requisites." *Amor fati* can be read as choosing/creating/acting the best with/in what life has to offer and working hard so as not to lapse into *ressentiment* with the leftovers of even the most thorough redemptive

¹⁷²Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, #276.

¹⁷³Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, #299.

¹⁷⁴Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, #321. We have to learn to forget what impedes our creativity. See Nietzsche, "On the uses and disadvantages of history for life," 62.

¹⁷⁵Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 165.

¹⁷⁶Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 178.

¹⁷⁷Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 194.

¹⁷⁸That Nietzsche believes that it is sometimes necessary to "pass by" certain experiences rather than to engage them directly does not mean that he advocates a general strategy of avoidance. He often prescribes suffering as a way of reaching *amor fati*. Whether passing by or suffering is the appropriate tactic depends on what will bring health and empowerment for the individual in the given situation.

suffering. *Ressentiment* is used by Nietzsche to refer to an unconscious inversion of values in which weakness is valued as superior to strength. It involves a flight from coming to terms with the self. The "need" to direct one's view outward instead of back to oneself -- is of the essence of *ressentiment*.¹⁷⁹ In *The Gay Science*, *amor fati* also includes not waging "war against what is ugly" and not accusing, even "those who accuse" -- two roads from *ressentiment*.¹⁸⁰ That is, the life that is free from *ressentiment* does not define itself against something else but defines itself positively through its own generative powers. It does not consume itself in its opposite, but enjoys, displays, and creates its values through the process of individualization.

Though *Zarathustra* spoke "The Yes and Amen Song," a love for "eternity,"¹⁸¹ it is in *Ecce Homo* that the stakes of *amor fati* are highest. "My formula for greatness in a human being is *amor fati* : that one wants nothing to be different, not forward, not backward, not in all eternity. Not merely bear what is necessary, still less conceal it -- all idealism is mendaciousness in the face of what is necessary -- but *love* it."¹⁸² There is the trace of this extreme formulation in *The Gay Science* when Nietzsche asks if in "your loneliest loneliness" you (would) (could) affirm that "this life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live once more and innumerable times more; and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and everything unutterably small or great in your life will have to return to you, all in the same

¹⁷⁹Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, 37.

¹⁸⁰Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, #276.

¹⁸¹Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 228.

¹⁸²Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, 258.

succession and sequence."¹⁸³ This is clearly not the Nietzsche who suggested that "as long as life is *ascending*, happiness and instincts are one."¹⁸⁴ For that Nietzsche there is no demand that one affirm the eternity of evil.

How different Nietzsche's near-death-bed exposition in *Ecce Homo* (1889) reads than how he thought he would look back on his life in *Human, All Too Human* (1878).¹⁸⁵ There, in the aphorism titled *ensor vitae*, he posits that "finally, when the tablet of his soul is wholly written over with experiences, he will not hate and despise existence, but neither will he love it: he will hover above it, now with the eye of joy, now with that of sorrow, and, like nature itself, be now in a summery, now in an autumnal mood."¹⁸⁶ Nietzsche's *ensor vitae* is in the spirit of *amor fati* as initially defined and developed in the present discussion.¹⁸⁷

Amor fati interpreted through the eternal return of everything belongs to the Aristocratic Nietzsche.¹⁸⁸ The present work concerns a radical democratic Nietzschean pedagogy. A democratic *amor fati* is vital to it. There is a clear and fruitful reading in Nietzsche of a democratic *amor fati*. Each individual can work toward living a life free of

¹⁸³Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, #341.

¹⁸⁴Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, 44.

¹⁸⁵Although Nietzsche didn't die until 11 years after writing *Ecce Homo*, it was the last book he wrote.

¹⁸⁶Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human*, #287.

¹⁸⁷*amor fati* was anticipated in Nietzsche's *The Birth of Tragedy* (1871) with the category of the Dionysian [Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, 273]. According to Thiele, at age 13 Nietzsche already had expressed his love of fate, "albeit in theistic terms" [Leslie Paul Thiele, *Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of the Soul: A Study of Heroic Individualism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 197].

¹⁸⁸A diachronic reading of Nietzsche yields the various anti-democratic perspectives that he deployed. Early Nietzsche called for an anti-democratic romantic submission to genius, sometimes for the sake of culture, sometimes for humanity in its highest exemplars. Later, Nietzsche had a more aggressive anti-democratic view of castes and systems of disciplinization for the creation of his "overman." Aristocratic Nietzsche appears in the early and late texts whereas what I call democratic Nietzsche appears in the middle works. Aristocratic *amor fati* is most fully expressed in the last of Nietzsche's texts. See chapter one for a fuller discussion of these points.

ressentiment, can learn to love and find some good in even the worst, can learn to say Yes and No, and to pass by. Few, if any, [and this is something Nietzsche knew very well] can attain the will of wanting "nothing to be different, not forward, not backward, not in all eternity."¹⁸⁹ In Nietzsche's later work *amor fati* is an attitude towards existence as a whole based on a metaphysics of the eternal recurrence. In Nietzsche's early articulations of the idea, *amor fati* can be seen a guide to the will in each moment, a practical imperative to try to make each moment worthy, a call for acceptance. In his first explication of *amor fati* Nietzsche said that he wanted to learn "to see as beautiful what is necessary in things."¹⁹⁰ Why is a metaphysics of eternal recurrence "necessary" to love your fate?

For Nietzsche, "the will to *immortalize*" can be "prompted" by "gratitude and love;" "but it can also be the tyrannic will of one who suffers deeply, who struggles, is tormented, and would like to turn what is most personal, singular, and narrow, the real idiosyncrasy of his suffering, into a binding law and compulsion."¹⁹¹ Nietzsche combined the above elements in his late definition of *amor fati*. He eternalizes affirmation because he wants to challenge the will to affirm to heroic proportions.

Aristocratic Nietzsche perverts *amor fati* with his wish for the eternal recurrence. Here *amor fati* is for the overman or, I assert, the underman. Somehow wishing to experience the HELL that a life (all life?) can contain again and again and again and again is a clear sign of less than total acceptance of some experiences. To teach/offer the *amor fati* of willing their experience for eternity seems an ineffective discourse when

¹⁸⁹Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, 258.

¹⁹⁰Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, #276.

¹⁹¹Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, #370.

engaging with someone who is being neglected or abused, a victim of a traumatic crime or disaster of nature, a parent grieving the loss of a child, a lover losing their partner, or an ill person.¹⁹² To offer suffering people eternal recurrence is to offer them the extreme form of the Zizekean counsel to "enjoy your symptom,"¹⁹³ after Kierkegaard's fashion. There is a difference between affirming involvement and participation in each moment, and affirming every moment that has ever happened and will ever happen to you for all eternity.

The *amor fati* appropriate to democratic individualization is the fight for presence and not for eternity. That means there might be moments when life lives as if it could be wished/willed as such for eternity. From a position of Nietzschean noontide, one can declare the existence that led to that moment to be an existence they affirm. There might also be moments where overcoming to reach the health of *amor fati* is hard work, where presence is a flight from absence. When one is experiencing life-death moments it might not be possible to love one's fate. "There is no haiku in a heart attack."¹⁹⁴ There can be love of life/experience just because it is part of your life; each experience doesn't have to be good or made good. For democratic Nietzsche, becoming never stops. "We ourselves wish to be our experiments and guinea pigs."¹⁹⁵ The concern is not with repetition [the metaphysical Nietzsche of eternal recurrence] but with becoming. democratic Nietzsche teaches overcoming not the overman. A Nietzschean philosophy across the curriculum offers a psychological and not a

¹⁹²I am not (necessarily) offering an exhaustive list here.

¹⁹³Slavoj Zizek, *Enjoy Your Symptom: Jacques Lacan in Hollywood and Out* (New York: Routledge, 1992).

¹⁹⁴Michael A. Weinstein, Class Notes, 1985-1994.

¹⁹⁵Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, #319.

metaphysical interpretation: *amor fati* is not beyond the human but is a way in which each individual is brought to their individuality through an encounter with themselves and the world of experience.¹⁹⁶

One must affirm life if one is to be Nietzschean at all and a democratic Nietzschean philosophical pedagogy will foster such affirmation. "He who wants to influence the order of society has only to implant into people's hearts this philosophy of cheerful rejection of changing places and absence of envy."¹⁹⁷ *amor fati* as a pedagogy means each coming to terms with himself or herself as a temporal being. *amor fati* implies coming to terms with what has happened to you to make you who you are now. *amor fati* is a questioning, a practice, in the direction of being able to affirm what is inside of you (even if it is the result of what is external). *amor fati* is the result and point of the psychoanalytic phase of individualization. "Love yourselves as an act of clemency."¹⁹⁸

For most, there is much work to be done to adopt *amor fati* as a life attitude. There can be no regret, bitterness, resentment, *ressentiment*, no wishing to be someone else.¹⁹⁹ "'I would not change places with anyone' [is the] philosophy society is always in need of."²⁰⁰ *amor fati* is an overall gratitude for one's existence, a striving for such gratitude as you overcome or pass by what you can't be-grateful-for/love. This isn't easy when we all live with systematic disparity between desire and fulfillment.

¹⁹⁶From here on, the democratic conceptualization of *amor fati* will be expressed in lower case even when starting a sentence. This is in the Derridian spirit of the difference that I am making in interpretation, so as not to mislead the reader with the emphasis on a capital A *amor*.

¹⁹⁷Nietzsche, "Assorted opinions and maxims," #396.

¹⁹⁸Nietzsche, *Daybreak*, #79.

¹⁹⁹Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, 122.

²⁰⁰Nietzsche, "Assorted opinions and maxims," #396.

There is no reading of *amor fati* that makes this attitude toward life easy to accomplish. democratic *amor fati* is an active life strategy. As Nietzsche first introduced it, *amor fati* is an active disposition to try to find a way to affirm the life you are living. Once the eternal return is introduced, *amor fati* becomes a passive attitude and not an active strategy. At best it is the most active of passive strategies. No longer does the goal seem to be trying to make life something you can affirm; the emphasis here is on trying to affirm everything by loving it as it is for eternity.²⁰¹

Once Nietzsche introduces the eternal recurrence he joins the company of the philosophical traditions that he claimed to be challenging. "As John Locke summed up the matter, faith is 'assent to a proposition.'"²⁰² *Amor fati* interpreted as embrace of the eternal recurrence posits an attitude toward existence under a standard of heroism.

A democratic interpretation of *amor fati* is not heroic. The consequences of a rejection of heroism are clear when the democratic perspective is contrasted to the aristocratic viewpoint in which the eternal recurrence defines *amor fati*. Adherence to the eternal recurrence requires that one affirm that each moment of one's life be eternally repeated. The democratic perspective does not make such a demand upon the individual to affirm the past. Rather, what is asked of the individual in the democratic view is a will to overcome those aspects of the past that draw the individual into *ressentiment*. To interpret *amor fati* in terms of the eternal recurrence is to deny the worth of the finite individual. That denial is

²⁰¹At its root the democratic *amor fati* as I read it finally rests on affirming "everything" (that can't be overcome). The difference is one of emphasis.

²⁰²John Dewey, *A Common Faith* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934), 20.

exactly what a democratic pedagogy which accepts the disparity between desire and fulfillment seeks to dispute.

Two works that deal extensively with Nietzsche as an educational theorist discuss *amor fati*. In the case of both Sharp (1973)²⁰³ and Thiele (1990)²⁰⁴ *amor fati* is interpreted from what has here been defined as an aristocratic viewpoint. Ignoring the fact the Nietzsche generated the idea of *amor fati* before he thought of the eternal recurrence, Sharp and Thiele base *amor fati* on the eternal recurrence. According to Sharp: "Many interpreters of Nietzsche's philosophy have tended to dismiss the doctrine of eternal recurrence as not important to an understanding of his thought. However . . . it is all important, the foundation of his *amor fati*."²⁰⁵ Similarly, Thiele asserts that "Nietzsche's writings on *amor fati*, love of fate, and the eternal recurrence cannot be understood in isolation."²⁰⁶

By fusing *amor fati* and eternal recurrence, Sharp makes judgments on pedagogy that are sharply at variance with those of a democratic Nietzsche. For Sharp: "The doctrine of eternal recurrence could have a profound effect on students. It would encourage them to take each act seriously and not to defer the task of creation for a time that may never come. Each moment becomes sacred and is to be lived fully and at once."²⁰⁷

From the viewpoint of a democratic Nietzschean pedagogy, there is nothing wrong with taking each act seriously, but there is a problem with

²⁰³Ann Margaret Sharp, "The Teacher as Liberator: An Analysis of the Philosophy of Education of Friedrich Nietzsche" (Ph.D. diss., University of Massachusetts, 1973).

²⁰⁴Leslie Paul Thiele, *Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of the Soul: A Study of Heroic Individualism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).

²⁰⁵Sharp, "The Teacher as Liberator," 89.

²⁰⁶Thiele, *Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of the Soul*, 197.

²⁰⁷Sharp, "The Teacher as Liberator," 91.

the notion of taking each moment as sacred. For democratic Nietzsche, the moment is not sacred. Rather, nothing is sacred. What is important is a way of participating in the moment that furthers or at least does not destroy the possibilities for individualization. A pedagogy that would encourage students to have a sense that each moment is sacred would take them away from their encounter with themselves and their ability to become capacitated to participate in their life experimentally. To say that the moment is sacred is to say that the individual student is not the end of education.

Thiele is less consistent than Sharp in following the thesis that eternal recurrence and *amor fati* are inseparable. In many cases he adopts positions similar to or the same as those of a democratic Nietzsche. However, Thiele's entire discourse is guided by the idea that a life of which Nietzsche would approve is a heroic life. Thus he says that "the eternal recurrence is best understood as the test of one's *amor fati*, and hence of one's greatness."²⁰⁸ Here again fusing *amor fati* and eternal recurrence is subversive of a democratic pedagogy which far from emphasizing a motivation to be great emphasizes self-knowledge and the uses of that self-knowledge to individualize.

amor fati, understood democratically, is the foundation and final aim of a democratic pedagogy based on Nietzsche's principles. democratic *amor fati* is intimately connected to individualization, which is the proximate comprehensive goal of a Nietzschean democratic pedagogy. To become a being-in-and-for-self, which is the formal definition of individualization, in great part means to be an actively involved participant

²⁰⁸Thiele, *Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of the Soul*, 201.

in one's life who tries to keep life from getting the better of oneself by making living a process that can be affirmed in its particularity: to live in a way that is appropriate to oneself, and not necessarily to anyone else, in each moment. democratic *amor fati* is the practice of finding ways not to reject the present, but instead to relate to the moment in as positive a way as possible. To live the democratic *amor fati* is necessarily to individualize, to come to terms with the specific events that one has lived and to overcome them when they excite *ressentiment*, and to find the best connections for one's particular needs in the present.

The Social: Friendship, Giving, Love

In any of Nietzsche's voices, he teaches that we are in a social relationship, a give and take with others, as soon as we have language. As with individualization, generativity, literacy and health, engaging with others is a state of being to which Nietzsche attaches norms. The placement of the social at the end of this chapter is not an indication that it is an afterthought nor that it is the culmination of a pedagogy of/for individualization. Rather, healthy interpersonal relationships are possible only after each has worked through/toward *amor fati*. That is, only when one is free from *ressentiment* can one be a giving or a loving friend. "One has to sit firmly upon *oneself*, one must stand bravely on one's own two legs, otherwise one is simply *incapable* of loving."²⁰⁹ Yet "love of *one* is a barbarism; for it is exercised at the expense of all others."²¹⁰ This also includes love of self. "Even self-love presupposes an unblendable duality

²⁰⁹Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, 266.

²¹⁰Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, #67.

(or multiplicity) in one person."²¹¹ Individualization is not solipsistic or narcissistic.

Nietzsche teaches that "*one must learn to love*" [self and others].²¹² By love in this context he means to be charitable, generous, giving. If one does not learn generosity, "if education and chance offer us no opportunity to practise these sensations our soul will grow dry and even incapable of understanding them in others."²¹³ Nietzsche is clear that love is for self as well as for other, that it is not sacrificial. In learning to love "in the end we are always rewarded for our good will, our patience, fairmindedness, and gentleness."²¹⁴ That reward is not given by the world or the beloved, but by the change undergone by the giver. "What? -- is love supposed to be something unegoistic?"²¹⁵

Nietzsche is critical of those who think that love is unegoistic; "love has furnished the concept of love as the opposite of egoism while it actually may be the most ingenuous expression of egoism."²¹⁶ "Good-naturedness, friendliness, [and] politeness of the heart;" "I mean those social expressions of a friendly disposition, those smiles of the eyes, those handclasps," also have "very little of the unegoistic in them."²¹⁷ "Anyone who has really made sacrifices knows that he wanted and got something in return -- perhaps something of himself in return for something of himself -- that he

²¹¹Nietzsche, "Assorted opinions and maxims," #75.

²¹²Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, #334. Nietzsche teaches that not only do "we have to learn to love," but that "hatred likewise has to be learned and nourished if one wants to become a good hater" [*Human, All Too Human*, #601].

²¹³Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human*, #601.

²¹⁴Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, #334.

²¹⁵Nietzsche, *Daybreak*, #145.

²¹⁶Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, #14.

²¹⁷Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human*, #49.

gave up here in order to have more there, perhaps in order to *be* more or at least to feel that he was 'more.'"²¹⁸

Nietzsche posits that "benevolence" "is the ever available medicine;"²¹⁹ in his transvaluation of values it "too is to be reckoned."²²⁰ Referring to sexual practice, sympathy and worship, Nietzsche asserts that "one person, by doing what pleases him, gives pleasure to another person."²²¹ He teaches us to recognize that "he who feeds the hungry refreshes his own soul: thus speaks wisdom."²²² "The best way of beginning each day well is to think on awakening whether one cannot this day give pleasure to at any rate *one* person."²²³

Love, for Nietzsche, in the broad sense that includes such relations as friendship, is essentially a disposition and practice of free giving and generous receiving. For Nietzsche, "a gift-giving virtue is the highest virtue."²²⁴ "I am a giver of gifts: I like to give, as a friend to friends."²²⁵ There need not be reciprocity of giving. "Man involuntarily conducts himself nobly when he has become accustomed to desiring nothing of men and always bestowing gifts upon them."²²⁶ It is clear that Nietzsche wanted to share the wisdom he gained by his overcomings. "Writing ought always to advertise a victory -- an overcoming of *oneself* which has to be communicated for the benefit of others."²²⁷ "I give each my own."²²⁸

²¹⁸Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, #220.

²¹⁹Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human*, #50.

²²⁰Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human*, #49.

²²¹Nietzsche, *Daybreak*, #76.

²²²Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 22.

²²³Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human*, #589.

²²⁴Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 74.

²²⁵Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 89.

²²⁶Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human*, #497.

²²⁷Nietzsche, "Assorted opinions and maxims," #152.

²²⁸Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 69.

Friendship and love require the ability to receive. In the aphorism, "*in honor of friendship*" Nietzsche relates the story of a Macedonian king and an Athenian philosopher.²²⁹ When the "independent sage" received a gift of money from the king, he promptly returned it. According to Nietzsche, this showed the king that the philosopher did not know that friendship was a "higher feeling" than pride. Nietzsche considers that "the gift of having good friends is in many men much greater than the gift of being a good friend."²³⁰

Nietzschean friendship/love is individualized. "To treat all men with equal benevolence and to be kind to everyone irrespective of who he is can be just as much an emanation of a profound cynicism as of a thorough philanthropy."²³¹ For Nietzsche the educator, pedagogy is a social encounter, at its best it is a relation of love. As discussed above, Nietzsche recognized the benefit of having the proper educator. "Great success, however, is reserved above all to him who wants to educate, not everybody or even limited circles, but a single individual, and in doing so looks neither to the right nor the left."²³²

Recurring back to the section above on the convergence of thought and life -- "Physician, help yourself: thus you may help your patient too. Let this be his best help that he may behold with his eyes the man who heals himself."²³³

The principle of individualization must remain as the focal point of education. "The supreme principle of all education, that one should offer

²²⁹Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, #61.

²³⁰Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human*, #368.

²³¹Nietzsche, "Assorted opinions and maxims," #236.

²³²Nietzsche, *Daybreak*, #194.

²³³Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 77.

food only to him *who hungers for it!*"²³⁴ In applying this principle in contemporary formal educational contents the most important point to recognize is that for Nietzsche education is fundamentally self-education. Nietzsche was most concerned with showing how learning can be a dimension of the life process as a whole. The contribution of his democratic perspective to schooling and related problems is brought out in the next chapter, through a Nietzschean read of contemporary radical democratic educational reform literature.

²³⁴Nietzsche, *Daybreak*, #195.

CHAPTER 3 - RADICAL DEMOCRATIC EDUCATIONAL REFORM

"Few are capable of preserving their individuality at all in the face of an education which believes it demonstrates its success, not in going out to meet clear needs and feelings in an educative sense, but in entangling the individual in the net of 'clear concepts' and teaching him to think correctly: as if there were any sense whatever in making of a man a being who thinks and concludes correctly if one has not first succeeded in making of him one who feels rightly."¹

"*First nature*. - The way in which we are educated nowadays means that we acquire a *second nature*: and we have it when the world calls us mature, of age, employable. A few of us are sufficiently snakes one day to throw off this skin, and to do so when beneath its covering their *first nature* has grown mature. With most of us, its germ has dried up."²

In the 1960s a new tendency in radical democratic educational reform discourse arose that raised, as did much of 1960s discourse, fundamental questions about the institutions that mediate people's lives. The most prominent public intellectuals associated with this reform movement are Paulo Freire, Ivan Illich, Jonathan Kozol, and Neil Postman.³ All of them have continued writing into the present and have iterated and sometimes refined their thought as they have responded to criticism, learned from changing times, and striven to achieve clarity.

¹Friedrich Nietzsche, "Richard Wagner in Bayreuth," in *Untimely Meditations*, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 215.

²Friedrich Nietzsche, *Daybreak*, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), #455.

³See page 115 of this text for an explanation of how I came to know these authors.

Their writings, done by each independently, comprise what Michel Foucault calls a "discursive formation" - that is, they share common structures of articulation though their vocabularies are diverse and their emphases different.⁴

The reform discourse growing out of the 1960s does not simply repeat earlier reform discourse. Firstly, it is international, comprehending in Freire the issues of the Third World and in Illich a cosmopolitan perspective. Secondly, it has a strong radical component in the sense that its practitioners try to make fundamental criticism of institutions and practices and to suggest non-institutional, unconventional, or oppositional strategies of reform. It is here that they connect to Nietzsche. In fact, a Nietzschean read is what in my case has revealed that Freire, Illich, Kozol, and Postman are "authors" in a distinctive discursive formation.

The four public intellectuals share a common grid of concerns. They are radical, as has been said, in that they try to examine the assumptions of institutions, practices, and discourses. They are democratic in that they are concerned with the good of each individual, not with the good of and produced by an aristocracy, of excellence or otherwise, or of some collective entity. They center their attention on education (learning) as the key social activity for generating radical reform, even if they are sometimes pessimistic about its chances for success. They are reformers because they prescribe making alterations in educational practice, not programs for social revolution, even if some of them might (at least at times) endorse revolutionary aims.

⁴Michel Foucault, *The Archeology of Knowledge*, trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon, 1972).

Freire, Illich, Kozol, and Postman also share a common form of enunciating their discourse. Each one defines a (different) oppressive structure that hinders the achievement of individual (human) good [a power structure rooted in economic class for Freire, schooling as an oppressive cultural construct for Illich, the sacrificial nation-state for Kozol, and technopoly (the control of life by technologies manipulated by technocratic elites) for Postman]. Each one of them defines a strategy for resisting, ameliorating, or perhaps ultimately eliminating the conditions responsible for inhibiting the achievement of good. In each case, the strategy involves literacy, defined in a broad sense as empowerment of expression ["generative discourse" for Freire, rehabilitation of the "vernacular" for Illich, "first-person singular speech" for Kozol, and recovery of narrative and inquiry, and, consequently, of time perspective for Postman].

In the sections to follow I will show how radical democratic educational reform discourse is made coherent in its differences by a Nietzschean read of (primarily) its most current texts, through concepts of literacy. In this process I will show how the reform discourse supplements the discourse of democratic Nietzsche. That is, I will use democratic Nietzsche to make sense out of the educational reformers and the reformers to enhance the strategies and understandings of a (Nietzschean) conception of philosophy across the curriculum. I will conclude the chapter with an overall democratic Nietzschean assessment of the reformist discourse.

Paulo Freire: Literacy and Power

Freire's pedagogy of literacy, with its emphasis on generative words and its eye on helping individuals understand how they are being

interpellated into social organizations, echoes Nietzsche's discourse. Freire's pedagogy includes what I have called Nietzschean self-observational discourse. For Freire, "the act of looking implies another, that of 'admiring.' We admire and in our looking deeply into what we admire, we look inward and from within; this makes us see."⁵ Admiration also applies, perhaps first and foremost, to the individual's self. An "immersion" in one's "own existence"; "making the way [one] lives obvious in [one's] consciousness, describing it and analyzing it, amount to an unveiling of [the individual's] reality, if not a political engagement for [one's] transformation."⁶ This inward look is always self-critical. That is, like Nietzsche, Freire defends a critical love of self. "We must adopt a critical view, that of the person who questions, who doubts, who investigates, and who wants to illuminate the very life we live."⁷ "For me it is impossible to know rigorously while depreciating intuition, feelings, dreams, and desires. It is my entire body that, socially, knows. I cannot, in the name of exactness and rigor, negate my body, my emotions, and my feelings."⁸ For Freire, "knowing" "is not a neutral act, not only from the political point of view, but from the point of view of my body, my sensual body. It is full of feelings, of emotions, of tastes."⁹ "Let's try to understand life, not necessarily as the daily repetition of things, but as an effort to create and re-create, and as an effort to rebel, as well."¹⁰

⁵Paulo Freire, *The Politics of Education*, trans. Donaldo Macedo (New York: Bergin and Garvey, 1985), 37.

⁶Freire, *The Politics of Education*, 15-16.

⁷Freire, *The Politics of Education*, 198.

⁸Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the City*, trans. Donaldo Macedo (New York: Continuum, 1993), 105.

⁹Myles Horton and Paulo Freire, *We Make the Road by Walking: Conversations on Education and Social Change*, ed. Brenda Bell, John Gaventa and John Peters (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990), 23.

¹⁰Freire, *The Politics of Education*, 199.

Freire, like Nietzsche, tells the reader that he is "not simply the last book [he] wrote."¹¹ Freire's respect for the unity between [educational] practice and theory is Nietzschean convergence of thought and life as full-strength pedagogy.¹² "The great necessity we have as progressive educators is to be more consistent, and to diminish the distance between what we say and what we do."¹³ Freire and Nietzsche both express feelings of incompleteness. Freire says that he is constantly searching for solidarity and transcendence of solitude yet he admits that he treated the space and time of exile as a learning experience.¹⁴ As shown in the last chapter, Nietzsche calls to each to learn to love self and solitude. Freire and Nietzsche both teach that "the more you are loved and you love, the more you can love."¹⁵

As with Nietzsche, Freire takes the capacity to express oneself clearly to oneself and others -- literacy -- as essential to a pedagogy of empowerment. For Freire, "to be illiterate you need to live where there are letters and you don't know them."¹⁶ "No one elects to be illiterate. One is illiterate because of objective conditions. In certain circumstances 'the illiterate man is the one who does not need to read.' In other circumstances, he is the one to whom the right to read was denied. In either case, there is no choice."¹⁷

What Freire's pedagogy has to offer to supplement Nietzsche's is the perspective that contemporary education can alter political functioning by

¹¹Freire, *The Politics of Education*, 180.

¹²Freire, *The Politics of Education*, 155-156; Freire, *Pedagogy of the City*, 132.

¹³Freire, *Pedagogy of the City*, 22.

¹⁴Freire, *The Politics of Education*, 181.

¹⁵Freire, *Pedagogy of the City*, 97.

¹⁶Freire, *The Politics of Education*, 14.

¹⁷Freire, *The Politics of Education*, 13.

individuals recognizing their circumstances and position in the world. "On the basis of the social experience of illiterates, we can conclude that only a literacy that associates the learning of reading and writing with a creative act will exercise the critical comprehension of that experience, and without any illusion of triggering liberation, it will nevertheless contribute to its process."¹⁸

For Freire, "in transforming society, the important task is not to take power but to reinvent power."¹⁹ "Education has a lot to do with the reinvention of power."²⁰ "Education is a political act."²¹ "Why? [1] Because the very nature of education has the inherent qualities to be political, as indeed politics has educational aspects."²² [2] "Education is a series of theories put into practice."²³ [3] "The political makeup of education is independent of the educator's subjectivity; that is, it is independent if the educator is conscious of this political makeup, which is never neutral."²⁴

Freire expresses the need for a political dimension in education but he does not make the Althusserian distinction that I do between Politics and politics.²⁵ He does distinguish between politics and ideology and so his theorizing can fall within my use of the Althusserian differentiation of Repressive State Apparatuses and Ideological State Apparatuses. On Althusser's terms, Freire does leave room for a nonpolitical Political

¹⁸Freire, *The Politics of Education*, 17.

¹⁹Freire, *The Politics of Education*, 179.

²⁰Freire, *The Politics of Education*, 179.

²¹Freire, *The Politics of Education*, 188.

²²Freire, *The Politics of Education*, 188. See also, Ira Shor and Paulo Freire, *A Pedagogy for Liberation: Dialogues for Transforming Education* (New York: Bergin and Garvey, 1987), 61.

²³Freire, *The Politics of Education*, 189.

²⁴Freire, *The Politics of Education*, 179.

²⁵See pages 29-30 of this text for an explication of this distinction.

education by criticizing the "mechanistic interpretations"²⁶ which state that "a change of perception is not possible before a change in the social structure because perception is conditioned by society."²⁷ Furthermore Freire acknowledges that "only a mechanist would have trouble seeing that the superstructure cannot be automatically transformed by making changes in the infrastructure."²⁸

Freire recognizes the "strong ideological dimension to [the] question of challenging and transforming the consciousness of students."²⁹ When discussing life in the school (Ideological State Apparatus), Freire asserts that "one of the first things to do is to begin to know the space in which we are."³⁰ His "liberating educator" "will try to *unveil* the ideology enveloped in the *very* expectations of the students."³¹ This is accomplished, according to Freire, by making "an 'ideological map' of the institution."³² Yet, for Freire, "only political action in society can make social transformation, not critical study in the classroom. The structures of society, like the capitalist mode of production, have to be changed for society to be transformed."³³

Without the Althusserian distinction, Freire's dictum that education is politics might seem contradictory. At times he seems to assert that one can undermine the system through challenging the ISA's. At other times he seems to say that such changes are not possible without changing the RSA's too, "taking it to the streets." These positions can be reconciled by remembering Freire's point that pedagogy is not sufficient for liberation

²⁶Freire, *The Politics of Education*, 31.

²⁷Freire, *The Politics of Education*, 40.

²⁸Freire, *The Politics of Education*, 31.

²⁹Shor and Freire, *A Pedagogy for Liberation*, 174.

³⁰Shor and Freire, *A Pedagogy for Liberation*, 61.

³¹Shor and Freire, *A Pedagogy for Liberation*, 68.

³²Shor and Freire, *A Pedagogy for Liberation*, 61.

³³Shor and Freire, *A Pedagogy for Liberation*, 175.

but that it does make a contribution to it. Rather than giving a foundationalist reading of the relation between structure and super-structure, Freire allows them to condition each other. Pedagogy and mass action are both necessary for social transformation in the directions of popular empowerment that Freire prescribes; neither one of these is sufficient by itself.

Freire teaches that "social movements were born *already* political."³⁴ Where Nietzsche too might state the idea that "no educator who dreams of a different society can dismiss social movements,"³⁵ from Nietzsche this would be a warning and not a calling. Freire and Nietzsche part company on Freire's statement that "social movements should not stop at personal and individual liberation."³⁶ (Freire does not mean, however, that the person should ever subserve a social movement or cause -- what he has in mind is the co-participation of individuals in a personal and social process of empowerment.)

Freire and Nietzsche seem to speak as one when they favor a situation where each can participate fully "*to create and re-create*."³⁷ "One of the tasks of critical education and radical pedagogy is to help the critical thinking-speaking process to re-create itself in the re-creation of its context."³⁸ Freire and Nietzsche share the view that we are all oppressed [by (at least) specialization, technology, bureaucracy, objectification]. But whereas Freire's focus is on social-cultural oppression, Nietzsche cares about cultural-individual oppression. Freire is concerned with a "full

³⁴Freire, *The Politics of Education*, 194.

³⁵Freire, *The Politics of Education*, 195.

³⁶Freire, *The Politics of Education*, 194.

³⁷Freire, *The Politics of Education*, 4.

³⁸Freire, *The Politics of Education*, 187.

humanity"³⁹ as well as individualization, because he believes that they are mutually dependent. Both writers are committed to liberation and overcoming.

For Freire, democratic participation is necessary for individualization. "The struggle for democracy is the centerpiece for the struggle for liberation."⁴⁰ In order to struggle for liberation literacy is necessary: "At a particular moment in the struggle for self-affirmation, when subordinated to and exploited by the ruling class, no social group or class or even an entire nation or people can undertake the struggle for liberation without the use of a language."⁴¹ "It is not possible to think of language without thinking of the concrete social world we constitute. It is impossible to think of language without thinking of power and ideology."⁴² Understanding that "it is not education that molds society to certain standards, but society that forms itself by its own standards and molds education to conform with those values that sustain it,"⁴³ Freire talks about "trying to think and teach by keeping one foot inside the system and the other foot outside."⁴⁴ From Nietzsche's view this is impossible. But it is the opening that positions Freire's pedagogy as political in a way that Nietzsche's is not. Nietzsche did not address the (possibility) (reality) that many are categorically denied access to language. Freire teaches that liberatory pedagogy "means waging a cultural politics that seeks to make

³⁹Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, trans. Myra Bergman Ramos (New York: Continuum, 1990), 42.

⁴⁰Paulo Freire, Foreword to *Paulo Freire: A Critical Encounter*, ed. Peter McLaren and Peter Leonard, trans. Donaldo Macedo (New York: Routledge, 1993), xi.

⁴¹Freire, *The Politics of Education*, 186.

⁴²Freire, *Pedagogy of the City*, 41.

⁴³Freire, *The Politics of Education*, 170.

⁴⁴Freire, *The Politics of Education*, 178.

presently unassailable and impenetrable cultural borders indeterminate."⁴⁵ Freire opens up a supplementary way to individualization. A pedagogy for individualization (is) (must be) concerned with the economy of language.

Culture is democratic, that is, it is not in principle restricted to any particular group or individual, once it has become environment. Yet even if culture is democratic, cultural theory, criticism and appropriation may not be. For certain groups of people, engaging the Repressive State Apparatuses might be needed, if they are ever to be individualized. Education might not always be political, but in some cases it must be. I do not think that Nietzsche would disagree with this. What seems less certain is the Freirean view that there is an obligation to give. This seems to be the key to Freire's politics. For Nietzsche, individualization is a social process because language is involved with it, but it is an individual fulfillment, and any giving is done through generosity. The social impulse, for Nietzsche, is an outgrowth of individualization, not the result of a sense of obligation or of the judgment that there is a debt to be paid back. political participation is not (necessarily) an individualization practice. In Thiele's words; "For Nietzsche, a successful politics of the soul excluded political engagement in the social realm."⁴⁶ Nietzsche was concerned with the individual, not with self-affirming subjects who privilege social consciences.

Interpreting language as a vital capacity and not merely as a tool means that everyone who does not command their language is illiterate. Freire makes the case that "being illiterate does not preclude the common

⁴⁵Freire, *A Critical Encounter*, xii.

⁴⁶Leslie Paul Thiele, *Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of the Soul: A Study of Heroic Individualism* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), 224.

sense to choose what is best for oneself."⁴⁷ For the pedagogy being developed here this could only be the case if one had a command of self-observational discourse. Defining literacy most broadly, Freire states that "reading does not consist merely of decoding the written word or language; rather, it is preceded by and intertwined with knowledge of the world. Language and reality are dynamically interconnected."⁴⁸ "Language is not exclusively an instrument for communication. Language is *itself* communication. Language is also knowledge, language is also doing."⁴⁹ "To acquire literacy is more than to psychologically and mechanically dominate reading and writing techniques. It is to dominate these techniques in terms of consciousness . . . creat[ing] and re-creat[ing], a self-transformation producing a stance of intervention in one's context."⁵⁰ This process is what Freire calls *conscientização* (conscientization). To develop *conscientização* requires commanding the language. It is with language that it becomes "possible for men to enter the historical process as responsible Subjects, *conscientização* enrolls them in the search for self-affirmation."⁵¹ Freire like Nietzsche, teaches that "a language can only develop when it is practiced in all domains and given opportunity to do so."⁵² In Nietzsche's words: "The development of language and the development of consciousness (*not* of reason but merely of the way reason enters into consciousness) go hand in hand."⁵³

⁴⁷Freire, *The Politics of Education*, 176.

⁴⁸Paulo Freire and Donaldo Macedo, *Literacy: Reading the Word and the World* (New York: Bergin and Garvey, 1987), 29.

⁴⁹Neil Bruss and Donaldo P. Macedo, "Conversations with Paulo Freire at the University of Massachusetts at Boston," *Journal of Education* 166, no. 3 (1984): 217.

⁵⁰Paulo Freire, *Education for Critical Consciousness*, trans. Myra Bergman Ramos (New York: Continuum, 1990), 48.

⁵¹Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, 20.

⁵²Freire, *The Politics of Education*, 185.

⁵³Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1974), #354.

Freire provides a contemporary method, tested in educational practice, for attaining literacy. It is based on generativity. It begins with talking. "The educator's role is fundamentally to enter into dialogue with the illiterate about concrete situations and simply to offer him the instruments with which he can teach himself to read and write." Dialogue is in contrast to what Freire calls the "'banking' concept of education" or "banking" education"⁵⁴ (which echoes what Nietzsche criticizes as the "'acroamatic' method of teaching"⁵⁵), "in which the scope of action allowed to the students extends only as far as receiving, filing, and storing,"⁵⁶ what others consider worth knowing. "Education is suffering from narration sickness."⁵⁷ Freire's use of dialogue cultivates a "problem-posing education."⁵⁸

With dialogue, coordinators, teacher-learners, radical pedagogues, engage the student-teachers in a "horizontal relationship . . . nourished by love, humility, faith and trust."⁵⁹ Dialogue is accomplished by researching the vocabulary with which one is working, selecting "generative words" [those generated from ones' life experiences; words "whose syllabic elements offer, through re-combination, the creation of new words"⁶⁰], creating codifications [as challenges], elaborating on agendas, and exploring

⁵⁴Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, 58-73.

⁵⁵Friedrich Nietzsche, "On the future of our educational institutions," in *The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche*, ed. Oscar E. Levy, trans. J.M. Kennedy (Edinburgh: T.N. Foulis, 1910), 125-126. In Nietzsche's words: "One speaking mouth, with many ears, and half as many writing hands -- there you have to all appearances, the external academical apparatus" [Nietzsche, "On the future of our educational institutions," 126].

⁵⁶Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, 58.

⁵⁷Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, 57.

⁵⁸Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, 72.

⁵⁹Freire, *Education for Critical Consciousness*, 45.

⁶⁰Freire, *Education for Critical Consciousness*, 49.

phonemic families which correspond to the generative words by using discovery cards.⁶¹ Codify to liberate. Decodify to demystify and free.

Freire justifies the use of his pedagogy of/for literacy to his First-World critics by showing the Third-Worldness within the First World.⁶² This justification seems unnecessary when everywhere many are "exploited, violated, and violently denied the right to exist and the right to express themselves."⁶³ He does not assume that "suffering is a seamless web always cut from the same cloth. Oppression must always be understood in its multiple and contradictory instances."⁶⁴ For example, Freire's pedagogy teaches that "the concept of the gender struggle is political and not sexual."⁶⁵ He shows that when people work to describe and transform the social situation in concert through dialogue with each other, cultural codes such as racism, sexism, patriotism, and consumerism can be recontextualized. "Dialogue is the encounter between men, mediated by the world, in order to name the world,"⁶⁶ to co-create the world. A naming generated by reflection on and discussion of life experience of the participants is what makes this pedagogy radical. It is not possible, according to Freire (and Nietzsche) without love. "Love is at the same time the foundation of dialogue and dialogue itself. . . . Love is an act of courage, not of fear, love is commitment to other men."⁶⁷

⁶¹Freire, *Education for Critical Consciousness*, 51-54.

⁶²See, for example, Freire, *The Politics of Education*, 188. Also, see Jonathan Kozol, *Illiterate America* (New York: Plume, 1985), 40, for a discussion of Michael Harrington's "underdeveloped nation" within America.

⁶³Freire, *The Politics of Education*, 192.

⁶⁴Freire, *A Critical Encounter*, x.

⁶⁵Paulo Freire, "A dialogue with Paulo Freire," in *Paulo Freire: A Critical Encounter*, ed. Peter McLaren and Peter Leonard (New York: Routledge, 1993), 175.

⁶⁶Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, 76.

⁶⁷Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, 77-78.

For Freire and Nietzsche (and all the radical educational reformers) literacy is a never ending pursuit. For Freire, "philosophically and existentially, the fundamental task for human beings should be to read the world, to write the world, to read words and to write words. If we did that consciously, of course, we would be subjects of history. Then we could speak freely about our presence in the world. And doing that, you would perceive that adult literacy is concerned with economic transformations, cultural transformations, political transformations, social transformations."⁶⁸

Both Freire and Nietzsche advocate a contextualized self-criticism and self-analysis, as well as criticism of the modern state and its disciplinary organizations. In a chapter titled "literacy as a theoretical discourse," Freire asserts that "it is not viable to separate the literacy process from general educational processes. It is not viable to separate literacy from the productive process of society."⁶⁹ For Freire, "language is an ideological problem."⁷⁰ This may be so, but his perspective that "language has to do with social classes"⁷¹ and that "one cannot understand and analyze a language, then, without a class analysis"⁷² must be questioned in a culture/age where public discourse is "show business."

Ivan Illich: Literacy, Power, and Disestablishing Schools

In some ways Ivan Illich is the most radical of the democratic educational reformers since he challenges the notion of schooling itself and

⁶⁸Bruss and Macedo, "Conversations with Paulo Freire at the University of Massachusetts at Boston," 225.

⁶⁹Freire and Macedo, *Literacy: Reading the Word and the World*, 50.

⁷⁰Shor and Freire, *A Pedagogy for Liberation*, 71.

⁷¹Shor and Freire, *A Pedagogy for Liberation*, 71.

⁷²Freire and Macedo, *Literacy: Reading the Word and the World*, 53.

ultimately the construct of education, a hegemonic cultural-institutional paradigm that subverts acknowledgment of and deprives of value all of the many ways of learning that escape submission to bureaucratized curricula. Whereas Freire recognizes power structures and attempts to foster community resistance to them, Illich advocated first "disestablishing" those structures altogether and later has searched for the origins and conditions of the cultural code that has made them possible.

Illich's most famous text, *Deschooling Society*, was one of the must reads of the 1960s counterculture.⁷³ There Illich echoes the anti-statist Nietzsche in basing his criticism of established schooling on the modern state organization and in making education the key institution in determining "the mutual definition of man's nature and the nature of modern institutions": "I have chosen the school as my paradigm, and I therefore deal only indirectly with other bureaucratic agencies of the corporate state: the consumer-family, the party, the army, the church, the media."⁷⁴ He does not, any more than Nietzsche, believe that educational structures are separate in the ends for which they function from the other structures of modern life, but holds that "family life, politics, security, faith, and communication would profit from an analogous process."⁷⁵ All of them have as their primary purpose the shaping of people's "vision of reality."⁷⁶

Yet school is privileged as a key institution by Illich: "The hidden curriculum of family life, draft, health care, so-called professionalism, or of the media play an important part in the institutional manipulation of

⁷³Ivan Illich, *Deschooling Society* (New York: Harper, 1970).

⁷⁴Illich, *Deschooling Society*, 2.

⁷⁵Illich, *Deschooling Society*, 3.

⁷⁶Illich, *Deschooling Society*, 68.

man's world-vision, language, and demands. But school enslaves more profoundly and more systematically, since only school is credited with the principal function of forming critical judgment, and, paradoxically, tries to do so by making learning about oneself, about others, and about nature depend on a prepackaged process. School teaches us so intimately that none of us can expect to be liberated from it by something else."⁷⁷

"School," for Illich, is "the age-specific, teacher-related process requiring full-time attendance at an obligatory curriculum."⁷⁸ Illich is opposed to this process because it has monopolized learning and has created and coerced a demand for its services, which are not necessarily conducive to the good of individuals. At its maximum development in contemporary society the school takes over the functions of religion: "The school system today performs the threefold function common to powerful churches throughout history. It is simultaneously the repository of society's myth, the institutionalization of that myth's contradictions, and the locus of the ritual which reproduces and veils the disparities between myth and reality."⁷⁹

It is important to note here that Illich, throughout his writings, often identifies the terms "education" and "teaching" with the bureaucratic school system and its cultural code. That does not mean that he is opposed to education in the broader sense of learning or to teaching in the broader sense of facilitating, helping, showing, and engaging in mutual inquiry. Indeed, in *Deschooling Society*, he posits that "disestablishing" schools by removing their compulsory aspect and their power to certify competence

⁷⁷Illich, *Deschooling Society*, 68.

⁷⁸Illich, *Deschooling Society*, 38.

⁷⁹Illich, *Deschooling Society*, 54.

would open the way to a society in which learning would go on more freely and would be adjusted to what individuals believed they needed and what they wanted. Illich, like Nietzsche, favors education for individualization: "Either we continue to believe that institutionalized learning is a product which justifies unlimited investment or we rediscover that legislation and planning and investment, if they have any place in formal education, should be used mostly to tear down the barriers that now impede opportunities for learning, which can only be a personal activity."⁸⁰

Schooling is criticized by Illich primarily because it inhibits individualization: "Universal schooling was meant to detach role assignment from personal life history: it was meant to give everybody an equal chance to any office. . . . However, instead of equalizing chances, the school system has monopolized their distribution."⁸¹ Thus, knowledge has become a scarce resource, when, in fact, it should approach the limit of being a free good. Illich challenges the guiding myths perpetuated by the school system -- that instruction in schools is equivalent to learning⁸² and that "most learning is the result of teaching."⁸³

Rather than the ritualized behaviors taught in schools, Illich says that directed learning should be divided into "skill instruction" and "education," the latter used here in a positive sense. Education is participative, as it is for Freire, and is carried out by "partners" who engage in "generative discourse:" "It relies on the critical intent of all those who use memories

⁸⁰Illich, *Deschooling Society*, 71-72.

⁸¹Illich, *Deschooling Society*, 17.

⁸²Illich, *Deschooling Society*, 16.

⁸³Illich, *Deschooling Society*, 18.

creatively. It relies on the surprise of the unexpected question which opens new doors for the inquirer and his partner."⁸⁴

This is Illich's vision of a de-schooled society in which everyone is a learner: "Both the exchange of skills and matching of partners are based on the assumption that education for all means education by all. Not the draft into a specialized institution but only the mobilization of the whole population can lead to popular culture. The equal right of each man to exercise his competence to learn and to instruct is now pre-empted by certified teachers."⁸⁵ In Althusserian terminology, this vision is highly Political in the sense that includes activity within Ideological State Apparatuses and is political in the more restricted sense that disestablishing compulsory education and certification would demand changes in or disestablishment of some of the Repressive State Apparatuses.

Deschooling Society was published in 1970 and contains marked elements of the utopianism of the 1960s counterculture. At that time Illich was optimistic, asserting that "the most radical alternative to school would be a network or service which gave each man the same opportunity to share his current concern with others motivated by the same concern."⁸⁶ At that time he envisioned a computer network similar to current techn-utopian visions of the "information superhighway" that would allow direct contact among learners unmediated by certified authorities dispensing programmed curricula. He is particularly concerned about the compulsory aspect of schooling which leads to "schooling for schooling's sake."⁸⁷ In contrast: "A good educational system should have three purposes: it

⁸⁴Illich, *Deschooling Society*, 25-26.

⁸⁵Illich, *Deschooling Society*, 32.

⁸⁶Illich, *Deschooling Society*, 28.

⁸⁷Illich, *Deschooling Society*, 25.

should provide all who want to learn with access to available resources at any time in their lives; empower all who want to share what they know to find those who want to learn it from them; and, finally, furnish all who want to present an issue to the public with the opportunity to make their challenge known."⁸⁸

Although countercultural Illich is in favor of a notion of individualization, his views are not fully coincident with Nietzsche's. He supplements Nietzsche by filling out the social dimension of learning, particularly in his idea of partnerships, but his networking utopia ("learning webs" as he calls them) would not be sufficient for Nietzsche because of Illich's trust in individuals being able to help themselves and each other individualize without having learned self-observational discourse and without having attended to literacy. Nietzsche would be favorable to Illich's call in *Deschooling Society* for learning as "immeasurable re-creation"⁸⁹ and for a "growth in disciplined dissidence, which cannot be measured against any rod, or any curriculum, not compared to someone else's achievement."⁹⁰

Illich is far more Nietzschean in the essays included in his collection *In the Mirror of the Past: Lectures and Addresses, 1978-1990*.⁹¹ Like so many critics, reformers, and revolutionaries of the 1960s, Illich became more skeptical of sweeping structural change in the following decades. He also made the step from the counterculture to postmodernism by shifting his focus from the bureaucratized educational structures to the cultural

⁸⁸Illich, *Deschooling Society*, 108.

⁸⁹Illich, *Deschooling Society*, 58.

⁹⁰Illich, *Deschooling Society*, 57.

⁹¹Ivan Illich, *In the Mirror of the Past: Lectures and Addresses, 1978-1990* (New York: Marion Boyars, 1992).

code that they transmit. The later Illich is very much like Foucault, trading in epistemes ("paradigms" and "constructs") that are formative of individual character. Indeed, Illich composes a sketch of the history of the construct of education that could stand alongside Foucault's histories of madness, sexuality, or the prison.⁹²

In describing his epistemic shift Illich writes in 1986 that "much more important than the disestablishment of schools -- I now see -- was the reversal of those trends which make of education a pressing need rather than a gift of gratuitous leisure. I began to fear that the disestablishment of the educational church would lead to a fanatic revival of many forms of degraded education."⁹³ Postmodernized Illich is a skeptical searcher, much like the Nietzsche of "On the future of our educational institutions."⁹⁴ He wants to understand "the historical circumstances under which the very idea of educational needs can arise."⁹⁵

Questioning his previous belief that "educational needs of some kind were a historical given of human nature," postmodern Illich defines "education" in a negative sense as "'learning,' *when it takes place under the assumption of scarcity in the means which produce it.*"⁹⁶ That is, he gives special emphasis to his earlier insight into the bureaucratic schooling system as "schooling for schooling's sake," now grounded in restrictions on the creation and dissemination of knowledge.

⁹²Michel Foucault, *Madness and Civilization*, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Random House, 1965); Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Random House, 1978); Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Pantheon, 1977).

⁹³Illich, *In the Mirror of the Past*, 162.

⁹⁴Nietzsche, "On the future of our educational institutions."

⁹⁵Illich, *In the Mirror of the Past*, 163.

⁹⁶Illich, *In the Mirror of the Past*, 165.

Illich traces the restrictive construct of education to John Amos Comenius (1592 - 1670), who wrote the first text book: "at the time of Comenius the history of *homo educandus* begins, at least as a project and program: *omnibus, omnia omnino docendi*. With this intent to teach everybody everything thoroughly, the idea of *homo educandus* is defined. The new man is a being who ought to be taught whatever he should know or do."⁹⁷

Homo educandus (educational man) is the formative code that lies behind the schooling system. Illich teaches us to recognize that "the fundamental concepts with which we operate -- educational needs, learning, scarce resources, etc. -- correspond to a paradigm which is far from natural."⁹⁸ He challenges the notion that we need to enter a formal educational system to learn. Indeed, most learning has always gone on in the various areas of life on a more or less informal basis. The "educational construct" that learning goes on in schools and nowhere else has now been coupled with the notion that literacy equals communication equals cybernetic code. Raising skepticism about the computer, which he once looked to with hope, Illich defends literacy: "You can see that my world is that of literacy. I am at home only on the island of the alphabet. I share this island with many who can neither read nor write, but whose mind-set is fundamentally literate like mine. And they are threatened, as I am, by the betrayal of those clerics who dissolve the words of the book into just a communication code."⁹⁹

⁹⁷Illich, *In the Mirror of the Past*, 114.

⁹⁸Illich, *In the Mirror of the Past*, 117.

⁹⁹Illich, *In the Mirror of the Past*, 181.

Illich claims that in the modern period a concept of language has become hegemonic that makes language "one more tool managed by the professional lackey to power. Language was seen as an instrument to make people good, to make good people."¹⁰⁰ Here Illich echoes his contemporary Foucault on modern disciplinary institutions that work on the souls of individuals to render them docile and Nietzsche who saw the teaching of language in modern state schools as a means of rendering people servants of the state.

Illich's response to the dominance of the "educational construct" is a call for a rehabilitation of the "vernacular." He distinguishes between language as taught in schools -- "standard educated colloquial" -- and the "vernacular": "I want to contrast taught colloquial and vernacular speech, costly language and that which comes at no cost."¹⁰¹ "Vernacular" is used in a wide sense by Illich, similar to the concepts of literacy in Nietzsche and Freire. "Just now we need a simple, straightforward word to designate the fruit of activities in which people engage when they are not motivated by considerations of exchange, a word that would designate non-market-related activities by which people do things and make do -- wants to which, in the process of satisfying them, they also give concrete shape."¹⁰² Indeed, the "vernacular," for Illich, indicates "the existence of a *vernacular mode of being and doing* that extends to all aspects of life."¹⁰³

Illich's discussion of the "vernacular" enhances the Nietzschean view of literacy. Like Nietzsche, Illich associates taught colloquial with the "acroamatic method;" like Freire, Illich is critical of a "banking concept of

¹⁰⁰Illich, *In the Mirror of the Past*, 140.

¹⁰¹Illich, *In the Mirror of the Past*, 124.

¹⁰²Illich, *In the Mirror of the Past*, 124.

¹⁰³Illich, *In the Mirror of the Past*, 125.

education:" "Taught language is the dead, impersonal rhetoric of people paid to declaim with phony conviction texts composed by others."¹⁰⁴ In contrast, "vernacular spreads by practical use; it is learned from people who mean what they say and who say what they mean to the person for whom what they say is meant."¹⁰⁵ The vernacular is constituted by generative relations: "While the vernacular is engendered in the learner by his presence at the intercourse between people who say something to each other face to face, taught language is learned from speakers whose assigned job is gab."¹⁰⁶

Illich ties the vernacular to individualization and generativity. For Illich, "the art of living in its entirety -- that is, the art of loving and dreaming, or suffering and dying -- makes each lifestyle unique. And therefore this art is much too complex to be taught by the methods of a Comenius or Pestalozzi, by a schoolmaster or by TV. It is an art which can only be picked up. Each person becomes a vernacular builder and a vernacular speaker by growing up, by moving from one initiation to the next . . . Vernacular dwellers generate the axioms of the spaces they inhabit."¹⁰⁷

As in the case of Illich's advocacy of an open network in *Deschooling Society*, Nietzsche would be skeptical about Illich's defense of the vernacular. While Nietzsche would argue that the vernacular would be the base upon which to build literacy, he would be wary of any endorsement of it that did not include self-observational discourse. He might also, as Illich himself does, question how much of the vernacular is

¹⁰⁴Illich, *In the Mirror of the Past*, 127.

¹⁰⁵Illich, *In the Mirror of the Past*, 126.

¹⁰⁶Illich, *In the Mirror of the Past*, 127.

¹⁰⁷Illich, *In the Mirror of the Past*, 56.

left in a technological order. Illich notes that the vernacular existence has been superseded by the consumer society and its taught colloquial discourse that more and more degrades into superficial codes that render individuals passive. Indeed, he admits that American colloquial has become divided into a commodity-language taught to "language producers by equipping them with a language stock"¹⁰⁸ and "an impoverished vernacular that tries to survive."¹⁰⁹

Neil Postman: Literacy, Power and Technopoly

Like Illich, Neil Postman has gone through two phases of thought, beginning as an exemplar of the 1960s counterculture and then going through a period of questioning that has led him to a "conserving" approach in the face of the power of bureaucratically-organized communications technologies that dominate the formation of sensibility and mentality. In his famous early work, *Teaching as a Subversive Activity*, written in collaboration with Charles Weingartner, Postman asked "that the schools be 'subversive,' that they serve as a kind of antibureaucracy bureaucracy."¹¹⁰ In that book, Postman, like Nietzsche, Freire and Illich, criticizes the "acroamatic method" of teaching, asserting that students in classrooms basically "sit and listen to the teacher," and "are required to believe in authorities" and "to *remember*[:]" They are almost never required to make observations, formulate definitions, or perform any

¹⁰⁸Illich, *In the Mirror of the Past*, 141.

¹⁰⁹Illich, *In the Mirror of the Past*, 127.

¹¹⁰Neil Postman and Charles Weingartner, *Teaching as a Subversive Activity* (New York: Delta, 1969), 13.

intellectual operations that go beyond repeating what someone else says is true."¹¹¹

In order to overcome what Nietzsche calls the "acroamatic method," what Illich names the "educational construct," and what Freire refers to as "the banking concept of education," early Postman advocated an "inquiry method" in which "students generate their own stories by becoming involved in the methods of learning."¹¹² He called for education to be "student centered," "question-centered," and "language-centered."¹¹³ Postman is here expressing in his way what Freire calls "generativity" and Illich calls "the vernacular."

In the years following the 1960s Postman did not so much alter his basic value commitments as acknowledge, similarly to Illich, the broader structural obstacles to radical reform. In *The Soft Revolution*, written as a guidebook for students, Postman, again collaborating with Weingartner, advanced proposals for gentle subversion: working within the system through peaceful resistance and social service rather than against the system through the violent and disruptive protests that he believed had too often characterized radicalism in the 1960s.¹¹⁴ By 1979, Postman had made his epistemic shift, calling for *Teaching as a Conserving Activity*.¹¹⁵ The schools were now to be fortified as resistance against the acroamatic mode of the mass media, which had become the effective system of (mis)education.

¹¹¹Postman and Weingartner, *Teaching as a Subversive Activity*, 19.

¹¹²Postman and Weingartner, *Teaching as a Subversive Activity*, 29.

¹¹³Postman and Weingartner, *Teaching as a Subversive Activity*, 102.

¹¹⁴Neil Postman and Charles Weingartner, *The Soft Revolution* (New York: Delta, 1971).

¹¹⁵Neil Postman, *Teaching as a Conserving Activity* (New York: Laurel, 1979).

Postman's line of media criticism continued in 1985 with *Amusing Ourselves to Death*.¹¹⁶ This study of "public discourse in the age of show business" makes a strong case for the perspective that "in the Age of Show Business and image politics, political discourse is emptied not only of ideological content but of historical content, as well."¹¹⁷ With the publication of *Technopoly* in 1992,¹¹⁸ Postman defines a system of technological control that he believes can only be countered by schools.

According to Postman, "we may have reached the point where cosmetics has replaced ideology as the field of expertise over which a politician must have competent control."¹¹⁹ Freire's pedagogy for literacy is "seemingly" displaced by the television world. Indeed, there are elements in Freire's pedagogy that connect to modern ideas of the responsible and educated citizen-participant in democratic politics, in the "public" arena. Postman's postmodern insights on television and its replacement of the printed word by the visual image changes the modern epistemology of discourse.

Postman, like Nietzsche, teaches that "the 'truth' is a kind of cultural prejudice."¹²⁰ Postman may not be willing to "claim that changes in media bring about changes in the structure of people's minds or changes in their cognitive capacities," "limiting" his argument to how a "major new medium [television] changes the structure of discourse."¹²¹ Nietzsche would make a more ambitious claim about the influence of media. For

¹¹⁶Neil Postman, *Amusing Ourselves to Death: Public Discourse in the Age of Show Business* (New York: Penguin, 1985).

¹¹⁷Postman, *Amusing Ourselves to Death*, 136.

¹¹⁸Neil Postman, *Technopoly: The Surrender of Culture to Technology* (New York: Vintage, 1992).

¹¹⁹Postman, *Amusing Ourselves to Death*, 4.

¹²⁰Postman, *Amusing Ourselves to Death*, 22.

¹²¹Postman, *Amusing Ourselves to Death*, 27.

Nietzsche (and Freire), a change in the discourse changes everything. In both an earlier and a later text, Postman does state that "every teacher ought to be a semantics teacher, since it is not possible to separate language from what we call knowledge."¹²²

For Postman, "every new technology for thinking involves a tradeoff."¹²³ And "a television-based epistemology pollutes public communication and its surrounding landscape."¹²⁴ "Our politics, religion, news, athletics, education and commerce have been transformed into congenial adjuncts of show business, largely without protest or even much popular notice. The result is that we are on the verge of amusing ourselves to death."¹²⁵ As for Illich, who noted the decline of the vernacular, for Postman the root of the epistemological corruption is a "loss of narrative" that follows from the "erosion of symbols" and is "one of the most debilitating consequences of Technopoly's power."¹²⁶ Nietzsche, too, did not believe that "it was possible to remove the native soil from under a man's feet and that he should still remain standing."¹²⁷ Nietzsche, however, had no idea that the visual "symbol drain" would be realized (he was not privy to television) despite his ability "to steal glimpses of the future out of the very entrails of existing conditions."¹²⁸ But he did talk about the *last man* who would sit and "blink" while the world went by. Nietzsche's privileging of laughter as joyful wisdom seems as far from Postman's critique of amusement as is possible.

¹²²Postman, *Teaching as a Conserving Activity*, 130; Postman, *Technopoly*, 194.

¹²³ Postman, *Amusing Ourselves to Death*, 29.

¹²⁴ Postman, *Amusing Ourselves to Death* 28.

¹²⁵Postman, *Amusing Ourselves to Death*, 3-4.

¹²⁶Postman, *Technopoly*, 171.

¹²⁷Nietzsche, "On the future of our educational institutions," 65.

¹²⁸Nietzsche, "On the future of our educational institutions," 10.

In Nietzsche's day, newspaper journalism began the trend toward "the greatest possible *expansion* of education on the one hand, and a tendency *to minimise and weaken* it on the other."¹²⁹ According to Postman, "television is not only a curriculum but *constitutes the major educational enterprise now being undertaken in the United States*,"¹³⁰ and "the television commercial [is] the most voluminous information source in the education of youth."¹³¹ Furthermore, Postman has suggested that "the content of the TV curriculum is irrefutable. You can dislike it but you cannot disagree with it;"¹³² one can neither refute an image nor "information [that] moves in one direction."¹³³ He describes the "TV curriculum [as] *attention-centered, nonpunitive, affect-centered, present-centered, image-centered, narration-centered, moralistic, nonanalytical, nonhierarchical, authoritarian, contemptuous of authority, continuous in time, isolating in space, discontinuous in content, immediately and intrinsically gratifying*"¹³⁴ [whereas in his view "the school curriculum is subject-matter-centered, word-centered, reason-centered, future-centered, hierarchical, secular, socializing, segmented, and coherent,"¹³⁵ and should be]. Ironically, Postman posits that although television is a mass medium, "the TV curriculum is individual-centered;"¹³⁶ that is, "its epistemology begins and largely ends in the viscera."¹³⁷ Even so, "The Mass Man, as

¹²⁹Nietzsche, "On the future of our educational institutions," 35-36.

¹³⁰Postman, *Teaching as a Conserving Activity*, 51.

¹³¹Postman, *Teaching as a Conserving Activity*, 61.

¹³²Postman, *Teaching as a Conserving Activity*, 57.

¹³³Postman, *Teaching as a Conserving Activity*, 65.

¹³⁴Postman, *Teaching as a Conserving Activity*, 68.

¹³⁵Postman, *Teaching as a Conserving Activity*, 81.

¹³⁶Postman, *Teaching as a Conserving Activity*, 63.

¹³⁷Postman, *Teaching as a Conserving Activity*, 59.

McLuhan describes him, is one whose private identity is merged with the corporate whole."¹³⁸

In a culture where television is hegemonic, Nietzsche's democratic question becomes how do we individualize in a media environment of visual signifiers? What can literacy mean in a world of virtual reality defined as technology that provides an externalized imagination as a sensory field in place of the world of ordinary perception? It means the same kind of empowerment as it does for Nietzsche and Freire, but now literacy is a form of resistance to being placed in a state of technological dependency. Postman, as diagnostician and educator, shares with Freire and Nietzsche the attitude of knowing your times to transcend your times. "Clearly, there is no more important function for education to fulfill than that of helping us to recognize the world we actually live in and, simultaneously, of helping us master concepts that will increase our ability to cope with it. This is the essential criterion for judging the relevance of all education."¹³⁹ Coping with and transcending today's world means, for Postman, that "each person must decide how to enact [the] ideas" of a "loving technological resistance fighter."¹⁴⁰ Part of loving resistance for Postman is education in literacy, despite the pervasiveness of technopoly: "We need students who will understand the relationships between our technics and our social and psychic worlds, so that they may begin informed conversations about where technology is taking us and how."¹⁴¹ With loving resistance, Postman has expanded upon his goal in *Teaching as a Subversive Activity* "to help all students develop built-in, shockproof

¹³⁸Postman, *Teaching as a Conserving Activity*, 79.

¹³⁹Postman and Weingartner, *Teaching as a Subversive Activity*, 212.

¹⁴⁰Postman, *Technopoly*, 185.

¹⁴¹Postman, *Technopoly*, 198.

crap detectors as basic equipment in their survival kits."¹⁴² In *Technopoly*, he adds that "irreverence" is "an antidote for excessive or artificial piety, and is especially necessary when piety is used as a political weapon."¹⁴³

With his perspective on technopoly, the rule of technologies and the elites (technocracy) that control them over life, Postman supplements Nietzsche's pedagogy. "Every technology . . . is a product of a particular economic and political context and carries with it a program, an agenda, and a philosophy that may or may not be life-enhancing and that therefore requires scrutiny, criticism and control."¹⁴⁴ "In fact, I can think of few curriculum innovations more useful than the schools' giving a special course called 'The Technicalization of America.'"¹⁴⁵ Postman shares McLuhan's view that as we tried "to control atom-bomb fallout, so we will one day try to control media fallout. Education will become recognized as civil defense against media fallout."¹⁴⁶

One has to wonder if this is so when television has invaded the classroom. Michael Apple shows all too clearly how Whittle Communication's Channel One usage in the schools "creates the captive audience:" "Schools must guarantee that ninety percent of the pupils will be watching [ten minutes of 'news' and two minutes of commercials] ninety percent of the time [every school day for three to five years];" in exchange the school receives the electronic equipment needed to receive the transmission for "free."¹⁴⁷ Apple characterizes Channel One as "the

¹⁴²Postman and Weingartner, *Teaching as a Subversive Activity*, 218.

¹⁴³Postman, *Technopoly*, 167.

¹⁴⁴Postman, *Technopoly*, 185.

¹⁴⁵Postman, *Teaching as a Conserving Activity*, 175.

¹⁴⁶Postman, *Teaching as a Conserving Activity*, 82.

¹⁴⁷Michael W. Apple, *Official Knowledge: Democratic Education in a Conservative Age* (New York: Routledge, 1993), 97.

officially sponsored opening up of school content to commercial sponsorship and organization."¹⁴⁸ Of course, textbook usage also creates a captive audience, but Channel One does it with all the problems and perils inherent in the visual medium of television. As Jonathan Kozol notes: "Time at least is on the side of the reflective reader [of printed materials]."¹⁴⁹ Apple suggests that "it is more than a little romantic to assume that teachers will always be able to spend already scarce time on deconstructing the news or 'playing' with the commercials."¹⁵⁰ And even for those who find the time to deconstruct and subvert Whittle's project, its mere usage teaches that "the citizen as a political being with reciprocal rights and duties is lost. In its place is the self as *consumer*. Schooling (and students) [have become] 'a retail product.'"¹⁵¹

Arthur Kroker, a contemporary political and cultural theorist, characterizes the current state of "possessed individualism" as "subjectivity to a point of aesthetic excess that the self no longer has any real existence, only a perspectival appearance as a site where all the referents converge and implode."¹⁵² For Kroker, gone is the "possessive individual as the consumer par excellence;" now we have the "possessed individual as itself an object of consumption."¹⁵³ Apple's analysis of Channel One makes this all too clear. According to Robert Michels, the early twentieth-century political sociologist, the Marxist cultural revolution has occurred and instead of a transvaluation we have "proletarian culture at a higher

¹⁴⁸ Apple, *Official Knowledge: Democratic Education in a Conservative Age*, 94.

¹⁴⁹ Jonathan Kozol, *Illiterate America* (New York: Plume, 1985), 178.

¹⁵⁰ Apple, *Official Knowledge: Democratic Education in a Conservative Age*, 114.

¹⁵¹ Apple, *Official Knowledge: Democratic Education in a Conservative Age*, 116.

¹⁵² Arthur Kroker, *The Possessed Individual* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 5.

¹⁵³ Kroker, *The Possessed Individual*, 6.

level."¹⁵⁴ Nietzsche's *last man* is "the couch potato." Unfortunately it is no longer necessary to stay at home, the schools now too allow (teach?) each of us to sit and "blink" as the [techno-corporate transformed] world goes by.

Jonathan Kozol: Literacy, the State, and Schooling

The question remains, can one be individualized in today's public schools? Jonathan Kozol's contemporary studies of America's public schools supplement Nietzsche in that Kozol brings the cultural criticism they in great part share up-to-date. He might not say much that differs, but he says it/sees it now. Where they do differ is on the use of "we." Kozol [and all the contemporary democratic educational reformers] hopes/strives for a "transformative we" ["the first person plural"] -- a "we" based on critical reflection and not on collective ideology -- that can only result from "the sense of [the] self-possession to say 'I.'"¹⁵⁵ A "transformative we" is something that Nietzsche did not express/advocate. [But he did believe that once a person was fully individualized, the gift-giving virtue would emerge.] Even with this difference, the focus and the process of their pedagogies are similar. Who can read Kozol's *Death at an Early Age*,¹⁵⁶ *The Night is Dark and I am Far From Home*,¹⁵⁷ *Illiterate America*,¹⁵⁸ *Rachel and Her Children*,¹⁵⁹ and/or *Savage Inequalities*,¹⁶⁰ and not believe that Kozol has a pedagogical focus on/for individualization?

¹⁵⁴Robert Michels, *Political Parties*, trans. Eden and Cedar Paul (New York: Collier, 1962).

¹⁵⁵Jonathan Kozol, *On Being a Teacher*, (Oxford: Oneworld Publications Ltd., 1993), 10.

¹⁵⁶Jonathan Kozol, *Death at an Early Age* (New York: Bantam, 1968).

¹⁵⁷Jonathan Kozol, *The Night Is Dark and I Am Far from Home* (New York: Touchstone, 1990).

¹⁵⁸Jonathan Kozol, *Illiterate America* (New York: Plume, 1985).

¹⁵⁹Jonathan Kozol, *Rachel and Her Children* (New York: Crown, 1988).

¹⁶⁰Jonathan Kozol, *Savage Inequalities* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1991).

With the insight that all language is social, it is clear that we are all we's before we are each ever an I. The work to be done is to take the we and individualize an I. In (at least) two of his books, Kozol introduces the idea that "schools, by tradition, do all that they can to train us *not* to speak in the first person."¹⁶¹ He criticizes "the well-indoctrinated man" who "contemplates in the conditional, aspires in the subjunctive and regrets in the pluperfect. There are few moments when he dares to speak and live in the first-person present."¹⁶² The "present" that Kozol privileges here is not the "present" that Postman criticizes in reference to the epistemology of television. Kozol's first-person present is constituted by the individual's involvement in practices, whereas Postman's televised present is geared to "immediate gratification" and does not require the individual "to remember or anticipate anything."¹⁶³

Kozol shows how the basis of the split between thought and life fostered by the schools is the way in which the schools function to train children to serve the existing structures of institutional power. Kozol notes, echoing Nietzsche in "On the future of our educational institutions," in his compelling *The Night is Dark and I Am Far from Home*, that "children do not go to school for 'their own good.' They go to school for something called 'their nation's good.'"¹⁶⁴ "Public schools in the U.S. do not exist to educate an ethical human being."¹⁶⁵ "There is no pretense here of going to school to learn to be a sensitive, loving or compassionate

¹⁶¹Kozol, *On Being a Teacher*, 10; Kozol, *The Night is Dark and I am Far from Home*, 108-118.

¹⁶²Kozol, *The Night Is Dark and I Am Far from Home*, 116.

¹⁶³Postman, *Teaching as a Conservative Activity*, 60.

¹⁶⁴Kozol, *The Night Is Dark and I Am Far from Home*, 34.

¹⁶⁵Kozol, *The Night Is Dark and I Am Far from Home*, 166.

person."¹⁶⁶ Where is the pedagogy that allows children "to grow up, not just smart and slick, but also ethical and strong"?¹⁶⁷

Nietzsche too reflected on this for-other, for-self split. As Kozol observes, "our own schools were modeled on the German system more than a century ago and both systems have quite similar objectives."¹⁶⁸ As stated in Chapter One, Nietzsche warned that this education proceeds by conditioning and seducing "a way of thinking and behaving that, once it has become a habit, instinct, and passion, will dominate [each] *to [their] own ultimate disadvantage* but 'for the general good.'"¹⁶⁹ As Kozol puts it: "School serves the state. The interests of *this* state are not compatible with private ethics or unmanageable dissent."¹⁷⁰

According to Kozol, our public schools run according to the principle "that earnest conscience, straightforward guilt, bad dreams, unsophisticated and direct self-accusation, are, in some sense, unwholesome, unattractive, not to be admired."¹⁷¹ He has diagnosed that "one of the most effective inhibitions planted in the consciousness of students and teachers in our public schools is a seldom-stated yet remorseless sense of terror at the possibility of *saying no*."¹⁷² Nietzsche teaches that "a good educator knows cases in which he is proud of the fact that his pupil remains true to himself *in opposition to him*."¹⁷³

¹⁶⁶Kozol, *On Being a Teacher*, 5.

¹⁶⁷Kozol, *On Being a Teacher*, 70.

¹⁶⁸Kozol, *On Being a Teacher*, 24.

¹⁶⁹Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, #21.

¹⁷⁰Kozol, *The Night Is Dark and I Am Far from Home*, 37.

¹⁷¹Kozol, *The Night Is Dark and I Am Far from Home*, 172.

¹⁷²Kozol, *On Being a Teacher*, 21.

¹⁷³Friedrich Nietzsche, "Assorted opinions and maxims," in *Human, All Too Human*, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), #268.

In *On Being a Teacher*, Kozol develops his counterpart of Illich's "disciplined dissidence" and Postman's "loving resistance fighting:" "disobedience instruction."¹⁷⁴ He calls for teachers to be and to educate "intellectual guerrillas,"¹⁷⁵ "ethical rebels,"¹⁷⁶ and "gentle rebels."¹⁷⁷ He is not, he makes clear, calling for subversion or for "deschooling," but for a freer play of ideas.¹⁷⁸ The "gentle rebel" is a kindred type to Postman's "loving resistance fighter": "A gentle rebel often moves more slowly, agrees to bypass some of the small battles, tries very hard to avoid the needless suffering of others -- and ends up winning the real war."¹⁷⁹ Kozol's rebel neither willfully takes a stand for the sake of doing so nor goes to self-indulgent extremes but tries to "achieve a goal"¹⁸⁰ and to be "an infinitely more careful scholar than the writer or speaker of innocuous and inoffensive views."¹⁸¹ Gentle rebellion is constituted by "logical dissent in the face of a dishonest obligation."¹⁸² Returning to the theme of the first-person singular, teachers should foster the capacity "to speak out and to *be*, an open and at all times undisguised 'first person.'"¹⁸³

For Kozol, as for Freire, Illich, Postman, and Nietzsche, there can be no rebellion/resistance without literacy: "Literacy cannot wholly counteract the visual and aural violence of the mass media; but it can reduce the impact of that violence by placing it in context and by introducing counteracting forces in the form of calm aesthetic satisfactions

¹⁷⁴Kozol, *On Being a Teacher*, 21-28.

¹⁷⁵Kozol, *On Being a Teacher*, 3.

¹⁷⁶Kozol, *On Being a Teacher*, 116.

¹⁷⁷Kozol, *On Being a Teacher*, 48.

¹⁷⁸Kozol, *On Being a Teacher*, 95.

¹⁷⁹Kozol, *On Being a Teacher*, 48.

¹⁸⁰Kozol, *On Being a Teacher*, 52.

¹⁸¹Kozol, *On Being a Teacher*, 19.

¹⁸²Kozol, *On Being a Teacher*, 78.

¹⁸³Kozol, *On Being a Teacher*, 11.

that transcend the hedonistic thrill of instantaneous and often mesmerizing exaltations."¹⁸⁴ In his study of *Illiterate America*, Kozol notes that in this country illiteracy is neither an "accident" nor an "error."¹⁸⁵ As such, he sees literacy as "civil disobedience in pedagogic clothes."¹⁸⁶ In Kozol, the Althusserian distinction between politics and Politics (seems to) merge when he discusses literacy. He makes a strong case for the "probability that ethical rebellion will be met with powerful retaliation;"¹⁸⁷ he shows that historically it always has. Kozol's "disobedience instruction" is an "informed irreverence."¹⁸⁸ He distinguishes between "sheer vindictive malice of defiance and aggression on the one hand, and a vigorous note of ethical irreverence on the other."¹⁸⁹

There can be no convergence of thought and life, no literacy as defined by Nietzsche, Freire, Postman, Illich or Kozol, without the ability to question and position oneself critically within one's circumstances. For Kozol: "One of the best ways to determine whether students have been given an authentic set of choices, I suggest, is by demanding a response to one specific question: 'Is there anything here within this room to keep a child awake at night with painful self-examination? Is there anything here which can compel the students to confront, not just the textbooks and not just their teacher, but *themselves* as well with questions that might warrant a legitimate debate?'"¹⁹⁰ Recalling Freire on "generativity," Illich on the "vernacular," and Postman on the "inquiry method," Kozol shows that

¹⁸⁴Kozol, *Illiterate America*, 177.

¹⁸⁵Kozol, *Illiterate America*, 89.

¹⁸⁶Kozol, *Illiterate America*, 92.

¹⁸⁷Kozol, *Illiterate America*, 175.

¹⁸⁸Kozol, *Illiterate America*, 175.

¹⁸⁹Kozol, *On Being a Teacher*, 25.

¹⁹⁰Kozol, *On Being a Teacher*, 90.

literacy means that "people need to have the power to inform *themselves*."¹⁹¹ "Literacy must comprehend the arrogance of taste: the willingness to state that some things count a lot, others much less, and some things not at all."¹⁹²

The very opposite of students informing themselves is what Kozol calls the "bizarre phenomenon of 'divided monologue,'"¹⁹³ which corresponds to Nietzsche's "acroamatic method," Freire's "banking concept of education," Illich's "educational construct" and Postman's one-way curriculum. In the divided monologue, "the teacher asks, and the teacher replies -- even though the replies appear to be coming from the mouths of children."¹⁹⁴ That is, there is a "script," which comes from the educational bureaucracy and which is "subsequently read in two-part harmony by the teacher and the class. *It is all, however, being spoken by one person.*"¹⁹⁵

Kozol's belief that "the hidden curriculum . . . is the teacher's own integrity and lived conviction"¹⁹⁶ is a corollary to Nietzsche's convergence of thought and life and a form of loving resistance. This "hidden curriculum" is perhaps a key resistance to Postman's television curriculum, and might be cultivated to make it more so. As Postman states it: "There is no escaping the fact that the principal 'method' of any classroom is the personality and the knowledge of the teacher, which is to say, teaching is an art."¹⁹⁷ Kozol asserts that as teachers "we need also to be first persons in

¹⁹¹Kozol, *Illiterate America*, 159.

¹⁹²Kozol, *Illiterate America*, 179.

¹⁹³Kozol, *On Being a Teacher*, 55.

¹⁹⁴Kozol, *On Being a Teacher*, 55.

¹⁹⁵Kozol, *On Being a Teacher*, 55.

¹⁹⁶Kozol, *On Being a Teacher*, 20.

¹⁹⁷Postman, *Teaching as a Conserving Activity*, 191. Although Postman here has been shown to share the same discursive formation with Kozol, he criticizes him for not offering substantive and constructive proposals for reform. That criticism is unwarranted, since Kozol offers many concrete suggestions for building resistances and releases within and around the bureaucracies (which Kozol adopted in his teaching

the eyes of children in the deeper sense of letting all our own complexities, our viewpoints, hesitations, dreams and passions -- and our vulnerable aspects, too -- become apparent to the class."¹⁹⁸ This is the very opposite of the undemanding passivity that Postman associates with television and is kindred to Freire's notion of "generativity," of creating discourses for the particular, living participants in social situations. "All literacy, all language, in the long run, is a dialogue between one person and another."¹⁹⁹ As already shown for Nietzsche, Freire, Illich, and Postman -- for Kozol "love too is a part of literacy."²⁰⁰

Nietzschean-Reformist Pedagogy

We live in a world of oppressive mystification. It may be too late to speak of self-determination once one knows one is also an Althusserian transformer, interpellated into the economic, political, legal, medical, communication, relational, *ad nauseam* systems of production and control. But there is still room not to have to reduce life to a succession of moments each traded and called forth as commodities. Nietzsche's supplemented democratic philosophical pedagogy as developed here is a way of learning generative discourses that are both inter-individual and intra-individual. The core of Nietzschean individualization is self-care. As Foucault has observed, if there is still "the possibility of committing suicide, or jumping

practices). The spirit of these proposals, such as visits to the homes of students by teachers, is captured in the "willingness to undercut the grading system and the tracking system, to combat head-on the multiple modes of sex discrimination in a public school, to join in plans contrived to win our students license to do independent work outside of school and in this way to undercut the school attendance rules" [Kozol, *On Being a Teacher*, 126].

¹⁹⁸Kozol, *On Being a Teacher*, 12.

¹⁹⁹Kozol, *Illiterate America*, 162.

²⁰⁰Kozol, *Illiterate America*, 162.

out of the window or of killing the other," there is both "the possibility of resistance," and the possibility for "the ethic of care for the self as a practice of freedom."²⁰¹

Is a pedagogy aimed at self-care possible within a school setting or, more broadly, in a social setting, or must it be primarily or even solely a task of the solitary individual? That question crystallizes the problem of the relation between Nietzsche as democratic educationist and the discourse of contemporary radical democratic educational reform. As stated earlier, Nietzschean individualization is a social process by virtue of its mediation by language, but the contemporary reform literature goes farther, offering models and visions of cooperative educational relations.

Nietzsche and the reformers share the same criticism of the educational system of their times. Kozol and Nietzsche offer identical criticisms of the state as a disciplinary system that forms individuals to serve it rather than to become "beings in-and-for-themselves." Freire ("banking education"), Illich ("educational construct"), Kozol ("divided monologue"), Postman ("educational discourse"), and Nietzsche are at one in their criticism of what Nietzsche denounces as the "acroamatic" or declamatory method of teaching, in which pedagogy is constituted by a one-way mediation of a subject matter by a teacher to students. Postman and Nietzsche share a distrust of modern industrial elites, and Postman's notion of technopoly can be usefully read as an updating of Nietzschean criticism of the modern power structure and its use of education to inhibit individualization and to encourage standardized responses. Finally, although Freire's emphasis on class domination is not echoed by Nietzsche,

²⁰¹Michel Foucault, "The ethic of care for the self as a practice of freedom," trans. j.d. gauthier, s.j., in *The Final Foucault*, ed. James Bernauer and David Rasmussen, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988), 12.

the former shares with the latter the view that organized power structures operate to reduce individuals to what Freire calls "slave consciousness."

When Nietzsche faces up to the implications of these criticisms he does not think very far on the possibilities of a social context, but goes in the direction of self-cultivation. The reformers, in contrast, are concerned with relational reconstruction.

As it stands, Nietzsche could not accept the ways followed by the reformers because for all of them, individualization is understood as a radical moment within a social process, whether it be what Freire calls *conscientização*, Illich calls the "vernacular" way of living, Postman calls the "inquiry method," and Kozol calls a "transformative we." None of these conceptions, which implant the individual in networks of social relations would be satisfactory to Nietzsche, who prized individualization as an individual fulfillment and did not implant it in a social process.

Yet there is a possibility that neither Nietzsche nor the contemporary reformers have grasped that could bring them toward a rapprochement. In order to effect such a rapprochement both sides would have to change. From the Nietzschean side there would have to be acknowledgment that forms of cooperative or mutual or collaborative learning in which subject matter mediates relations between teachers and students might further individualization as an individual fulfillment. From the reformist side there would have to be an acceptance of individual fulfillment as the goal of cooperative/mutual/collaborative learning -- that is, to orient educational relations toward self-care rather than common care. This is not to say that Nietzsche himself or any of the reformers would be favorable to such a

rapprochement but only that it would provide a social dimension to a democratic *Nietzschean* pedagogy.

The most promising way of adding a social dimension to Nietzschean pedagogy through the reform literature is through the notions of generativity and vernacular. The cooperative generation of language through forms of discussion is a process that can be directed to the personalization of vernacular (not solipsistic or schizophrenic language, but shared discourse that honors and encourages individual differences) and that is given its principle by the realization that literacy is finally meant to be an individual fulfillment, the vehicle through which each expresses and figures out *their* world in addition to contributing to a common discourse. From the broad base of cooperative literacy for personalized discourse a Nietzschean-reformist pedagogy "against the times" would foster "critical consciousness"/*conscientização* (Freire), "loving resistance fighting" (Postman), "disciplined dissidence" (Illich), and "informed irreverence" (Kozol), all of which are terms for the defensive arts, the practice of which train people to stand up to the pressures of bureaucratic structures. Indeed, without the cultivation of the arts of social defense in a cooperative setting it is unlikely that anyone in the technopoly could be brought to the strength necessary to undertake self-care on a sustained basis.

CODA

I have found the interview to be the most illuminating form of writing about a writer's general judgments. Therefore, for my concluding remarks, I have constructed an interview with myself to allow for the freedom, latitude and informality that the interview permits.¹

Q: Why Nietzsche?

First off, let me make it clear that when I was first introduced to Nietzsche's texts (1984), I had no idea that the Nietzsche industry existed, let alone that it was thriving. I also had no idea how strong the resistance against him has been. It would not be an understatement to say that reading Nietzsche gave me my first glimmer of feeling as if there was another person who walked this earth who was a kindred spirit of mine. Studying Nietzsche has led me to others.

When I began graduate school (a direct result of reading Nietzsche) I experienced a smorgasbord of thinkers/disciplines. As the coursework for the Ph.D. loomed close to being completed, I realized that Nietzsche was the only thinker I felt passionate about -- or more honestly -- the only thinker I felt and thought so clearly to be someone whose ideas could sustain me for the time needed to do good scholarship for a dissertation.

¹I thank bell hooks for her dialogue with herself [Gloria Watkin], for giving me the idea to interview myself. See bell hooks, "bell hooks speaking about Paulo Freire - The man, his work," in *Paulo Freire: A Critical Encounter*, ed. Peter McLaren and Peter Leonard (New York: Routledge, 1993): 146-154.

Once I delved in with that kind of intensity, I discovered that I was right! What I did not know was how empowering the work on Nietzsche would be. I would like to acknowledge the wisdom of Mike Weinstein for knowing enough about me and Nietzsche to support and encourage this project.

Q: What attracted you to the writings of contemporary educational reformers in the first place?

Initially it was the title, *The Night is Dark and I Am Far From Home*,² that intrigued me and introduced me to the literature. When I discovered the book, I had no idea who Jonathan Kozol was, or how this work would radically change me. The book spoke to me because it allowed me to reinterpret my high school experiences and gave me the empowerment of transvaluing those experiences from the way the system valued them. After reading Kozol I was almost "proud" of my "delinquent" years. I had learned to say no! The success/enjoyment/ usefulness/benefit of this reading motivated me to seek out Illich's *Deschooling Society*.³ Then it was Neil Postman's *Teaching as a Subversive Activity*.⁴ Once I became responsible for teaching teacher-candidates, I sought out all the literature that offered me alternatives to the practices I had been subjected to. It wasn't until I was studying for my preliminary examinations that I encountered Paulo Freire. I remain grateful to Ken Meyer for assigning him to me as someone I had to encounter and make my way with before I began to write my dissertation.

²Jonathan Kozol, *The Night Is Dark and I Am Far from Home* (New York: Touchstone, 1990).

³Ivan Illich, *Deschooling Society* (New York: Harper, 1970).

⁴Neil Postman and Charles Weingartner, *Teaching as a Subversive Activity* (New York: Delta, 1969).

Q: How did your response to these writers change as you engaged them more deeply?

I became much more critical, more critical of many of the writings as well. Though I found it more useful to temper the reformers, I did not abandon their insights. What was the most difficult was coming to terms with my students' reactions to these works which have ranged from total denial, to "things are different here," to ridicule. Colleagues outside of the discipline of education, even though students themselves, have been even more resistant to my excitement in sharing these texts. Even taking all that in, I found it impossible to put aside this literature.

Q: Do they still have anything to offer you?

Yes. Alternatives to the "grow up and join in the educational discourse formation as it is" for one. Food for thought about what it means to be "successful" without full participation in the ways things are for another. As I spent more time with Nietzsche, I found more and more similarities between his texts and this literature. Being a Nietzsche fan left these works with plenty to offer me.

Q: How do you conceive of your own participation in the educational system?

Always a student, wanting to learn, to grow, to overcome. As a teacher, I have greatly enjoyed helping students with whatever needs they express and have not yet brought to conscious expression, helping them individualize. There is no doubt that many of my classroom experiences

have yielded both positive energy and health for all involved. I would go so far as to state that I am always a student, even when paid as a teacher. That is, no matter how much students in my classes may have learned/grown, I have learned as much (if not more) than they have. I remain a dedicated teacher-learner.

Q: How does that kind of participation fit in or not with the ideas of the democratic educational reformers?

I stand with Postman as a loving resistance fighter; with Kozol as an informed irreverent, a gentle rebel; with Freire in my never-ending pursuit for a critical consciousness; with Illich in my caring for the vernacular versus technical specialized language.

Q: Are there limits to achieving the values to which you are committed in working within the system?

There are limits but I cannot negate my joyful experiences in the classroom as both teacher and student. I am not willing to give up either my own growth and pleasure or the opportunity to reach and help others in their quest for a good life.

Q: What do you mean by philosophy across the curriculum?

A constant, not to be restricted to one class period or semester of study, continuous, stance/attitude/way of being-in-the-world that takes nothing for granted, questions everything, feels thoughtfully, does not negate what to most are the small, insignificant details of life (such as eating and sleeping), expresses, admits and encounters both the external and

internal limits and opportunities -- keeping the self -- in this finite life in as clear a view as is possible. Philosophy across the curriculum is also philosophy beyond the curriculum because the work toward *amor fati* and health is a life's work. It is democratic in that it is available as a way of life for everyone.

Q: How is this way of being-in-the-world articulated within schools?

I don't believe it is for the most part, at least not in the public schools. Between national-standardized testing, social accountability, and the constant (creation) (reminder) of our so-called needs, most of the focus is on the state, consumer, and techno-corporate needs. As shown in Chapter Three, our public schools educate students to be in-and-for-others. Philosophy across the curriculum is a pedagogy for the oppressed.

Q: How can it be? Or can it be?

I have been lucky to experience philosophy across the curriculum in many pockets of the educational system, most notably in political theory courses taught at a major midwestern land-grant university. This occurred due to sympathetic, non-traditional, instruction where the focus remained on the student and not on the discipline or some pre-set conditions, behavioral objectives, or expectations.

Q: Would that be the same as Nietzsche's way of working in the system?

For Nietzsche, there was no working within the system. This is why I felt the need to supplement his texts in this work. Unfortunately for him there was no sympathetic teacher or student who was living flesh and

blood. He was no educational reformer on these terms in his short-lived teaching practice.

Q: Is there anything else?

"Do not ask me who I am and do not ask me to remain the same."⁵

"Fight the power," work for/from strength. Turn off the television, throw out the newspaper, dance to the music. Do not overlook the great "dead white males" as you read, experiment, and search for integral and alternative voices. Philosophy as coherent, organized, systematization may be dead but "truths" (need not) (must not) be denied.

⁵Michel Foucault, *The Archeology of Knowledge*, trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon, 1972), 17.

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