

cR

Centro
de Referência
Paulo Freire

**Este documento faz parte do acervo
do Centro de Referência Paulo Freire**

acervo.paulofreire.org



InstitutoPauloFreire

**A THEORY OF
RELATIONAL KNOWLEDGE
(working title)**

A dissertation proposal submitted by

LYNNE E. RICHARDS

to
THE FIELDING INSTITUTE

in partial fulfillment of
the requirement for the
degree of

Doctor of Philosophy
in
Human and Organization Systems

Peter Park, Ph.D.
Chair

Willy DeMarcell Smith, Ph.D.
Associate Dean

Jody Veroff
Second Faculty Member

Matt Hamabata
Research Faculty Member

Dina Boogaard
Student Member

March 27, 1996

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Location of the Problem	1
Introduction	1
I. The Need for Community Building and Liberatory Praxis	5
The Market	5
Radical Individualism	6
Institutionalizing Social Responsibility	7
Social Capital	9
The Decline of Social Capital in the United States	10
The Norms of Social Capital: Trust and Reciprocity	11
Communicative Interaction	14
II. Dialogue and Knowledge	16
Freirean Dialogue	16
Knowledge Produced Through Freirean Dialogue	17
From the Social to the Intimate Realm	20
Trust and Knowledge in the Intimate Realm	21
What Does It Mean To Know Something?	22
Relational Knowledge	22
III. Statement of the Problem	24
My Research Questions	25
The Context of Discovery and the Context of Justification/Validation	25
The Two-Fold Nature of the Contexts: For the Individual and For the External World	26
Discovery	26
Justification/Validation	27
Summary	29
Method of Inquiry	33
I. Overall Plan for the Study	33

Locating Relational Knowledge Within the Forms of Knowledge	33
A Hermeneutic Treatment of Theories of Relationship and Intimacy	34
Establishing a Theory of Relational Knowledge	36
The Issue of Justification/Validation for Relational Knowledge	37
Contributions Made by This Study	38
Fundamental Lingering Questions	38
II. A Theoretical Dissertation	38
III. Hermeneutic Work with Literature as Data	40
IV. Focus Groups for Feedback on Theory Drawn from the Hermeneutic Process	41
V. Concerns	43
About Generalized Theory	43
About Articulating the Relational Through a Purely Representational Medium	44
About Constructing a Discourse to Overcome the the Effects of the Dominant Discourse While Still Being a Member of That Dominant Discourse	45
The Importance of the Topic	47
I. As an Aid to Theory Development and Practice for Community Building and Liberatory Praxis	47
II. To Aid in the Legitimation of Marginalized Knowledge Within the Social Sciences	48
Summary	51
References	52

Appendices	59
Appendix A:	59
Primary Texts Relevant to a Discussion of the Forms of Knowledge	59
Supplementary Texts Relevant to a Discussion	59
Appendix B:	61
Primary Texts Relevant to a Theory of Relational Knowledge	61
Supplementary Texts Relevant to a Theory of Relational Knowledge	61
Appendix C:	65
Primary Texts Relevant to the Issue of Justification/ Validation for Relational Knowledge	65
Supplementary Texts Relevant to the Issue of Relational Knowledge	65

Location of the Problem

Introduction

The topic of this dissertation is relational knowledge. But the location of the problem that led me to such a seemingly esoteric topic is pretty far afield from psychological theories of relationship or philosophical arguments about epistemology. My need for a theory of relational knowledge begins with my concern about community building and liberatory praxis: How do we work together to address the shared social and institutional problems that confront us on a daily basis? How does one disempowered voice join with others (of the same or different social status, race, or gender) to become empowered and positively transform our collective daily experience?

These are age-old questions that seemingly must be answered again and again. In 1740, philosopher David Hume told the tale of two farmers whose predicament foreshadows much of our current malaise.

Your corn is ripe today; mine will be so tomorrow. 'Tis profitable for us both, that I should labour with you today, and that you should aid me tomorrow. I have no kindness for you, and know you have as little for me. I will not, therefore, take any pains upon your account; and should I labour with you upon my own account, in expectation of a return, I know I should be disappointed, and that I should in vain depend upon your gratitude. Here then I leave you to labour alone; You treat me in the same manner. The seasons change; and both of us lose our harvests for want of mutual confidence and security. (cited in Sugden, 1986, p. 106)

Third World farmers today have irrigation and harvesting needs in common but have difficulty pooling their energy and scant resources for mutual gain. As parents, we all want the best for our children, yet we seldom succeed at working together to improve their schools or make their playgrounds safe (Putnam, 1993b). Sociologists have variously dubbed this condition--our difficulty with cooperation toward mutual gain-- "the tragedy of commons; the logic of collective action; public goods; prisoners' dilemma" (1993b, p. 35). In each case, despite our best interests, we tend to move away from, rather than toward, cooperative effort. We choose separation and individuation rather than commitment and community (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, and Tipton, 1985).

In my work as well as my life, I have learned that real transformation comes about only by engaging a person's heart. I have also discovered that the engagement of the heart comes about primarily through connection to other human beings. The power of that connection is fundamental for personal and social transformation. Whatever the venue--non-profit agencies, large corporations, community associations, or my own family--I have found, over and over, that true relationship to another person is the primary path that moves one to social action.

In the many studies that have recognized and explored the need for a greater sense of community and more liberatory praxis, the point has been made both implicitly and explicitly that relationship is critical to the success of an

emancipatory agenda. Through this study, I am proposing to add to the conversation a critical look at the epistemological content of relationship, based on my suspicion that we cannot operationalize the development of relationship without such an understanding.

My dissertation project will attempt to define relational knowledge in operational terms, using a hermeneutic process to move back and forth between the current theories of relationship and intimacy as well as existing theories of representational and reflective knowledge. The objective is to develop a theory on the process by which we arrive at relational knowledge, analyzing the process and its epistemological content as thoroughly as philosophers of science have previously analyzed the process and content of empirical knowledge.

A further objective of the study is to examine the context of justification for relational knowledge. I intend to explore how one might come to justify a claim to the possession of relational knowledge and the possible criteria by which that claim might be validated. Inherent within this objective is the assumption that there is a need for claims to the validity of relational knowledge. I plan to both explore and challenge that basic assumption.

Also inherent within this study are the cultural and ideological biases of the researcher. Accordingly, it begins from an occidental, and specifically North American, view of the subject, centered on the more individualistic paradigm of the

west and then attempting to learn from the more collectivist concept of self and the associated relationship to other that is found in some African and Asian philosophies. While it is my intention to develop a theory of relational knowledge that is inclusive but not universal, the scope of the study will limit the depth of my review of non-western theories of self and relationship. A more in-depth study of the culturally-specific ways in which relational knowledge is created and understood awaits future research.

Because this is a theoretical dissertation, the data for my investigation will, in large part, be the existing texts on other studies and theories relevant to a theory of relational knowledge. Thus, through the course of the study, I will review a number of different bodies of literature. Because I have located the need for a theory of relational knowledge within the realm of community building and liberatory praxis, I will begin with a study of the literature in sociology and political science that treats the concepts of civil society, civic engagement, communicative interaction, and liberatory dialogue. Robert Putnam's work on the notion of social capital and Paulo Freire's work on dialogue and emancipatory pedagogy serve as focal points for the literature review in which I ground the need for this study.

I. The Need for Community Building and Liberatory Praxis

While the concept of democracy presupposes a certain disposition to work with others different from oneself toward shared ends, we persistently encounter a weakening of “that world known as civil society, a world of groups and associations and ties that bind” (Elshtain, 1995, p. 2). In the United States, two distinct forces appear to stoke the fire beneath this move toward separation and individuation rather than toward commitment and community. One is the market and the other our founding value of radical individualism.

The Market

Of the free-market concept as obstacle to the fostering of cooperation and civil society, Alan Wolfe (1989) wrote:

Although many have claimed that community need not necessarily decline as modernity advances, the concept of community is, at least to some degree, in tension with one of modernity’s major instruments: the market. “A community,” Thomas Bender has written, “involves a limited number of people in a somewhat restricted social space or network held together by shared understandings and a sense of obligations”; thus, for community to exist there must preexist “a network of social relations marked by mutuality and emotional bonds.” Community ties, consequently, are quite different than market ties. The former are intimate, reciprocal, and sympathetic, while the latter tend to be impersonal, rational, temporary, and instrumental. (p. 61)

While the value of rationality and instrumentalism has grown ever greater, the idea of civil society has never been specifically explicated in the United States. Rather, our collectivity came into being as a civil society and thus there was no need of a theory of such. While the populace has always been careful to protect its assumed values of trust, friendship, and association from any threat by the state, no guard was up for protection against economic strategy. If citizens of the United States “now are to protect the remaining realms of intimacy and community against the market, they will have to create, through conscious deliberation, the kinds of ties of civil society that they once assumed God or nature would automatically provide.” (p. 77)

Radical Individualism

Another countermeasure to the ties of civil society, radical individualism has always been embraced as the embodiment of the American spirit. We pride ourselves on our individual self-reliance and autonomy and we judge others who fall short on those measures. Ironically, however, this same individualism can only be experienced and understood through social and cultural patterns of meaning. We discover ourselves only through, not independent of others. Never are we ends in ourselves, but always part of a larger whole (Bellah et al, 1985).
Philosopher Charles Taylor (1992) describes the process: “My discovering my

own identity doesn't mean that I work it out in isolation, but that I negotiate it through dialogue, partly overt, partly internal, with others" (p.34).

Because of the desire for autonomy, our natural dependence upon social connection results in deep internal conflict at both the personal and societal level. The value we place upon individualism provokes our retreat from social commitments, while the innate yearning for connection with others makes the autonomous life feel empty and devoid of meaning. The struggles we experience "would be even greater if we did not, in fact, engage in practices that constantly limit the effects of an isolating individualism, even though we cannot articulate those practices nearly as well as we can the quest for autonomy" (Bellah et al, 1985, p. 151).

Institutionalizing Social Responsibility

One collective approach toward amelioration of this dichotomy is the delegation of civic commitment and our sense of social responsibility and connection to the realm of social services. We attempt to safeguard our individualistic rights by defaulting to institutionalized systems designed to serve the needs of faceless entities who were never consulted on the exact and personal nature of their needs. Nor were they actively involved in the process of getting those needs met (McKnight, cited in Elshtain, 1995). But true commitment and

social responsibility cannot be delegated. As long as the "others" remain faceless and generalized, compassion and commitment to service descend to the level of pity (Arendt, cited in Elshtain, 1995).

"Pity *for* is not the same as solidarity *with*" (Elshtain, 1995, p. 122). True political freedom can only be brought about when people work together, face to face, *mano a mano*, binding themselves to each other through mutual agreements and reciprocal promises. Concepts of collaboration and partnership must be employed by those wishing for greater cooperation toward mutually desired ends. The "good intentions" of institutionalized social services fall far short of community-minded action. "Civic cooperation requires trust that each participant will fulfill her or his obligations. Participation in a collective effort is increased by the extent to which each participant feels assured that others will honor their responsibilities" (Stone, 1995, p. 5).

Like Hume's farmers, trusting that it is in one's individual interest to believe in the good will and commitment of another often seems to be asking too much. At every level, from the global village to our national society to the local community to our own families, we have failed to integrate our interests-- "we have put our own good, as individuals, as groups, as a nation, ahead of the common good" (Bellah et al, 1985, p. 285). This failure is largely grounded in our fear that if we let go of our individualistic dream of private success for "a more

genuinely integrated societal community", we will have to sacrifice our autonomy, "collapsing into dependence and tyranny" (p. 286). We do not see that it is the profound fragmentation of our collective existence that most threatens our individuation; that our individual sense of dignity and autonomy can only be sustained by a communal integration (1985).

Social Capital

Civic alliances can be formed around a multiplicity of purposes--from economic development to educational improvement to historic preservation to welfare reform to neighborhood rezoning--but in every case the success of the cooperative effort will be contingent upon the mutual trust of the participants (Stone, 1995). Robert Putnam refers to the level of trust that must accompany any effort to promote cooperation as "social capital"--the features of social organization that enhance the efficacy of society by promoting cooperative efforts. The term was originally coined by James Coleman (1990).

Like other forms of capital, social capital is productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends that would not be attainable in its absence. . . . For example, a group whose members manifest trustworthiness and place extensive trust in one another will be able to accomplish much more than a comparable group lacking that trustworthiness and trust. (cited in Putnam, 1993b, p. 37)

The Decline of Social Capital in the United States

Putnam sees social capital as the necessary ingredient for participatory democracy and finds its decline evident in the lack of engagement in groups, associations, voting, and so forth. (Putnam, 1995a) He cites examples of individual activities being on the increase while group opportunities to perform these same activities are being dramatically rejected. While membership in new mass-membership organizations like Sierra Club, NOW, and AARP are up, the social connectedness of their members is generally limited to ties to common symbols, common leaders, and, sometimes, to common ideals, but not to each other. The only requirement for membership in this kind of association lies in writing a check for annual dues. The likelihood, for example, of membership increasing social trust, is slim. As Putnam puts it, "From the point of view of social connectedness, the Environmental Defense Fund and a bowling league are just not in the same category" (p. 71).

Evidence indicates that the United States' stock of true social capital has been dwindling for over a quarter of a century. If we compare ourselves with the previous generation, this evidence clearly shows us to be less connected with one another (Putnam, 1995b). Further, if studies in Latin America offer insights for grassroots efforts in the United States, our stock of social capital may be more critical than economic capital for the success of these efforts.

As an economist I had expected that the need to mobilize a minimal amount of capital would be at the root of at least some of the cooperative, worker-mandated enterprises. But it turned out that a more fundamental need is, once again, some experience dispelling isolation and mutual distrust. (Hirschman, 1984, pp. 56-57)

Based on these learnings, if, for example, we want to make a positive impact on the economic conditions of Appalachia, creating and increasing social capital in the region is imperative (Hille, 1994).

The Norms of Social Capital: Trust and Reciprocity

The kind of trust and engagement found in a community with a significant stock of genuine social capital assists the community in overcoming what economists call 'opportunism'--situations in which shared interests go unrealized as each individual takes advantage of some incentive to move away from collective action (Granovetter, 1985). In short, "One feels too much the 'I' and too little the 'we' " (Tullio-Altan, 1986, pp. 31-35). Like Hume's farmers, presumably decent people with no desire to harm one another, contemporary citizens feel compelled to take the individualist route since without confirmed commitments they have no guarantee against renegeing. In such cases, cooperation seems irrational, thus "all end up with an outcome no one wants--unharvested corn, overgrazed commons, deadlocked government" (Putnam, 1993a, p. 164).

So what will break this pattern? How can one person reasonably believe that the other will keep his or her word when there will always be temptations to abandon it? Putnam maintains that success in overcoming dilemmas of collective action and the self-defeating opportunism that ensue is contingent upon the broader social context in which the situation is occurring. "Voluntary cooperation is easier in a community that has inherited a substantial stock of social capital, in the form of norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement" (p. 167). In fact, networks of civic engagement encourage the development of both generalized reciprocity and social trust.

Such networks facilitate coordination and communication, amplify reputations, and thus allow dilemmas of collective action to be resolved. When economic and political negotiation is embedded in dense networks of social interaction, incentives for opportunism are reduced. At the same time, networks of civic engagement embody past success at collaboration, which can serve as a cultural template for future collaboration. Finally, dense networks of interaction probably broaden the participants' sense of self, developing the "I" into the "we", or (in the language of rational-choice theorists) enhancing the participants' "taste" for collective benefits. (1995a, p. 67)

While shared vision and reciprocal interest, drive the initial engagement, trust is the basic building block for cooperation (Keyes, Schwartz, Vidal, and Bratt, 1995). The more trust within a community, the more cooperation, which itself breeds even more trust (Putnam, 1993a). The trust sustained in social capital is not blind, however. It is based upon experience of an individual's or group's

past performance, current ability, and internal and external motivations. Bernard Williams (1988) has called a belief that is founded upon intimate familiarity with a particular individual "thick trust". With groups, a more impersonal or indirect kind of trust is called for. How personal trust becomes social trust is still ambiguous. Glenn Loury (cited in Putnam, 1993a) has suggested that social trust differs from trust among individuals as the latter admits of levels while the former is based more on the situation than personal character. Given what has been discussed thus far, it is not clear to me that the process is so clearly dichotomized. Certainly social trust will be based upon a situational assessment, but experience of an aggregated personal character of the group may also be a substantive factor.

Putnam (1993a) has maintained that often when group or association members know little about a group or one or more of its individual members, they will have to place their trust in the trust of others in order to fulfill their obligations. "As one informant puts it, 'mutual trust is lent'. Social networks allow trust to become transitive and spread: I trust you, because I trust her and she assures me that she trusts you" (pp. 169-169). Thus the network of civic engagement encourages a *prima facie* trust which in turn builds a new, deeper trust that now can be based upon experience of the "borrowed trust" having been warranted. "Successful collaboration in one endeavor builds connections and trust--social assets that facilitate future collaboration in other, unrelated tasks. As

with conventional capital, those who have social capital tend to accumulate more--them as has, gets" (Putnam cited in Hille, 1994, p. 2).

Communicative Interaction

We know ourselves as social selves--friends, lovers, parents, and children, members of a people (Bellah et al, 1985). Through our interaction as individuals we come to feel our connection to the collective--to the whole of humanity--at the most fundamental levels. Paulo Freire (1993) has pointed out that as a thinking individual, I cannot think without the co-participation of others.

There is no longer an "I think" but "we think." It is the "we think" which establishes the "I think" and not the contrary. This co-participation of the Subjects in the act of thinking is communication. Thus the object is not the end of the act of thinking, but the mediator of communication. (p.137)

Repeated communication and interaction are key to the development and maintenance of social capital as they are the vehicles through which trust is learned (Ostrom, 1990). Social capital is created over time, through a series of repeated interactions in which people learn about each other and discover the information needed to trust and cooperate with one another (Gruber, 1994). It thrives in an environment conducive to the ongoing development of relationships and behaviors

supportive of communicative interaction and cooperation rather than confrontation.

While the traditional form of confrontational interaction is not a hallmark of a community rich in social capital, neither will such a community be conflict-free. Rather, its members will have strong views and convictions that are communicated through rich dialogue, allowing for consideration of the opposing viewpoints of other members. Such dialogue will contain "both the heat of argument as well as the warmth of a nurturing environment within which to engage in productive communicative interaction" (Ward, 1994, p. 192). Aristotle conceived of a similar kind of "friendship" as the model for relations among members of the same political community (Walzer, 1980).

As with the development of trust, communicative interaction engenders more and better communicative interaction. The concepts of civil society and social capital are predicated upon the belief that it is only through coming together in the first place that we form the moral rules which make our interactions possible. A sociological approach to moral obligations must, therefore, focus on how we interact socially (Wolfe, 1989). We need a vision for the creation of environments of mutual respect and trust as well as acknowledgment of the fact that within dialogic interaction conflict must be constructively negotiated. In short, we need a framework that both "fosters and values a multiplicity of voices

without invalidating differences among participants" (Ward, 1994, p. 193).

Freirean dialogue provides such a vision and framework.

II. Dialogue and Knowledge

Dialogue is the communicative exchange of equal partners sharing information, but also sentiment and values. It is the means for bringing people together to explore the "sharedness of a problem, the connectedness of lives, and the common ground for action" (Park, 1989, p. 14). Through dialogue, people interact in praxis; they live humanly--expressing, developing, re-creating, and affirming their humanity (Lankshear, 1993).

Freirean Dialogue

Paulo Freire bases his pedagogical theory on the belief that every person, no matter how "ignorant" or oppressed, has the ability to look critically at the world through a dialogical encounter with others (McLaren and Leonard, 1993; Shaul, 1970). "People educate each other through the mediation of the world" (Freire, 1970, p. 14). Confirming their solidarity as human beings, they recapture the humanity usurped through the unequal power relationships that oppress them. Social capital is built as they realize the interconnection of their lives and thus their responsibility to and accountability for each other (Freire, 1970). To the extent

that this "solidarity in difference" is realized, the dialogical encounter "has the potential of becoming a truly liberating and transforming human experience for the participants" (Ward, 1994, p. 200).

Freire's vision of a liberatory dialogic method has a deeper emancipatory agenda than the more popularized conceptions of dialogue put forth by Bohm (1990) and Senge (1990).

Dialogue further requires an intense faith in [humanity], faith in their power to make and remake, to create and recreate, faith in their vocation to be more fully human (which is not a privilege of an elite, but the birthright of all). . . . Founding itself upon love, humility and faith, dialogue is a horizontal relationship of which mutual trust between the participants is the logical consequence. (Freire, cited in Lankshear, 1993, p. 101)

For Freire, the only path for true humanism is dialogue as it embodies authenticity and commitment in interaction. Through dialogue people transform the world, and in so doing, humanize it for everyone. Freire sees this transformation as a labor of love which cannot be accomplished by irreconcilables (Freire, 1970). Their encounter must be based on trust and openness.

Knowledge Produced Through Freirean Dialogue

The act of transforming reality demands a constant critical reflection on the world. Through liberatory dialogue, participants engage in the joint endeavor of

intellectual inquiry as the knowledge they seek unfolds through their discourse. Without communicative interaction, the act of knowing, because it is intersubjective, becomes incomprehensible. Thus, Freire has followed Eduardo Nicol (cited in Freire, 1993) in adding the relationship of dialogue to the three essential relationships comprising knowledge--the gnosiological, the logical, and the historical. "Knowledge is built up in the relations between human beings and the world, relations of transformation, and perfects itself in the problematization of these relations" (Freire, 1993, p. 109).

Though the process is not really so linear, raising intellectual capital is the next step once social capital has been accrued. While social capital allows people to come together in an effective way, it does little in helping to determine what they will accomplish. For that, intellectual capital is required (Gruber, 1994). This intellectual capital is the knowledge produced through dialogue. It is factual knowledge, but also interpersonal and critical knowledge. As individuals share perceptions, experiences, and perspectives, the group as a whole arrive at new understandings based on their collective life experience and knowledge (1994). Information becomes intellectual capital as it is shared, understood, and accepted through dialogue (Innes, 1988).

The kind of liberatory dialogue that Freire calls for must be based upon "an epistemology that values more than objective knowledge and that recognizes that

knowledge making is a collective endeavor” (Ward, 1994, p. 193). Oppressed people have been told so often that they are ignorant--that they know nothing and cannot learn--that finally, they come to believe it. Generally, they do not realize that they know many things learned through their experience with the world and with others (Freire, 1970).

When individuals come to know themselves, each other, and things about the concrete world, they come to understand how their personal knowledge is related to the knowledge of various communities and the inequitable power structures that impact their interaction. Freire (1970) cautions that this kind of dialogue is often difficult and is contingent upon a foundation of love, humility, faith in humanity, trust, hope, and critical thinking. The dialogue must be “critical” so that the group injustice in social situations will be comprehended and considered as a challenge to be met and transformed (Ward, 1994). The connections between root causes of their problems, what is required for a better life, and what must be done to achieve that vision become clear as their collective knowledge enables people to determine what their world could be like and how it could be run. “It is essential that people know how their lives can be different from what they are--full of injustice and suffering--and know how to achieve that end” (Park, 1989, p. 1).

“By its definition, ‘social capital’ requires, in the long term, an approach which stresses ‘collaborative empowerment’ or ‘political activism’ ” (Bruner, 1995, p. 5). Politics, according to Hannah Arendt (1963), is the activity by which people intentionally work together to change a set course of events. People begin this collective change process when they perceive the oppressive nature of the dominant reality. They begin to engage in the process Freire (1970) has referred to as *conscientizacao*. This kind of political and personal consciousness is arrived at by reflecting and acting upon the world in dialogue with others in order to transform it (Ward, 1994).

From the Social to the Intimate Realm

Some people will dismiss the idea of a transformed social order based on trust, connectedness and dialogue as hopelessly idealistic. Like Freire and others cited here, I believe such a transformation is imperative. As Alan Wolfe (1989) has pointed out, “all societies, no matter how tough-minded their institutions, operate successfully because some people trust others, because conformity tempers individualism, because some are willing to let others be free riders, and because not all people press their rights simultaneously” (p. 189).

At either end of the continuum for liberal political theory--from Putnam’s concept of democratic society to Freire’s revolutionary pedagogy--words like

commitment, trust, mutual reciprocity, and even love are consistently pointed to as prerequisites for personal and social transformation. In political, sociological, and psychological terms, these characteristics define a healthy individual, a healthy relationship, and a healthy community. If we start from a concept of self that is, as we discussed, grounded in its connection to the world of others, we find individuals building trusting and committed relationships with family members and friends first, and then engaging with the community and the larger social sphere. Thus, we come to understand about trust, commitment, and reciprocity first through the intimate realm and then gradually expand to include a broader world. Moving from the particular to the general, "we rely on the recognition of our dependency on intimates to help us codify our relationships with strangers..." (Wolfe, 1989, p. 258).

Trust and Knowledge in the Intimate Realm

As I reflect on my own life experience, it seems that when I trust someone it is because I have come to know something through relationship with that person. But not all of what I know in this case can be shown or proven. It cannot be scientifically validated or considered as purely objective. My trust is based, at least in part, on the kind of interpersonal knowledge we have been discussing--the kind built up in the relationship between human beings.

What Does It Mean To "Know" Something?

In traditional Western epistemology, "to know" has meant to represent accurately that which is outside the mind: the mind becomes the mirror of nature. A "theory of knowledge" then, is based upon an understanding of the mental processes that enable the mind to construct these representations. One can only know something in so far as it implicates accurate representation of something external to the self. The primary human faculty for attaining knowledge, then, is reason. Body-centered influences like emotion, instinct, will, sentiment, and value only contaminate pure rationalist claims to this mind-centered knowledge (Jaggar and Bordo, 1989). Representational knowledge consists of empirically-derived facts alone.

Traditionally, the method for arriving at scientific fact is Cartesian reductionism. By delimiting interconnectedness and reducing diversity to underlying similarity we can gain an understanding of the world in an abstract and generalized sense (Scheman, 1993). Our universe becomes both predictable and controllable.

Relational Knowledge

Yet, experience tells us that there are fundamental differences between knowing somebody and knowing something outside of relationship. That is to say,

representational knowledge is fundamentally different from the knowledge that allows us to be in relationship with someone--the kind of relational knowledge we experience in everyday life, the kind that is connected with trusting another person.

Traditionally, this relational knowledge was not considered to be "real knowledge" as it remained largely unconceptualized. Only representational knowledge was privileged in this way. Today, we have moved beyond the privileging of academic or instrumental knowledge to include interpretive knowledge, but have yet to count as real knowledge that which allows us relationship with another. In other words, if I cannot empirically prove why I believe I can trust another, then I do not know that I can trust that person.

Feminist philosophers, social constructionists from the field of psychology, and many of the century's most noteworthy social theorists like Jurgen Habermas and Paulo Freire would most likely agree that it is a kind of knowing when I think I know someone in a way that leads me to trust him or her. But if they were to explain why, it is equally likely that they would be doing so in terms of the traditional epistemological paradigm of representationalism. For example, when social constructionists speak of relational knowledge as "knowing of the third kind" (Shotter, 1993), they speak of creating the other in interaction or through conversation. They are still speaking in terms of representational knowledge, still tinkering within the confines of knowing in a more restricted sense. While the

objective of this interpretive knowledge is to merge individual perspectives for the sake of mutual understanding rather than for prediction or control (Park, 1989), the data upon which knowledge of the other is based is still wholly external; it is representational.

III. Statement of the Problem

The problem seems to arise when we want to describe this other kind of knowledge, relational knowledge, or want to assert a claim that we do in fact know something relational. First we must answer the question, "What is it?" in regards to relational knowledge. But, by virtue of calling it knowledge, we must also address a second, epistemological question, "How do we know?". In both science and the "everyday" realm, when we are asked, "How do we know?" we engage ourselves in a dialogue about the validity of what we claim to know. We are challenged as to our claims to the validity of our representational knowledge.

The context of justification for representational knowledge is clearly defined. We may justify those validity claims in a number of ways. We may say that it fits with existing theory, or that it fits into a pattern; we may defer to everyday experience and understanding, or we can point out that it mirrors reality. At a general level, we get engaged in a dialogue about the validity of what we claim to know. But when asked to validate relational knowledge, we cannot fall

back upon the validity criteria of representational knowledge. We cannot "show" how what we say is representative of something else. How do we redeem our claims to the validity of relational knowledge? What is the analogue to "How do we know?" Because the content of our current epistemological framework is modeled solely upon the concept of representational validity, we take it as our departure point for consideration of how we know something relationally.

My Research Questions

A number of questions beg investigation: (1) What is an operating definition of, and the process through which we arrive at, relational knowledge? and (2) How do we justify that knowledge when called upon to do so? Do we need to validate relational knowledge and if so, how can this be done?

The Context of Discovery and the Context of Justification/Validation

The first question considers the context of discovery--that is, defining relational knowledge and how people come to know in this way, while the second set of questions regard the context of justification/validation which treats how we dismiss relational knowledge as knowledge and how to ground it in a way that it may be taken seriously as a viable form of knowledge. The discovery of an idea is almost exclusively psychological and the principles of logic and rationality do not

apply. The justification/validation of that idea, however, regards the acceptance or evaluation of that idea and is considered to be a logical activity in which psychological considerations do not apply (Fetzer and Almeder, 1993).

The Two-Fold Nature of the Contexts: For the Individual and For the External World

Each of these contexts of relational knowledge--discovery and justification/validation--are two-fold in nature as they must be considered via the two dimensions of (1) that which transpires within the individual, and (2) that which concerns the world external to the individual.

Discovery

Within the context of discovery, we want to understand how it is that we come to know.

1. Individual--For the individual, discovery is wrapped up in the personal conviction that one has this relational knowledge of something.
2. External World--In attempting to understand the nature of relational knowledge and discuss it as a concept in the external world, the process of discovery of that knowledge--how we arrive at it--must be implicated.

To illustrate the dichotomy: for the individual, it is never really a legitimate question to ask of another with whom you are in intimate relationship "Do you

love me?", for it goes against the whole spirit of love--in fact, it then becomes a matter of representational knowing, not relational. From the perspective of the outside world, we want to understand how it is that we come to know what we know relationally (that you do love me) so that we may agree in our judgment of it as knowledge.

Justification/Validation

Within the context of justification/validation we want to know how we can defend our knowledge claim or prove that we know.

1. Individual- For the individual, personal conviction about the relational knowledge excludes the necessity of justification/validation.
2. Outside World- In society, knowledge is politicized to the extent that the individual must justify/validate his or her claim to relational knowledge so that it will not be dismissed. While in the case of the individual we are treating an instance of relational knowledge, in the case of the outside world that same instance meets the broader challenge as to whether relational knowledge can be considered a form of knowledge at all.

The question of the need to validate arises as we consider that relational knowledge is embedded in the speech act within which we make claims to the validity of what we are saying. The careful examination of these claims to validity

will lead to a greater understanding of how we know these things in the relational sphere.

Embedded within any consideration of the context of justification/validation is the issue of whether the need is even legitimate. Does one need to justify one's claim to relational knowledge at all? If so, is that enough? Does one also need to validate those claims? And if so, what constitutes validity? Should relational knowledge be subjected to the same demands made of representational knowledge? Can a person justify an instance of relational knowledge, without agreement in the outside world that relational knowledge is a form of knowledge?

While we are taking the current epistemological framework as our starting point for consideration of the issue of justification/validation for relational knowledge, we may find that it is necessary to leave the traditional model behind. One viewpoint suggests that alternative epistemologies are complementary to the traditional theory of knowledge and would therefore argue for expanding upon the considerable integrity of the current canon. A second position, held by feminist and minority theorists, advocates for a complete overhaul of epistemology, fostering "so complete a deconstruction of existing science that the emergence of a successor science on a new epistemological base becomes not only possible but necessary" (Kloppenburger, 1991, p.539-540). A third perspective, that of feminist postmodernism, points to the existence of multiple and separate realities as an

argument against any kind of universalized epistemology (Haraway, 1986). From this perspective, the intersections of, and interactions between, diverse ways of knowing can be mutually beneficial for all (Harding, 1986). Is there an acceptable medium within the contradiction of the need to legitimate relational knowledge in a realm that does not currently admit of it as knowledge and the need to move beyond the prescripts of elitist authority to laying claim to alternative ways of knowing without asking permission?

Summary

To summarize my argument to this point, while our democratic society is founded upon the idea that we can and will work together to reach shared ends, we seem to have a common difficulty with cooperation toward mutual gain. A market-based system and a national value of radical individualism has perpetuated our disconnection, which in turn has fed our lack of trust in each other and vice versa. Further, our responsibilities on this front cannot be successfully relegated to the purview of institutionalized social services.

Cooperative effort is contingent upon the mutual trust of the participants. The level of trust and mutual reciprocity resident in a community can be regarded as its "social capital". While on decline in the United States, social capital is

essential for communities to move beyond individual interests to solving the problems of the collective.

Through communication and interaction, people connect with and learn to trust each other. Through dialogue, people interact in praxis. Paulo Freire proposes that a liberatory dialogue will facilitate people looking critically at the world together. Social capital will be built in the process as people realize the interconnection of their lives and thus their responsibility to, and accountability for, each other.

Knowledge unfolds through this dialogue; in fact, the act of knowing is incomprehensible without interaction. "Intellectual capital" is built up through dialogue. It is factual knowledge, but also interpersonal and critical knowledge. As individuals come to know themselves, each other, and things about the concrete world, they come to understand how their personal knowledge is related to the knowledge of various communities and the inequitable power structures that impact their interaction. Political and personal consciousness is arrived at by reflecting and acting upon the world through dialogue and toward transformation.


In order to understand how we can develop trust in relationship so that social capital, and then intellectual capital, may be created and enhanced in a community, it makes sense to look first at how this happens at the individual level. If we start from a concept of self that is, as we have discussed, grounded in its

connection to the world of others, we find individuals building trusting and committed relationships with family members and friends first, and then engaging with the community and the larger social sphere. Thus, we come to understand about trust, commitment, and reciprocity first through the intimate realm and then gradually expand to include a broader world.

When I think about why I trust someone, it is because I believe I know that person. In traditional Western epistemology, “to know” has meant to represent accurately that which is outside the mind: one can only know something in so far as it implicates something external to the self. Thus, reason is the primary faculty for attaining knowledge. Yet, experience tells us that there are fundamental differences between knowing somebody and knowing something outside of relationship. That is, representational knowledge is fundamentally different from the knowledge that allows us to be in relationship with someone; the kind that is connected with trusting another person. But when asked to validate relational knowledge, we cannot fall back upon the validity criteria of representational knowledge. We cannot “show” how what we say is representative of something else. How do we redeem our claims to the validity of relational knowledge? What is the analogue to “How do we know?”

My research questions, then, are (1) What is an operating definition of, and the process through which we arrive at, relational knowledge? and (2) How

do we justify that knowledge when called upon to do so? Do we need to validate relational knowledge and if so, how can this be done?



Method of Inquiry

Now that we are acquainted with my research questions and the context in which they arise, I will explain how I plan to explore the questions and attempt to arrive at theoretical answers. Already we have a feel for the complexity of the investigation as we have moved from social change concerns about community building and liberatory praxis to political science, to psychology, to social theory, to epistemology, to feminist theory, and back to social change in order to see how a theory of relational knowledge might help in community building and liberatory praxis. I believe these strands are integrally connected so in this chapter I will explain how I plan to proceed in weaving them together.

I. Overall Plan for the Study

Locating Relational Knowledge Within the Forms of Knowledge

In order to develop a theory to provide an operating definition of relational knowledge and the process through which we arrive at it, I plan to first situate relational knowledge relative to the only form of knowledge considered to be valid in traditional epistemology--that is, representational knowledge. I will lay the groundwork for a clear understanding of representational knowledge and then use the Forms of Knowledge Matrix (Park and Richards, 1996) to define representational knowledge, Habermas' concept of reflective knowledge, and a

preliminary concept of relational knowledge in terms of traditional epistemological concerns. I intend to make clear the gap in a theory of knowledge that does not include the relational form of knowledge.


(For a preliminary listing of primary and secondary texts relevant to a discussion of the forms of knowledge, see Appendix A.)

A Hermeneutic Treatment of Theories of Relationship and Intimacy

Having located relational knowledge within the Forms of Knowledge, I will proceed to develop a theory by first considering the existent literature on theories of relationship and intimacy from the fields of psychology, sociology, and philosophy. Previously, we discussed the wisdom in looking first at the intimate realm in order to understand how we can develop trust in relationship so that social capital, and then intellectual capital, may be created and enhanced in a community as we find individuals building trusting and committed relationships with family members and friends first, and then engaging with the community and the larger social sphere.

While my search has uncovered few studies done or theories constructed that pertain directly to the topic under consideration, there are a number of works that may shed light on a concept of purely relational knowledge. I will use a

hermeneutic process to work with these texts to formulate my theory of relational knowledge. Treating the texts as data for analysis, my hermeneutic questions will include: (1) What is particularly paradigmatic of the love relationship?, (2) What are essential elements of less intimate yet nonetheless relational interactions that are relevant to a theory of relational knowledge?, (3) What, of the identified elements, still remains within the realm of the representational paradigm?, and (4) What, of the identified elements, lies outside of the representational paradigm or may be relevant to a theory of relational knowledge?



(For a preliminary listing of the texts relevant to a theory of relational knowledge, see Appendix B.)

Establishing A Theory of Relational Knowledge

As a result of the preceding hermeneutic process, at this point in the study I will be in a position to articulate an operating definition of relational knowledge and the process by which it is developed. Working within the context of discovery, I will theorize as to that which transpires within the individual and that which concerns the world external to the individual from the standpoint of relational knowledge.

I will then conduct a focus group of six to eight participants to obtain their reaction to, and feedback on, the theory. I will further develop the theory as necessary following the focus group. A second focus group of different participants will then be conducted to obtain response to the enhanced theory. The process will be repeated and a third and final focus group with new participants will be conducted. The purpose of these focus groups is to ground the theory in the experience of real life. bell hooks (1994) has described a similar process for theory development in her writing.

Reflecting on my own work in feminist theory, I find writing--theoretical talk--to be most meaningful when it invites readers to engage in critical reflection and to engage in the practice of feminism. To me, this theory emerges from the concrete, from my efforts to make sense of everyday life experiences, from my efforts to intervene critically in my life and the lives of others. This too is what makes feminist transformation possible. Personal testimony, personal experience, is such fertile ground for the production of liberatory feminist theory because it usually forms the base of our theory making. (p. 70)

The Issue of Justification/Validation for Relational Knowledge

The issue remains as to how, in terms of relational knowledge, we can defend our knowledge claim or prove that we know. How do we justify that knowledge when called upon to do so? Do we need to validate relational knowledge and if so, how can this be done? Again, I will need to explore the issue in terms of the individual's personal conviction regarding an instance of relational knowledge as well as the implications of the politicized nature of knowledge claims from society's perspective--that is, concerning relational knowledge as a validated form of knowledge. I will look first at the issue of justification/validation for traditional theories of knowledge, and then, at the issue of justification/validation as it is raised in alternative epistemologies that treat multiple forms of knowledge. Finally, I will explore whether or not there is a need to validate relational knowledge, considering whether relational knowledge should be subjected to the demands made of representational knowledge.

(For a preliminary listing of primary and secondary texts relevant to the issue of justification/validation for relational knowledge, see Appendix C.)

Contributions Made By This Study

Once a theory of relational knowledge has been fully developed, I will consider the application of that theory in community settings. How can the theory be used to help people come together to address the shared social and institutional problems that confront them on a daily basis? How can it be used to help us understand how the personal trust that results from the relational knowledge between individuals can be developed into social trust within a group or community? And how can the theory be employed to deepen the relational foundation that already underpins my work as a social change practitioner? I will consider the theoretical implications for theories of social change, liberatory theory, and philosophy of science, and the practical implications for community building and liberatory praxis.

Fundamental Lingering Questions

Finally, I will detail the questions remaining unanswered through the course of this study. I will also explore the implications for further research.

II. A Theoretical Dissertation

Catherine MacKinnon reminds us that “we know things with our lives and we live that knowledge, beyond what any theory has yet theorized.” Making this theory is the challenge before us. For in its production lies

the hope of our liberation, in its production lies the possibility of naming all our pain--of making all our hurt go away. (hooks, 1994, p. 75)

I decided to write a theoretical dissertation when I realized that the scope of my proposed theory exceeded any design I could conceive of for my empirical research, given the time span in which the empirical piece would have to be completed. (When considering the subject matter of relationship, it is easy to imagine that an empirical research project would have to be conducted over a very significant period of time in order to demonstrate the development of true relationship and its effects.) Once it was clear that the projected results of my original design would fall short of my theoretical objectives, I elected to concentrate on theory development alone. It is, however, my intention to conduct a postdoctoral study to empirically test the theory developed in this dissertation.

To paraphrase Habermas (1973), the theory of relational knowledge is, in this study, conceived with a practical intention. Because of the critical dimension described above, it differs from traditional theory and "its claims to validity can be verified only . . . in the practical discourse of those concerned" (p. 2). When theory is essentially tied to "processes of self-recovery, of collective liberation" (hooks, 1994, p. 61) there is no breach between theory and practice. In fact, they fundamentally require and enable each other if our intention is for them to do so.

Stinchcombe (1968) has suggested that “theories ought not to be invented in the abstract by conceptual specialists; they should be adequate to the tasks of explanation posed by the data” (p. 3). To that end, the primary data for this theoretical study are the texts, drawn from multiple disciplines, that are relevant to the topic of relational knowledge. A secondary source of data is that which will be drawn from a series of focus groups designed to illicit discussion and feedback on the theory as it is being developed.

Developing a theory of relational knowledge will, of course, require much more than fitting together the relevant pieces from the diverse disciplines. An overarching framework must be developed which gives substance to the theory as a whole. That is, disciplinary boundaries will have to be not only crossed, but transcended (Bellah, 1985). Approaches for working with each data set are described below.

III. Hermeneutic Work with Literature as Data

Charles Guignon (1992) describes contemporary hermeneutics as presuming “a tacit ‘know-how’, embodied in our practices and made accessible in language” that is “prior to explicit propositional knowledge” (p. 174). Using this insider’s insight, we can work with the texts to make sense of a world already innately intelligible to us. Thus in hermeneutic inquiry, the task of interpretation is

seen as “understanding” rather than analysis. “In the fusion of horizons which is at the core of the hermeneutical experience, some elements of one’s own horizon are negated and others affirmed; some elements in the horizon of the text recede and others come forward. . .” (Palmer, 1969, p. 244).

Within hermeneutic inquiry, method is seen as a vehicle for the interpreter to measure and control the text rather than allow the phenomenon to lead. “The openness of “experience”--which alters the interpreter himself from the side of the text--is antithetical to method” (p. 247). I will follow a hermeneutic process in my work with the various texts collected from across the disciplines. Moving back and forth between the texts and my own hermeneutical experience of them, I will construct a theory of relational knowledge posing a limited number of questions representative of my own “horizon” and remaining open to what is not asked or expected from the horizon of the text.

IV. Focus Groups for Feedback on Theory Drawn from the Hermeneutic Process

The domain explored by this study is familiar territory for every one of us. As a researcher, it is conceivable that I may know even more about the subject of relational knowledge from my daily life experience than I will learn through the hermeneutic process of engaging with relevant texts. It is also conceivable that my

experience will be articulated in some of these texts in ways that provoke insights I had not yet articulated within myself. Hopefully, the same will be the case in the focus groups, as the intention is that the articulation of the theory of relational knowledge will provoke further insights in the participants and their responses will expand the articulation of that theory. The focus groups should also serve as a test to the validity of the theory as it does or does not resonate with the daily life experiences of the participants. I consider this element of the study to be essential to the development of a sound theory of relational knowledge.

Each focus group will consist of six to eight participants selected from a convenient sample. Because this is an exploratory study, any intentional design toward a representative sample would necessitate the consideration of issues currently outside the scope of this investigation. Questions of the impact of differences by race, class, gender, sexual preference, and cultural conditioning upon a theory of how we arrive at relational knowledge are all pertinent for fleshing out and localizing that theory and should be addressed by future research. It is anticipated that some of these issues will be presented, articulated, and even explored by the participants from the convenient sample, but a comprehensive roster of issues will not be systematically defined and addressed in this initial attempt to lay out the contours of a theory of relational knowledge.

The process used with each focus group will be open-ended and discussion-based. Participants will be given a written explanation of the theory and asked to read it at the outset of the two-hour period. The ensuing discussion will be largely unstructured as the only questions asked will be at the beginning of the discussion: What are your reactions to the theory--how does it fit with your own experience?; what, if any, questions does it raise for you?; what, if any, insights does it provoke in you? what, if anything, is not clear to you as it is currently described? Facilitation will be minimal, only probing for clarification or if any need arises to keep participants engaged.

All three focus groups will be recorded and transcriptions of the sessions will be interpreted for ongoing development of the theory. In this way, the transcripts become the new texts to be worked with hermeneutically, but even better than the texts explored initially, these texts are precisely related to the topic in question.

V. Concerns

About Generalized Theory

The traditional conception of theory is abstracted from the scientific enterprise, as this is carried on within the division of labor at a given level. This conception corresponds to the activity of scholars, as it is carried out side by side with all the other activities in society, without any direct insight into the connections between these separate activities being attained. In this conception, therefore, the real social function of science

does not appear, thus, not what the theory means for human existence, but only what it means within the detached sphere in which it is being produced under historical conditions. . . . The professional scholar, as scientist, views social reality, with all its products, as external to him, and, as citizen, perceives his interest in this society in terms of political articles [he may write], membership in parties or benevolent organizations, and participation in elections, without connecting these two, as well as several other modes of conduct, in any way, except, at most, by psychological interpretations; while critical thinking is motivated by the actual attempt to overcome this tension, to resolve [sublate] the opposition between the consciousness of goal, the spontaneity, the rationality immanent within the individuals, and the relations to the labor process which are fundamental for society. (Horkheimer, 1937, pp. 253, 264 cited in Habermas, 1973, p. 211)

I approach the task of developing a theory of relational knowledge with a long-standing concern about the political nature and legitimacy of generalized theory. In a discussion about how I could localize the general theory I might create, Jody Veroff suggested that I think in terms of not making normative judgments rather than worrying specifically about the general or localized nature of the theory. I am persuaded that the application of this sage advice will go a long way toward addressing my concern.

About Articulating the Relational Through a Purely Representational Medium

The nature of relational knowledge is such that when one attempts to describe or explain it, that which felt firmly grasped has suddenly slithered out of reach. Unlike its representational counterpart, relational knowledge is, in part,

non-verbal; it is also somatic and sometimes has an emotional component. A dissertation is purely verbal and therefore a purely representational medium. My experience with attempting to dialogue about relational knowledge leads me to anticipate some difficulty in articulating a theory of relational knowledge in a linear and strictly verbal format. I will look at how art critics and art theorists, such as John Berger and Rudolph Arnheim treating visual art and Theodor Adorno treating music, have handled their analogous dilemma. Like that which occurs between people, art transcends the representational, goes beyond the verbal. It is also like the content of relational knowledge in that both are consumptive--this form of knowledge on the one hand and art on the other is consumed within itself. Each begins and ends with itself, is created for its own sake. As the expression goes, the proof of the pudding is in the eating of it.

About Constructing a Discourse to Overcome the Effects of the Current Dominant Discourse While Still Being a Member of That Dominant Discourse

Yet we have different privileges and different compensations for our positions in the field of power relations. My caution is against a form of theoretical tourism on the part of the first world critic, where the margin becomes a linguistic or critical vacation, a new poetics of the exotic. (Kaplan, cited in Giroux, 1993, p. 177)

I am aware of the fact that I bring my own cultural, theoretical, and ideological lenses to the task of constructing a theory of relational knowledge. I

introduced this study as beginning from an occidental, and specifically North American, view of the subject, centered on the more individualistic paradigm of the west and then attempting to learn from the more collectivist concept of self and the associated relationship to other that is found in some African and Asian philosophies. In dedication to the objectives of both transformation and critique, I will need to work to be aware of my biases as I attempt what Giroux (1993) calls "border-crossing"--an effort in which one "has to reinvent traditions not within the discourse of submission, reverence, and repetition . . . nor a discourse of recognition whose aim is reduced to revealing and transmitting universal truths" (p. 178). Here I have the work of Paulo Freire as my model. He has persisted in confronting his personal ideologies as he has engaged with the world at large. For him, "the answer is in translating theory, not retreating from it" (McLaren and Leonard, 1993, p. 7).

The Importance of the Topic

The importance of the topic to be explored in this dissertation is two-fold: first, as an aid to theory development and practice for community building and liberatory praxis and second, to aid in the legitimization of marginalized knowledge.

I. As an Aid to Theory Development and Practice for Community Building And Liberatory Praxis

As federal, state, and local governments continue to enact program cutbacks, local community organizations will have to step in to address more and more of the nation's social problems (Smith, 1995). The social capital approach of focusing on trust and engaged networks is heavily dependent on these same grass-roots organizations for affecting change (Putnam, 1995b). But while community building or the strengthening of social capital are more and more consistently prescribed, little is known about how to do so in a distressed neighborhood (Brown, 1993; Bruner, 1995). "Students of social capital have only begun to address some of the most important questions that this approach to public affairs suggests. . . . Most important of all, how is social capital created and destroyed?" (Putnam, 1995b, p. 42).

By understanding the process through which we arrive at relational knowledge, its character and content, we will gain insight into how trust is

developed. This insight can then be used in theory development and practice for community building efforts to raise the level of social capital for collective problem identification and resolution.

II. Aid in the Legitimation of Marginalized Knowledge

Because the actuation of relational knowledge is found in community engagement, personal and social trust, and intimate relationship, the dismissal of it as knowledge is at the core of the problems of the 20th century. The implications of relegating attempts to understand and validate relational knowledge to the realm of the mystical, or the purely emotional, are not only epistemological but political as well.

Despite its claims to neutrality and objectivity, traditional epistemology issues from the interests of the specific dominant group--namely, a group of privileged white males. Far from being neutral, it is, a priori, endowed with the values of that group, thus excluding and oppressing the voices of other races, classes, and genders. Dialogue derived from the assumptions of traditional epistemology will thus be exclusive and oppressive as well (Code, 1991).

While Code has limited the following conclusions to the issue of gender, her point applies to issues of race and class as well.

The objective/subjective dichotomy occupies a central position in mainstream epistemology, marking off knowledge that is worthy of its

title from less worthy contenders. The complex, gender specific workings of that dichotomy show without doubt that the sex of the knower *is* epistemologically significant. The veneration of ideal objectivity and the concomitant denigration of subjectivity are manifestations of a "sex/gender system" that structures all the other inequalities of western social arrangements and informs even those areas of life- such as "objective" knowledge- that might seem to be gender-free. (p. 67)

As a result, people marginalized by the dominant ideologies derived from traditional epistemology have difficulty rising above the negative stereotypes to position themselves as credible knowers. Such a "knowledge claimant has to claim acknowledgment from other participants in a form of life. But advancing such claims is as much a political act as it is a straightforwardly epistemological one" (p. 215). The claimant must liberate herself from the negative epistemic stereotypes, both in the mind of others and in her own mind, thereby proving her trustworthiness as a knowledge source, in order to be given credence.

Knowledge that does not meet the criteria of objectivity is deemed subjective while knowledge issuing from that which we deem science is accorded the special privilege of being the only truly objective knowledge. "But just as the assertion that Adam had no navel because he was created and not born was challenged, so now has the absence of the scars of social contingency on the bodies of scientific 'facts' been brought into question" (Kloppenburger, 1991, p. 524). As we come to recognize the social contingency of scientific "facts" and the use of

them, there is no longer a legitimate foundation for the exclusion of knowledge claims which arise outside of the scientific realm.

To the extent that that which "counts" as knowledge must be "scientifically" deduced, the knowledge of those outside of the scientific establishment continues to be discounted and power is withheld. The legitimization of alternative ways of knowing, coupled with Freirean dialogue and community building for the development of social capital, will provide support for "the right of labeled people to be free from exile" (McKnight, 1987, p.57).

Those who were once labeled, exiled, treated, counseled, advised, and protected are, instead, incorporated in community where their contributions, capacities, gifts, and fallibilities will allow a network of relationships involving work, recreation, friendship, support, and the political power of being a citizen. . . . Whenever communities come to believe that their common knowledge is illegitimate, they lose their power and professionals and systems rapidly invade their social place. . . . We all know that community must be the center of our life because it is only in community that we can be citizens. It is only in community that we can find care. It is only in community that we can hear people singing. And if you listen carefully, you can hear the words: 'I care for you, because you are mine, and I am yours.' (pp. 57-58)

By revising the acknowledged epistemological framework to include the interaction of subjective and objective knowledge and admission of the germaneness of relational knowledge for true dialogue and community building, we can create a space in which people's "lived experiences that designate their social differences find a place to surface, be heard, and enter into the

communicative interaction from which they gain knowledge of themselves, of others, and of the world" (Ward, 1994, pp. 196-197).

Paulo Freire requires such a rejection of the subject/object dichotomy in favor of a unified praxis in interaction. Ward has explained how this is operationalized in a context of Freirean pedagogy: "In order to learn effectively, groups of students reflect subjectively on their immediate situation in the concrete, objective world in order to transform those situations, always moving closer to situations that foster the humanity of oppressed and oppressor alike" (p. 197). Thus Freire's position exemplifies the moral and political dimension to any epistemological standpoint. To the extent that subjective knowledges, and relational knowledge in particular, are dismissed, so is the value of community and compassion and the reliability of the relations in our daily life. With it goes the personal power to affect change based upon a belief in the credibility of our own knowledge and understanding.

Within the Social Sciences

Social scientists currently follow the natural sciences in working almost exclusively with representational knowledge, even in phenomenological and ethnographic studies. Definition of the process and validation of relational knowledge will displace the existent difficulties of demonstrating the validity of

relational knowledge without reversion to representational knowledge, thereby giving social scientists access to a much wider array of “legitimized” subject matter.

As the Modern scaffolding of the natural sciences begins to be deconstructed, there is a growing recognition that “the rigidity it imposed on rational practice in a world of independent and separate agents is no longer appropriate in the late 20th century, which is a time of increasing interdependence, cultural diversity and historical change” (Toulmin, 1990, p. 184). Conventional rationality must now admit of other measures of intellectual competence. “One must also evaluate all practical matters by their human ‘reasonableness’ ” (p. 185).

In the representational realm in which it is currently ensconced, relational knowledge is merely a means to an instrumental end. The relational knowledge of our everyday experience is both a means and an end in itself. It is essential to the advancement of our self-understanding that we come to comprehend the process by which we arrive at this relational knowledge and how we can redeem our claims to the validity of it.

Summary

In summary, the importance of the topic to be explored in this dissertation is two-fold. First, study of the topic will serve as an aid to theory development

and practice for community building and liberatory praxis as little is known about how social capital is created and destroyed. Second, the study will support the legitimation of marginalized knowledge. To the extent that that which "counts" as knowledge must be "scientifically" deduced, the knowledge of those outside of the scientific establishment continues to be discounted and power is withheld. When subjective knowledges, and relational knowledge in particular, are dismissed, so is the value of community and compassion and the reliability of the relations in our daily life. With it goes the personal power to affect change based upon a belief in the credibility of our own knowledge and understanding. The legitimation of alternative ways of knowing, coupled with Freirean dialogue and community building for the development of social capital, will sustain this power.

References

- Arendt, Hannah. (1963). On Revolution. New York: Penguin Books.
- Bellah, R., Madsen, R., Sullivan, W., Swidler, A., & Tipton, S. (1985). Habits of the Heart. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Bohm, David. (1990). On Dialogue. Cambridge, MA: Pegasus Communications.
- Brown, Prudence. (1993). Comprehensive Neighborhood-Based Initiatives: Implications for Urban Policy. The Chapin Hall Center for Children at the University of Chicago: Background memorandum prepared for a Roundtable on Neighborhood Change and Community Empowerment at the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.
- Bruner, C. (1995). Toward Defining Government's Role as Catalyst: Building Social Capital in Disinvested Communities (Occasional Paper 16). Ames, Iowa: Child and Family Policy Center.
- Code, Lorraine. (1991). What Can She Know? Feminist Theory and the Construction of Knowledge. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Coleman, James. (1990). Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Elshtain, Jean Bethke. (1995). Democracy on Trial. New York: BasicBooks.
- Fetzer, James & Almeder, Robert. (1993). Glossary of Epistemology/Philosophy of Science. New York: Paragon House.
- Freire, Paulo. (1970). Pedagogy of the Oppressed. New York: Continuum.
- Freire, Paulo. (1993). Education for Critical Consciousness. New York: Continuum.
- Giroux, Henry. (1993). Paulo Freire and the Politics of Postcolonialism. In Peter McLaren & Peter Leonard (Eds.), Paulo Freire: A Critical Encounter (pp. 177-188). London: Routledge.

- Granovetter, Mark. (1985). Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness. American Journal of Sociology. 91. 489.
- Gruber, J. (1994). Coordinating Growth Management Through Consensus-Building: Incentives and the Generation of Social, Intellectual, and Political Capital. Berkeley, California: Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley.
- Guignon, Charles. (1992). Hermeneutics. In Jonathon Dancy & Ernest Sosa (Eds.), A Companion to Epistemology. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
- Habermas, Jurgen. (1973). Theory and Practice. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Haraway, Donna. (1986). Primatology is politics by other means. In Ruth Bleier (Ed.), Feminist Approaches to Science. New York: Pergamon Press.
- Harding, Sandra. (1986). The Science Question in Feminism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Hille, P. (1994). No More Howling at the Moon: A Flexible Manufacturing Network for Social Capital. Berea, Kentucky: Berea College.
- Hirschman, A.O. (1984). Getting Ahead Collectively: Grassroots Experiences in Latin America. New York: Pergamon Press.
- Horkheimer, Max. (1937). Traditionelle und kritische Theorie. In Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung. Frankfurt.
- hooks, bell. (1994). Teaching to Transgress: Education as the Practice of Freedom. New York: Routledge.
- Innes, J.E. (1995). Planning Through Consensus Building: A New View of the Comprehensive Planning Ideal. Berkeley, CA: Institute of Urban and Regional Development, University of California, Berkeley.
- Jaggar, Alison & Bordo, Susan. (1989). Gender/Body/Knowledge/Feminist Reconstructions of Being and Knowing. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

- Keyes, L.C., Schwartz, Alex, Vidal, A.C., and Bratt, R.G. (1995). *Networks and Nonprofits: Opportunities and Challenges in an Era of Federal Devolution*. New York: Community Development Research Center.
- Kloppenburger, Jack. (1991). Social Theory and the De/Reconstruction of Agricultural Science: Local Knowledge for an Alternative Agriculture. *Rural Sociology*. 56(4), 519-548.
- Lankshear, Colin. (1993). Functional Literacy from a Freirean Point of View. In Peter McLaren & Peter Leonard (Eds.), Paulo Freire: A Critical Encounter (pp. 90-118). London: Routledge.
- McKnight, John. (1987). Regenerating Community. Social Policy, Winter, 1987, 54-58.
- McLaren, Peter & Leonard, Peter. (1993). Absent discourses: Paulo Freire and the dangerous memories of liberation. In Peter McLaren & Peter Leonard (Eds.), Paulo Freire: A Critical Encounter (pp. 1-7). London: Routledge.
- Ostrom, Elinor. (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Palmer, Richard. (1969). Hermeneutics: Interpretations in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
- Park, Peter. (1989). What Is Participatory Research? A Theoretical And Methodological Perspective. University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
- Park, Peter & Richards, Lynne. (1996). The Forms of Knowledge. (chart)
- Putnam, Robert. (1993a). The Prosperous Community: Social Capital and Public Life. American Prospect, 13, 35-42.
- Putnam, Robert. (1993b). Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Putnam, Robert. (1995a). Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital. Journal of Democracy, 6(1), 65-78.

- Putnam, Robert. (1995b). Tuning In, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America. The 1995 Ithiel de Sola Pool Lecture, American Political Science Association.
- Scheman, Naomi. (1993). Engenderings: Constructions of Knowledge, Authority, and Privilege. New York: Routledge.
- Senge, Peter. (1990). The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization. New York: Doubleday.
- Shaul, Richard. (1970). Publisher's Forward. In Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed. (pp. 11-16). New York: Continuum.
- Shotter, John. (1993). Cultural Politics of Everyday Life: Social Constructionism, Rhetoric and Knowing of the Third Kind. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Smith, S. R. (1995). Social Capital, Community Coalitions and the Role of Institutions. Paper presented at the American Political Science Association, New York City.
- Stinchcombe, Arthur. (1968). Constructing Social Theories. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Stone, C. N. (1995). Linking Civic Capacity and Human Capital Formation. College Park: University of Maryland.
- Sugden, Robert. (1986). The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Taylor, Charles. (1992). Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Toulmin, Stephen. (1990). Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Tullio-Altan, Carlo. (1986). La Nostra Italia: Arretratezza socioculturale, clientelismo, trasformismo e rebellismo dall'Unità ad oggi. Milan: Feltrinelli.

- Walzer, Michael. (1980). Radical Principles. New York: Basic Books.
- Ward, Irene. (1994). Literacy, Ideology, and Dialogue: Towards a Dialogic Pedagogy. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Williams, Bernard. (1988). Formal Structures and Social Reality. In Diego Gambetta (Ed.), Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations (p. 8-12). Oxford: Blackwell.
- Wolfe, Alan. (1989). Whose Keeper? Social Science and Moral Obligation. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Appendix A

Primary Texts Relevant to a Discussion of the Forms of Knowledge

The texts that will serve as focal points for this chapter include the following.

Jonathan Dancy, Contemporary Epistemology
 Rene Descartes, Meditations of First Philosophy
 Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge & Human Interests
 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason
 Friedrich Nietzsche, Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche's Notebooks of the Early 1870's
 Plato, Theaetetus
 W. V. Quine, "Epistemology Naturalized" in Ontological Relativity
 Charles Taylor, "Overcoming Epistemology"

Supplementary Texts Relevant to a Discussion of the Forms of Knowledge

The texts that will supplement the primary texts reviewed in this chapter include the following.

Karl-Otto Apel, "Can an Ultimate Foundation of Knowledge Be Non-Metaphysical?"
 Erich Auerbach, Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature
 Seyla Benhabib and Fred Dallmayr (Eds.), The Communicative Ethics Controversy
 Laurence Bonjour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge
 Jacob Maudemarie Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy
 Bronowski, The Origins of Knowledge and Imagination
 John Connolly and Thomas Keutner, Hermeneutics versus Science?
 Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa, A Companion to Epistemology
 Jonathan Dancy, Perceptual Knowledge
 Donald Davidson, Inquiries into Truth & Interpretation
 Donald Fiske and Richard Shweder, Metatheory in Social Science

- Anthony Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method
 Alvin Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition
 Paul Grice, Studies in the Way of Words
 G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right
 Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes, Rationality and Relativism
 David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding
 David Michael Levin, The Listening Self: Personal Growth, Social Change and the Closure of Metaphysics
 George Levine, Realism and Representation: Essays on the Problem of Realism in Relation to Science, Literature, and Culture
 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
 Karl Mannheim, Ideology & Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge
 Richard Manning, "Justified Acceptance, Information, and Knowledge"
 Michael McCarthy, The Crisis of Philosophy
 George Herbert Mead, On Social Psychology
 John P. Murphy, Pragmatism from Pierce to Davidson
 Thomas Nagel, Other Minds: Critical Essays 1969-1994
 Christopher Norris, "Objectivity and its Enemies"
 George Pappas, Justification and Knowledge
 George Pappas and Marshall Swain, Essays on Knowledge and Justification
 Michael Polyani, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy
 Michael Polyani, Tacit Knowledge
 Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations
 Karl Popper, Objective Knowledge
 Hilary Putnam, Renewing Philosophy
 Hilary Putnam, Representation and Reality
 W.V. Quine, Ontological Relativity & Other Essays
 W.V. Quine, Pursuit of Truth
 W.V. Quine and J.S. Ullian, The Web of Belief
 Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy
 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation
 Arthur Schopenhauer, On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason
 Peter Singer, Hegel
 Tom Sorell, Scientism: Philosophy and the Infatuation with Science
 P.F. Strawson, Analysis and Metaphysics
 Barry Stroud, The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism
 Marshall Swain, Reasons and Knowledge
 Charles Taylor, Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2
 Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy

Appendix B

Primary Texts Relevant to a Theory of Relational Knowledge

Until working in depth with the texts listed below, I am not able to determine which, if any, will become primary texts relevant to a theory of relational knowledge.

Supplementary Texts Relevant to a Theory of Relational Knowledge

The following list is an eclectic one as my search revealed related material in a wide array of disciplines.

John Amodeo, Love & Betrayal: Broken Trust in Intimate Relationships

Neera Kapur Badhwar, Friendship: A Philosophical Reader

Mikhail Bakhtin, Toward A Philosophy of the Act

Valerie Malhotra Bentz and Wade Kenny, "Building the Future from the Past:

Kenneth Burke's Answer to the Postmodern Charges Against Sociology"

Stephen Bergman, "Men's Psychological Development: A Relational Perspective"

Stephen Bergman and Janet Surrey, "The Woman-Man Relationship: Impasses and Possibilities"

Beverly Birns, "The Mother-Infant Tie: 50 Years of Theory, Science, and Science-Fiction"

Allan Bloom, Love & Friendship

David Bohm, Unfolding Meaning

Jean Shinoda Bolen, The Tao of Psychology: Synchronicity and the Self

David Brandon, Zen in the Art of Helping

Lois Braverman, "Chasing Rainbows: The Mystery of Friendship"

Malcolm Budd, Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology

Peter Cantwell and Sophie Holmes, "Social Construction: A paradigm shift for systemic therapy and training"

Sue-Ellen Case, Peforming Feminisms

Hendon Chubb, "Looking at Systems as Process"

Vincent Crapanzano, Hermes' Dilemma & Hamlet's Desire

- Gary Cooper, "Touchstones"
- John D'Emillio and Estelle Freedman, Intimate Matters
- Antonio Damasio, Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain
- Anthony deMello, Awareness: The Perils and Opportunities of Reality
- Ronald de Sousa, The Rationality of Emotion
- Marilyn Friedman, What Are Friends For? Feminist Perspectives on Personal Relationships and Moral Theory
- Erich Fromm, The Art of Loving
- Kenneth Gergen, Realities and Relationships: Soundings in Social Construction
- Kenneth Gergen, The Saturated Self: Dilemmas of Identity in Contemporary Life
- Mary Gergen and Kenneth Gergen, "What is This Thing Called Love? Emotional Scenarios in Historical Perspective"
- Anthony Giddens, The Transformation of Intimacy
- Francoise Giroud and Bernard-Henri Levy, Women and Men: A Philosophical Conversation
- Erving Goffman, Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-to-Face Behavior
- Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life
- Daniel Goleman, Emotional Intelligence
- Joan Halifax, The Fruitful Darkness: Reconnecting with the Body of Earth
- Donna Haraway, Primate Visions: Gender, Race, and Nature in the World of Modern Science
- Rom Harre and Grant Gillett, The Discursive Mind
- L.L. Havens, "Explorations in the Uses of Language in Psychotherapy: Simple Empathic Statements"
- L.L. Havens, Making Contact: Uses of Language in Psychotherapy
- James Hillman, A Blue Fire
- Lynn Hoffman, Exchanging Voices: A Collaborative Approach to Family Therapy
- Paul Jaffe, "The Development of the American Buddhist Peace Movement"
- Alison Jaggar and Susuan Bordo, Gender/Body/Knowledge: Feminist Reconstructions of Being and Knowing
- Lee Jampolsky, The Art of Trust
- Judith Jordan, "A Relational Perspective on Self-Esteem"
- Judith Jordan, "Challenges to Connection"
- Judith Jordan, "Clarity in Connection: Empathic Knowing, Desire, and Sexuality"
- Judith Jordan, "Courage in Connection"
- Judith Jordan, "Empathy and Self Boundaries"
- Judith Jordan, et al, "Empathy Revisited"
- Judith Jordan, "Relational Awareness: Transforming Disconnection"
- Judith Jordan, "Relational Resilience"
- Judith Jordan, "The Meaning of Mutuality"

- Judith Jordan, "The Movement of Mutuality and Power"
- Judith Jordan, et al, Women's Growth in Connection
- Ruthellen Josselson, The Space Between Us: Exploring the Dimensions of Human Relationships
- Jane Jorgenson, "Communication, Rapport, and the Interview: A Social Perspective"
- Jane Jorgenson, "Where is the 'Family' in Family Communication?: Exploring Families' Self-Definitions"
- Stanley Keleman, Love: A Somatic View
- J. Krishnamurti, On Love and Loneliness
- J. Krishnamurti, On Relationship
- George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By
- Judith Lasky and Helen Silverman, (Eds.), Love: Psychoanalytic Perspectives
- Rozanne Leppington, "From Constructivism to Social Constructionism and Doing Critical Therapy"
- Susan B. Levin, "Hearing the Unheard: A Postmodern Approach to Research Interviewing"
- Stephen Levine and Ondrea Levine, Embracing the Beloved: Relationship as a Path of Awakening
- Thomas Malone and Patrick Malone, The Art of Intimacy
- Sheila McNamee, "The Discourse of Burnout: Social Constructionist Inquiry"
- Alice Miller, The Drama of the Gifted Child
- Jean Baker Miller, et al, "Some Misconceptions and Reconceptions of a Relational Approach"
- Jean Baker Miller, "What Do We Mean By Relationships?"
- Katherine Miller and Eileen Berlin Ray, "Beyond the Ties that Bind: Exploring the 'Meaning' of Supportive Messages and Relationships"
- Stuart Miller, Men and Friendship
- Brian Morris, Anthropology of the Self: The Individual in Cultural Perspective
- Anne Norton, Reflections on Political Identity
- James Ogilvy, Living Without a Goal
- Samuel Osherson, Wrestling with Love: How Men Struggle with Intimacy
- Mary Lou Randour, Women's Psyche, Women's Spirit: The Reality of Relationships
- Adrienne Rich, On Lies, Secrets, and Silence
- Carl Rogers, Person to Person: The Problem of Being Human
- Stanley Rosen, "The Metaphysics of Ordinary Experience"
- Sallyann Roth and David Epston, "Developing Externalizing Conversations: An Introductory Exercise"

- Sallyann Roth and Richard Chasin, "Entering One Another's Worlds of Meaning and Imagination: Dramatic Enactment and Narrative Couple Therapy"
- Edward Sampson, Celebrating the Other
- Marian Sandmaier, "The Gift of Friendship"
- Alfred Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World
- John Shotter, Cultural Politics of Everyday Life
- John Shotter, "Language and the Construction of Self"
- John Shotter, "Making Sense on the Boundaries: On Moving Between Philosophy and Psychotherapy"
- John Shotter, "Simply 'Going On' Wittgenstein and Our Bodily Social Relations Prior to Communication"
- Richard Shusterman, "Dewey on Experience: Foundation or Reconstruction?"
- Gayatri Spivak, The Post-Colonial Critic
- Frederick Steier, "Toward a Radical and Ecological Constructivist Approach to Family Communication"
- Robert Sternberg and Michael Barnes, The Psychology of Love
- Irene Stiver, "Beyond the Oedipus Complex: Mothers and Daughters"
- John Suler, Contemporary Psychoanalysis and Eastern Thought
- Janet Surrey, "Relationship and Empowerment"
- Janet Surrey, "The 'Self-in-Relation': A Theory of Women's Development"
- Klaus Theweleit, Object-Choice (All You Need Is Love...)
- Tzvetan Todorov, Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogic Principle
- Lionel Trilling, Sincerity and Authenticity
- Victor Turner and Edward Bruner, The Anthropology of Experience
- Victor Turner, The Anthropology of Performance
- Judith Wallerstein and Sandra Blakeslee, The Good Marriage
- Kathy Weingarten, "A Consideration of Intimate and Non-Intimate Interactions in Therapy"
- Kathy Weingarten, "Consultations to Myself on a Work/Family Dilemma: A Postmodern, Feminist Reflection"
- Drew Westen, Self and Society: Narcissism, Collectivism, and the Development of Morals
- Robert Wuthnow, Acts of Compassion: Caring for Others and Helping Ourselves
- Danah Zohar and Ian Marshall, The Quantum Society: Mind, Physics, and A New Social V

Appendix C

Primary Texts Relevant to the Issue of Justification/Validation for Relational Knowledge

The texts that will serve as focal points for this chapter include the following.

Richard Bernstein, The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory
 Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment
 Ronald de Sousa, The Rationality of Emotion
 James Edwards, Ethics Without Philosophy: Wittgenstein and the Moral Life
 Jane Flax, Thinking Fragments: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, & Postmodernism in the Contemporary West
 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things
 Raymond Geuss, The Idea of a Critical Theory: Habermas & the Frankfurt School
 Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge & Human Interests
 Sandra Harding, Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? Thinking From Women's Lives
 Richard Rorty, Philosophy & the Mirror of Nature
 Chogyam Trungpa, Meditation in Action
 Tarthang Tulku, Time, Space, and Knowledge: A New Vision of Reality
 Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty

Supplementary Texts Relevant to the Issue of Justification/Validation of Relational Knowledge

The texts that will supplement the primary texts reviewed in this chapter include the following.

David Appelbaum, The Stop
 M.M. Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy of the Act
 Michele Barrett, The Politics of Truth: From Marx to Foucault

- Kenneth Baynes, James Bohman, and Thomas McCarthy, After Philosophy: End or Transformation?
- Mary Field Belenky, et al, Women's Ways of Knowing
- Sandra Lipsitz Bem, The Lenss of Gender: Transforming the Debate on Sexual Inequality
- Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self
- Richard Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics and Praxis
- Richard Bernstein, The New Constellation: The Ethical-Political Horizons of Modernity-Postmodernity
- Norman Blaikie, Approaches to Social Enquiry
- David Bloor, Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of Knowledge
- James Bohman, New Philosophy of Social Science
- David Bohm, Thought as a System
- Pierre Bourdieu and Loic J.D. Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology
- Pierre Bourdieu, Language & Symbolic Power
- Stanley Cavell, The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy
- Craig Calhoun, et al, Bourdieu: Critical Perspectives
- Eve Browning Cole, Philosophy and Feminist Criticism
- Vincent Crapanzano, Hermes' Dilemma & Hamlet's Desire: On the Epistemology of Interpretation
- David Dickens and Andrea Fontana, Postmodernism & Social Inquiry
- Irene Diamond and Lee Quinby, Feminism & Foucault
- Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics
- Brian Fay, Critical Social Science
- Paul Feyerabend, Against Method
- Paul Feyerabend, Three Dialogues on Knowledge
- John Fiske, Power Plays, Power Works
- Michel Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice
- Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge
- Mary Margaret Fonow and Judith A. Cook, Beyond Methodology: Feminist Scholarship as Lived Research
- Steve Fuller, Philosophy of Science and Its Discontents
- Steve Fuller, Philosophy, Rhetoric, & the End of Knowledge
- Steve Fuller, Social Epistemology
- Michael Gardiner, The Dialogics of Critique
- Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Further Essaya in Interpretive Anthropology
- Mary McCanney Gergen, Feminist Thought and the Structure of Knowledge

- Nicholas Gier, Wittgenstein and Phenomenology
 Robert Goodman and Walter Fisher, Rethinking Knowledge: Reflections Across the Disciplines
 Morwenna Griffiths and Margaret Whitford, Feminist Perspectives in Philosophy
 Elizabeth Grosz, "Nietzsche and the stomach for knowledge"
 Oswald Hanfling, Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy
 Donna Haraway, Primate Visions: Gender, Race, and Nature in the World of Modern Science
 Sandra Harding (Ed.), The "Racial" Economy of Science: Toward a Democratic Future
 Sandra Harding, The Science Question in Feminism
 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time
 Susan Hekman, Gender and Knowledge: Elements of a Postmodern Feminism
 David R. Hiley, et al, The Interpretative Turn: Philosophy, Science, Culture
 bell hooks, Black Looks: race and representation
 bell hooks, Feminist Theory: from margin to center
 Robert Hopkins, "Resemblance and Misrepresentation"
 David Couzens Hoy, Foucault: A Critical Reader
 Alison Jaggar and Susan Bordo, Gender/ Body/ Knowledge: Feminists Reconstructions of Being and Knowing
 Evelyn Fox Keller, A Feeling for the Organism
 Evelyn Fox Keller, Reflections on Gender and Science
 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
 Saul A. Kripke, Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language
 J. Krishnamurti, On Truth
 Patti Lather, Getting Smart: Feminist Research and Pedagogy with/in the Postmodern
 Charles Lemert (Ed.), Social Theory: The Multicultural & Classic Readings
 Helen Longino, Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry
 Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge
 James Maffie, "Towards an Anthropology of Epistemology"
 Norman Malcolm, Wittgenstein: Nothing is Hidden
 Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man
 D. A. Masolo, African Philosophy in Search of Identity
 Thomas McCarthy, Ideals and Illusions: On Reconstruction and Deconstruction in Contemporary Critical Theory
 Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas
 Richard M. McDonough, The Argument of the "Tractatus"
 Lois McNay, Foucault & Feminism

- Allan Megill, Prophets of Extremity: Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida
- Allan Megill, Rethinking Objectivity
- Trinh T. Minh-Ha, When the Moon Waxes Red: Representation, Gender, and Cultural Politics
- V. Y. Mudimbe, The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy, and the Order of Knowledge
- Linda Nicholson (Ed.), Feminism/Postmodernism
- Joyce McCarl Nielsen (Ed.), Feminist Research Methods: Exemplary Readings in the Social Sciences
- James Peterman, Philosophy as Therapy: An Interpretation and Defense of Wittgenstein's Later Philosophical Project
- Adrienne Rich, On Lies, Secrets, and Silence
- John Richardson, Existential Epistemology: A Heideggerian Critique of the Cartesian Project
- Richard Rorty, "Method, Social Science, and Social Hope"
- Richard Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers Vol. 1
- Madan Sarup, Post-Structuralism and Postmodernism
- Ben-Ami Scharfstein, The Dilemma of Context
- Naomi Scheman, Engenderings: Constructions of Knowledge, Authority, and Privilege
- John Shotter, Conversational Realities: Constructing Life Through Language
- Barry Smart, Michel Foucault
- Dorothy Smith, The Conceptual Practices of Power: A Feminist Sociology of Knowledge
- Gayatri Spivak, Outside in the Teaching Machine
- Liz Stanley and Sue Wise, Breaking Out Again: Feminist Ontology and Epistemology
- Liz Stanley, Feminist Praxis
- Frederick Steier, Research and Reflexivity
- George Steiner, Martin Heidegger
- John Suler, Contemporary Psychoanalysis and Eastern Thought
- Tzvetan Todorov, Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle
- Stephen Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity
- Roger Trigg, Rationality & Science: Can Science Explain Everything?
- Nancy Tuana, Woman and the History of Philosophy
- Charles Hampden-Turner, Charts and Concepts of the Mind and its Labyrinths
- Stephen Tyler, The Unspeakable
- Francisco Varela and Eleanor Rosch, The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience
- Kamala Visweswaran, Fictions of Feminist Ethnography

Cornell West, "The Politics of American Neo-Pragmatism"
Timothy Williamson, "Is Knowing a State of Mind?"
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations